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Abstract
This survey establishes a chronological trace of the entrepreneur as
treated in economic literature in order to give a more wholesome per-
spective to contemporary writings and teachings on entrepreneurship.
The authors review the historical nature and role of the entrepreneur as
revealed in economic literature from the 18th century to the present.
This survey shows the ambiguous nature of a concept that, due to
Schumpeter’s dominant influence, has come to occupy a primary role
in the theory of economic development. In addition, there are other
conceptions of entrepreneurship presented besides Schumpeter’s. This
historical survey also illustrates the tension that often exists between
“theory” and “practice.” We shall learn that it has been difficult for
economic theory to assimilate a core concept that plays a vital role in
social and economic change. Finally, the authors expose the many dif-
ferent facets of entrepreneurship as they have been perceived by some
of the great economists throughout the ages.
1
Introduction
Throughout intellectual history the prominence of the entrepreneur and
his/her role in economic theory has been intertwined with dynamic
versus static representations of economic activity. The science of eco-
nomics – which began as “political economy” in the 18th century –
was initially concerned with a dynamic problem, namely the explana-
tion of how economic progress occurs. Hence, we have Adam Smith’s
telling title of his masterwork, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations, written in 1776. During the infancy of eco-
nomic science the entrepreneur emerged as an economic agent central
to the operation of product and resource markets. Progress in defin-
ing and explaining the entrepreneur and his/her role was halting at
first; indeed the best work in this regard was done before Smith, who
obscured the issue somewhat by confounding the roles of entrepreneur
and capitalist. Karl Marx continued the classical tradition of inquiry
into the dynamics of capitalism, but because he treated capitalist and
entrepreneur alike with disdain, the concept of entrepreneurship lan-
guished thereafter.
After roughly a century of development, conventional economics
rejected Marx’s radicalism and re-invented itself as the science of how
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scarce resources are allocated in an efficient manner, a problem largely
static in nature. For several succeeding generations the role of the
entrepreneur was neglected, as economists labored to refine and extend
economic theory within an equilibrium framework. During this time,
entrepreneurship became the province of sociology, which, among other
things, concerned itself with the nature and character of leadership.
The entrepreneur remained prominent in economics but only to the
extent that the area of investigation was economic development. In
the 20th century, the name more closely associated with entrepreneur-
ship above all others was Joseph Schumpeter (1912), who constructed
The Theory of Economic Development around the dynamic, innova-
tive actions of the equilibrium-disturbing entrepreneur. This gave rise
to the phrase, “Schumpeterian entrepreneur,” which tacitly suggests
that there are other kinds of entrepreneurs, who conceivably do dif-
ferent things. Yet there have been few inquiries to determine what
those other things are and which economic agent is responsible for
them. Eventually the entrepreneur attracted the attention of manage-
ment science, which was forced to ferret out the distinctions between
entrepreneurs and managers. As a result, entrepreneurship is a focal
point today for at least three disciplines, economics, sociology, and
management, and it could become prominent in even more (e.g., psy-
chology). It might be expected that this multi-pronged approach to the
study of entrepreneurship would resolve key issues, such as “Who is the
entrepreneur?” and “What is the key function of the entrepreneur in a
market economy?” No such consensus has emerged, however.
The fractured nature of entrepreneurship is a striking anomaly that
accompanies dramatic growth of interest in the subject, both academic
and practical. Joseph Schumpeter began teaching at Harvard Univer-
sity in 1932. In conjunction with Arthur Cole, he started the Research
Center for Entrepreneurial History in 1946. The following year Myles
Mace offered what may be the first U.S. course on entrepreneurship to
188 students at the Harvard Business School (Katz, 2003). Since then,
the growth of entrepreneurship in higher education has been remark-
able. By the dawn of the 21st century, nearly 200,000 American stu-
dents had been enrolled in entrepreneurship or small business courses.
Currently, there are more than 2200 courses on the subject at more than
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1600 colleges and universities (Katz, 2003). In addition, there are more
than 150 university research centers on entrepreneurship, according to
the National Consortium of Entrepreneurship Centers.1
Informed speculation says that the demand for entrepreneurship
education will outpace the supply of well-trained university faculty.
Enrollments in entrepreneurship courses are increasing not only from
traditional business and economics students, but also from students in
the fields of science and engineering.2 In addition, the breadth of subject
matter that now falls under the rubric of entrepreneurship is expand-
ing.3 It is not uncommon for courses on business entrepreneurship to
include discussions of social entrepreneurship, political entrepreneur-
ship, and academic entrepreneurship.
On the supply side, a shortage of qualified faculty is exacerbated
by a dearth of doctoral programs in entrepreneurship (Katz, 2003).
In order to meet the excess demand for entrepreneurship education
many institutions are recruiting new business and management faculty
and/or adjunct professors to teach the subject, usually with a special-
ized small-business focus. The instructors who fill the ranks often come
from business rather than academe. The ensuing instruction tends to
emphasize “hands-on” business practices and concrete problems, not
conceptual issues or historical precedents. As a consequence, intellec-
tual history is sacrificed to the pressing demands of the here and now;
or it becomes merely one more victim of a pervasive anti-historical bias.
If this trend continues, it is likely that all historical perspective on the
subject of the entrepreneur will be lost.4
We have written this essay in hopes of preserving a vital histori-
cal perspective. Our exposition derives from an economic point of view
1 See http://www.nationalconsortium.org/. Of course, the topic of entrepreneurship has
diffused through a number of disciplines besides business and economics.
2 Part of the increase in demand from students in the sciences and engineering fields is
coming from the growth of students in professional science master’s degree programs. See
http://www.sciencemasters.com/.
3 Course topics range from history of economic thought to fostering an inventive business
culture, and from buy–sell strategies to the functioning of venture capital markets.
4 Of the many essays and books about entrepreneurship that are now used as course mate-
rial, the historical origin of the entrepreneur is generally noted to be Cantillon, but then
the authors jump to Schumpeter, forgetting those scholars in between and forgetting that
Schumpeter did not advance the notion of entrepreneurship as much as others had done.
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(not from sociology or management), and therefore makes no claims
to being holistic in its approach. This essay establishes a chronologi-
cal trace of the entrepreneur as treated in economic literature in order
to give a more wholesome perspective to contemporary writings and
teachings on entrepreneurship. In the following sections we review the
historical nature and role of the entrepreneur as revealed in economic
literature from the 18th century to the present.5 This kind of survey
is instructive in several ways. It shows, for example, the ambiguous
nature of a concept that, due to Schumpeter’s dominant influence, has
come to occupy a primary role in the theory of economic development.
We shall learn that there are other conceptions of entrepreneurship
besides Schumpeter’s. Indeed, throughout history the entrepreneur has
worn many faces and played many roles. Our historical survey also
illustrates the tension that often exists between “theory” and “prac-
tice.” We shall learn that it has been difficult for economic theory to
assimilate a core concept that plays a vital role in social and economic
change. Finally, our historical survey will expose the many different
facets of entrepreneurship as they have been perceived by some of the
great economists throughout the ages.
The historical economics literature gives no fewer than 12 identities
to the entrepreneur. We shall explore at length each of these identities
in the remainder of this essay. But first let us expose the various themes
we shall encounter.
1. The entrepreneur is the person who assumes the risk asso-
ciated with uncertainty.
2. The entrepreneur is the person who supplies financial
capital.
3. The entrepreneur is an innovator.
4. The entrepreneur is a decision maker.
5. The entrepreneur is an industrial leader.
6. The entrepreneur is a manager or superintendent.
5 The remainder of this essay is structured around our earlier survey (Hébert and Link,
1988); however, over these past two decades our interpretation of many of the early writings
has evolved, and we present that herein.
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7. The entrepreneur is an organizer and coordinator of eco-
nomic resources.
8. The entrepreneur is the owner of an enterprise.
9. The entrepreneur is an employer of factors of production.
10. The entrepreneur is a contractor.
11. The entrepreneur is an arbitrageur.
12. The entrepreneur is an allocator of resources among alter-
native uses.
Already it will be obvious that considerable overlap exists. Some
writers stressed more than one characteristic. Some views are compet-
ing; some are complementary. The entrepreneur, in sum, is a difficult
person to pin down. Nevertheless, when we contemplate this list we
are struck by the preponderance of emphasis on the entrepreneur as a
dynamic, not a passive, economic agent. The dynamism of economic
agents is not a trivial matter. In a Wall Street Journal article entitled
Dynamic Capitalism (October 10, 2006), Edmund S. Phelps, winner of
the 2006 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, compared the two prevail-
ing economic systems of the West, free enterprise versus corporatism,
concluding that only the former provides the openness, encouragement,
and flexibility that permit greatest implementation of new commercial
ideas coming from entrepreneurs. Phelps defines “dynamism” to mean
the fertility of the economy in coming up with innovative ideas believed
to be technologically feasible and profitable – in short, the economy’s
talent at commercially successful innovating. Because competition is so
closely linked to entrepreneurship, he might as easily have drawn the
contrast between the “entrepreneurial economy” and the “corporate
economy.”
In looking outside the United States today (and even to some quar-
ters within the United States), one encounters mostly hostility directed
toward the kind of dynamic capitalism that Phelps extols. Why is cap-
italism so reviled in Western Europe, for example? The reasons are
undoubtedly as convoluted as they are complicated, but one reason
seems to be the inability of many intellectuals to escape Marxist pat-
terns of thought. As Phelps points out, today’s street protestors appear
to equate business with established wealth, so that they regard giving
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latitude to business as tantamount to increasing the privileges of old
wealth and exacerbating disparity of incomes. By an “entrepreneur”
such critics mean a rich owner of a bank or a factory; whereas for
Schumpeter it meant a newcomer swimming against the tide of estab-
lished wealth, seeking to carve out new profits from opportunities that
did not exist before, and in the process, making consumers better off.
Clearly, in the battle of ideas taking place on the geopolitical stage,
intellectual constructs matter. Is this not sufficient justification for
investigation into the nature and role of the entrepreneur, as revealed
in the historical record?
2
The Prehistory of Entrepreneurship
The function, if not the name, of the entrepreneur is probably as old
as the institutions of barter and exchange. But only after economic
markets became an intrusive element of society did the concept take
on pivotal importance. Many economists have recognized the pivotal
role of the entrepreneur in a market economy. Yet despite its central
importance in economic activity, the entrepreneur has been a shadowy
and elusive figure in the history of economic theory.
Before research in entrepreneurship can be brought to a mature
stage, we must be able to answer two simple yet critical questions:
(1) Who is the entrepreneur? (2) What does he do that makes him
unique? Regrettably, the answers to these questions are far from clear-
cut. In modern economies, the distinction between entrepreneurial and
non-entrepreneurial behavior is often blurred. And the history of the
concept is not well understood or appreciated. As a result, there may
be almost as many definitions of entrepreneurship as there are students
of the subject. Schumpeter (1954), in his compendious History of Eco-
nomic Analysis, traced the history of the subject at some length, but
there is much of the story that he does not tell. Essays and journal
articles attack the issue piecemeal. The tendency of entrepreneurship
267
268 The Prehistory of Entrepreneurship
to be dissected by different disciplines (e.g., economics, sociology, and
management) adds further to its fractional nature.
As previously mentioned, this essay is delimited by its economic
perspective. As an independent discipline, economics is hardly more
than two centuries old. This makes it an elder statesman among the
social sciences and business and management fields, but a mere babe
in the history of human activity. The font of information on the nature
of entrepreneurship flowed well before Adam Smith gave form and
structure to economics in 1776, but the most striking thing about
this early period is the blankness of its record regarding the nature
of entrepreneurship.
2.1 Merchants and Adventurers
Early economic thought was sensitive to the fact that economic activity
is human activity and that acting agents can roughly be divided into
two classes: those who lead and those who follow. However ill-defined at
present, entrepreneurial talent has always been closely aligned with the
quality of leadership. Aside from royalty, the entrepreneur was typically
found among the ranks of merchants or the military. Military leaders
especially qualified, because wars were often fought for economic rea-
sons. The general who designed and executed a successful strategy in
battle took considerable risks and stood to gain substantial economic
benefits.
Ancient merchants also subjected themselves and their possessions
to risk in a way not unlike the military leader. Indeed, in early times
the functions of the trader and the adventurer were often merged in the
same individual. Marco Polo, for example, was an adventurer seeking
to establish vital trade routes to the Orient, a land of many new and
fascinating products. Even less peripatetic merchants were customar-
ily exposed to many risks. Courage in business was not equated with
courage in battle, however, and the merchant was held in low esteem by
the ancient philosophers. Aristotle, for one, recognized the place of the
merchant in society but did not regard him as having a high calling. On
the contrary, he must be watched constantly, lest society suffer from his
overzealousness and rapaciousness. According to Aristotle (1924, p. 20)
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the act of money-making divides itself into household management and
retail trade. Whereas he regarded the former as necessary and honor-
able, he considered the latter unnatural because it provided a way for
people to gain at the expense of another.
Of course the ancient Greek concern over maintenance of the status
quo was partly a result of interpreting economic activity as a zero-sum
game in which one person’s gain was another person’s loss – an idea
whose dominance persisted into the 18th century. By this view trade
does nothing to enhance the aggregate well-being of society. Centuries
of experience with markets should have taught us otherwise, but it is
remarkable how stubbornly this idea persists in contemporary society.
Profit, the return to successful entrepreneurship, remains suspect in
the minds of many well-educated people today, partly because of a
long Western tradition of equating the businessman with bogeyman.
2.2 Early Forms of Business Organization
The tendency to emphasize the importance of human decisions in the
strategic nature of economic activity depends to a large extent on the
kind of business organization that prevails.1 In the ancient and medieval
worlds, trade took place on a relatively small scale, nevertheless capital
requirements were paramount. The link between the capitalist and the
merchant adventurer depended on the contract they signed. Beginning
around 1000, it became custom to lend money at 20 percent interest
in contracts called mutua, in which loans were tightly secured by real
estate. In the late 12th century, the most common form of commercial
investment was the sea loan (societas maris), a cooperative agreement
between a traveling and an investing partner in which the interest paid
was usually higher but the risks of shipwreck and piracy were borne by
the lender rather than the merchant. According to de Roover (1963a),
the traveling partner always embarked on a hazardous sea voyage, han-
dled the actual business, and risked his life and limb, but received only
one-fourth of the profits, while the lion’s share of three-fourths went to
the investing partner. By way of explanation, de Roover (1963a, p. 49)
1 The same can be said in reverse, that is, the type of business organization can be tailored
to the nature of entrepreneurial activity. On this point see Alvarez and Barney (2005).
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remarked that the capitalist received a higher return because “life was
cheap and capital scarce.”
In Venice, Europe’s most active trading society in the 13th century,
the most prevalent contract was known as colleganze (elsewhere called
commende). By these contracts a capitalist could employ an agent by
promising him one-fourth of the profits, or an enterprising merchant
could mobilize the investments of several other people in his own hands.
In the 14th century, funds could be secured by merchants and adventur-
ers at terms dependent on the market rate of interest under a form of
contract known as the “local colleganza” (Lane, 1963, p. 316). As trade
expanded, capital sometimes became concentrated in a full business
partnership (compagnia).
One expects that the cost of capital in such arrangements would
reflect the amount of risk incurred; and indeed, ancient trade doc-
uments generally bear this out. However, Redlich (1966) found the
explanation for high returns to capital in the medieval prohibition
against usury. The Church’s prohibition enjoined medieval businessmen
from borrowing capital in some loan markets and paying a fair rate of
interest thereon. But certain kinds of business contracts were exempt
from the prohibition, including the colleganza and the societas maris.
Thus, entrepreneurs were forced by religious sanction to seek credit in
arrangements approved (or at least not forbidden) by the Church. The
consequent restriction on the supply of business capital could account
for higher interest rates.
Economic writers during the Middle Ages were primarily theolo-
gians writing under the auspices of the Church. De Roover (1963b,
pp. 82–83) claims that their consequent preoccupation with ethics seri-
ously limited these writers’ interest in certain questions, among them
entrepreneurship. Duns Scotus and San Bernardino were exceptions.
They agreed that merchants were entitled to compensation for risk
and recompense for their labor, albeit in amounts limited by “jus-
tice.” San Bernardino also stressed the qualities good merchants should
possess; they must have good judgment with respect to risks, be well
informed with respect to product qualities, prices, and costs, be atten-
tive to detail, and prepared to suffer hardships and all manner of
risks.
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2.3 Property Rights and the Entrepreneurial Function
Two main points may be gleaned from a review of ancient and medieval
literature on entrepreneurship, sparse though it may be. First, the
merchant–adventurer was a commonplace of ancient and medieval soci-
eties. Second, his success or lack of it depended on how well he fared
in overcoming risk and/or legal and institutional constraints. Much
of the remainder of this essay deals with the relationship of risk to
entrepreneurship. It is therefore incumbent upon us to say something
about legal and institutional factors.
Entrepreneurs (whether ancient or modern) work within an institu-
tional environment which itself often yields to entrepreneurial efforts.
That is to say, there are “political entrepreneurs” who expend efforts to
change institutional structures and practices in order to benefit them-
selves. Political entrepreneurship is not a major focus of this essay;
nevertheless, it is important to recognize at an early stage of inquiry
the vital role of institutions in shaping entrepreneurial activities and
rewards. This point is underscored by the following historical example.
An early manifestation of entrepreneurship involving risk bearing
and individual initiative existed in the medieval practice of tax farming.
In medieval society, a tax farmer was one who successfully bid for the
exclusive right to collect taxes in the name of the Crown. The amount
of each bid is related in a predictable way to the bidder’s evaluation
of the amount of taxes he can collect. The advantage to the monarch
who farms out the collection of taxes is that he knows his revenues and
receives them in advance. The risk to the tax farmer is that he may
collect less tax revenue than what he paid for the franchise to collect
taxes. Of course, if he collects more than the amount of his bid, he
profits by the difference. The practice of tax farming can be traced
back as far as ancient Greece and may, upon closer investigation, be
found to be even older.
The practice of tax farming helps to explain how property rights
ownership and the security of these rights impinge on the behavior of
entrepreneurs. The incentive that spurs each entrepreneur to action
is the opportunity to obtain profit. But making profit, while a neces-
sary condition, is not a sufficient condition for entrepreneurial activity.
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The entrepreneur must also be reasonably assured that he may keep
entrepreneurial profits that he acquires legitimately. Thus, certain insti-
tutional practices in a market economy will tend to encourage a high
level of entrepreneurial activity, especially (1) a free and open economy
that permits equal access to entrepreneurial opportunities, (2) guar-
antees of ownership in property legally acquired, and (3) stability of
institutional practices that establish both (1) and (2).
Perhaps the prevalence and longevity of tax farming as an
entrepreneurial activity were due to the relatively greater security
enjoyed by the fiscal entrepreneur as against the merchant–adventurer
whose goods were subject to fire, theft, storm, and other destruction,
and whose profit did not always reflect his diligence in supervision or
management.
2.4 The Evolution of a Concept
Redlich (1966, p. 715) maintains, on the one hand, that in a business
enterprise the provision of capital is on a par with management and
strategic decision making, for all three are necessary to business success.
On the other hand, he says, “when we look at individual enterprises
in specific situations any one of these three functions may temporarily
become ‘primary’.” Something analogous can be said about the his-
tory of entrepreneurship. Over time, one aspect or another comprising
“entrepreneurship” has vied for attention. Risk-bearing was among the
earliest themes associated with entrepreneurship. But the risk-bearing
function of entrepreneurship became less important after the establish-
ment of new forms of business organization generated by the legal con-
cept of limited liability. Subsequently, innovation came to be stressed
over other aspects of entrepreneurship in theories of economic devel-
opment. The third wave of entrepreneurial theories – one which still
ripples through modern economic literature – stresses the importance
of perception and adjustment in an equilibrating framework.
The term entrepreneur does not appear often in the prehistory of
economics. It is a word of French origin that enjoyed common, though
imprecise, usage in the 18th century, as corroborated by Savary’s Dic-
tionnaire Universel de Commerce (1723), which defines entrepreneur
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as one who undertakes a project; and a manufacturer; and a master
builder. An earlier form of the word, entreprendeur, appears as early
as the 14th century (Hoselitz, 1960). Throughout the 16th and 17th
centuries the most frequent usage of the term connoted a government
contractor, usually of military fortifications or public works.
The typical entrepreneur of the Middle Ages, usually a cleric, was
“the man in charge of the great architectural works: castles and for-
tifications, public buildings, abbeys and cathedrals” (Hoselitz, 1960,
p. 237). Until the end of the 12th century, the functions of inventor,
planner, architect, builder, manager, employer, and supervisor were all
combined in the notion of an entrepreneur, but risk-bearing and cap-
ital provision were not part of the concept. As capitalism began to
supplant feudalism, a clearer distinction emerged between the one who
performed artistic and technical functions and the one who undertook
the commercial aspects of a great task. The first writer to narrow the
meaning of the term, infuse it with precise economic content, and give
it analytic prominence was Richard Cantillon, an 18th-century busi-
nessman and financier whose ideas on the subject are treated in the
next chapter. Cantillon’s work is a watershed in the development of
entrepreneurial theory precisely because by the time we get to his treat-
ment of the subject, emphasis is being placed squarely on the purely
commercial aspects of getting things done in a market economy.
2.5 Postscript
From its inception the function of entrepreneurship has been inter-
twined with the availability of capital and the risk associated with com-
mercial ventures. This nexus eventually led to confounding the roles of
capitalist and entrepreneur, which in turn has led to retardation of full
and unambiguous understanding of the nature of entrepreneurship. As
a consequence, the concept of entrepreneur, as we shall see in ensuing
sections of this essay, was continuously re-invented to suit the purposes
of individual economic writers. Moreover, it is difficult to have a proper
appreciation of entrepreneurship without a thorough understanding of
how markets function within a given set of property rights.
3
Early French Contributions
The crucial role of the entrepreneur in economic theory was first and
foremost recognized by Richard Cantillon (1680?–1734), whose Essai
sur la nature du commerce en general was published posthumously in
1755, after circulating privately for two decades among a small group
of French economists. Although several French writers borrowed freely
from Cantillon’s manuscript during its private circulation, it was rela-
tively neglected after its publication until rediscovered in the 19th cen-
tury by William Stanley Jevons, a pioneer in neoclassical economics.
Today, Cantillon’s Essai is rightfully considered a classic of early eco-
nomic literature. Jevons enthusiastically called it “the cradle of political
economy.”
The details of Cantillon’s life and activities are rather sparse. He
was of Irish extraction, and is often confused with a relative of the
same name. The exact year of his birth has so far defied identifica-
tion. He was a successful banker and financier, but controversy dogged
him in everything. In Paris, he made a fortune at the expense of
John Law’s infamous inflationary scheme known as the “Mississippi
Bubble.” Demonstrating considerable entrepreneurial skill in his own
right, Cantillon anticipated the course of events set in motion by Law’s
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“system,” and profited handsomely from the financial opportunities
which it presented.
In 1716, Law obtained permission from France’s prince regent to
establish a royal bank. Shortly thereafter he secured an exclusive fran-
chise to form a trading company in the New World that was popularly
known as the Mississippi Company. The company monopolized French
foreign trade and eventually began to assume the French government’s
debt by trading shares of the company’s stock for certificates of indebt-
edness. With the certificates came the exclusive right to collect certain
taxes. Promises of large dividends to investors pushed share prices up
sharply, and a frenzy of stock speculation ensued. The system came
crashing down in 1720 when stock values rose out of proportion to the
real value of the company’s assets.
Cantillon made a great deal of money by liquidating his Mississippi
Company holdings before the speculative boom peaked. With the pro-
ceeds of his own shares reinvested in Britain and Holland, he fed the
British mania for speculation by advancing funds to English speculators
who bought shares in the Mississippi Company that they subsequently
pledged as collateral for their loans. Confident of the ultimate failure
of Law’s scheme, Cantillon sold the collateralized shares before the
price of the stock broke, thus pocketing speculative profits in addition
to the interest he collected on the loans he made. This practice pro-
voked numerous lawsuits by his borrowers, but Cantillon successfully
defended himself against their claims. This display of financial acumen
stamped Cantillon as a successful entrepreneur in his own right, but
his intellectual legacy was a greater testimony to his talents.
3.1 Entrepreneurs and Markets
Cantillon’s historic Essai sketched the outlines of a nascent market
economy founded on individual property rights and based on eco-
nomic interdependency, or what he called mutual “need and neces-
sity.” In this early market economy, Cantillon recognized three classes
of economic agents: (1) landowners, who are financially independent;
(2) entrepreneurs, who engage in market exchanges at their own risk
in order to make a profit; and (3) hirelings, who forego active decision
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making in order to secure contractual guaranties of stable income (i.e.,
fixed wage contracts).
Cantillon depicts the landowners as the “fashion leaders” of the
economy. By virtue of their wealth and social status they establish
patterns of consumption that conform to their individual tastes and
preferences. It has been said that Cantillon placed the landowner at
the top of his economic hierarchy, but a closer examination of his work
reveals the entrepreneur as the central economic actor. Cantillon’s Essai
contains over a 100 references to the entrepreneur as a pivotal figure
in the economic process. He laid it down as a general principle that
entrepreneurs conduct all the production, circulation, and exchange in
a market economy. As a motive force, entrepreneurs are much more
important than the landowners, who collectively determine aggregate
demand, but otherwise retire to the sidelines of economic activity.
Cantillon’s entrepreneur is someone who engages in exchanges for
profit; specifically, he is someone who exercises business judgment in
the face of uncertainty. This uncertainty (of future sales prices for goods
on their way to final consumption) is rather carefully circumscribed. As
Cantillon describes it, entrepreneurs buy at a certain price to sell again
at an uncertain price, with the difference being their profit or loss.
The chief producers in Cantillon’s day were farmers. “The farmer,”
Cantillon (1931, pp. 47–49) wrote, “is an entrepreneur who promises
to pay to the landowner, for his farm or land, a fixed sum of money
without assurance of the profit he will derive from this enterprise.” As
an entrepreneur–producer, the farmer decides how to allocate his land
among various uses “without being able to foresee which of these will
pay best.” He must contend with the vagaries of weather and demand,
placing himself at risk. Cantillon wrote that no one “can foresee the
number of births and deaths of the people in a state in the course of the
year,” or the rise and decline of family spending, “and yet the price of
the farmer’s produce depends naturally upon these unforeseen circum-
stances, and consequently he conducts the enterprise of his farm at an
uncertainty.” Thus, we have an explicit link between entrepreneurship
and uncertainty.
In a market economy, the farmer is linked to consumers by other
economic agents, who also face uncertain incomes. Goods are usually
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distributed by middlemen, who are intermediaries between producers
and consumers. To the extent that these intermediaries face uncertainty
in the marketplace, they too are entrepreneurs. These middlemen find
markets for their services mainly in the cities. Cantillon (1931, p. 49)
observed that more than half of farm output is consumed in the cities,
where entrepreneurs set up shop to receive goods from the farms and to
resell to ultimate consumers. The carriers and the wholesalers, through
whose hands goods pass as they move from the farm to the customer,
are also put at risk because of daily price fluctuations in the city. Time
is the handmaiden of uncertainty.
The city creates opportunities for other entrepreneurs who are res-
idents and who are willing to take risks in order to make goods avail-
able at the appropriate time and place. Each represents a link in the
chain of distribution. Thus entrepreneurs who carry goods to the city
usually sell to wholesalers, who subsequently sell at retail to ultimate
consumers. In this manner, part of the risk is shifted from carriers to
wholesalers and from wholesalers to retailers, each of whom provides
time and place utility to consumers.
As markets develop, self-interested entrepreneurs spring up every-
where, goaded on by the lure of profit, and joined together by mutual
need, or reciprocity. These entrepreneurs are encouraged because they
know that consumers are willing to pay a little extra in order to buy
in small quantities when it is convenient, rather than bear the incon-
venience and expense of stockpiling large quantities for their ultimate
use (Cantillon, 1931, pp. 51–53).
Cantillon broke with convention in emphasizing the economic func-
tion of the entrepreneur over his social status. Social standing is
practically irrelevant to Cantillon’s notion of entrepreneurship. The
ranks of entrepreneurs are filled with people from all social strata. He
went so far as to identify even beggars and robbers as entrepreneurs,
provided they take chances (i.e., face economic uncertainty). Yet
being an entrepreneur does not exclude one from being something
else. Entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs alike are joined in recip-
rocal trade agreements with other market participants, such that
they “become consumers and customers one in regard to the other,”
and proportion themselves to their customers in accordance with the
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laws of supply and demand. Like every other market, the market for
entrepreneurs will adjust to market circumstances. “If there are too
many hatters” Cantillon (1931, p. 53) wrote, “for the number of peo-
ple who buy hats . . . , some who are least patronized must become
bankrupt,” whereas “if they be too few it will be a profitable under-
taking which will encourage new hatters to open shops . . . so it is that
the entrepreneurs of all kinds adjust themselves to risks in a state.”
3.2 Uncertainty and Risk
Cantillon took uncertainty for granted as something inherent in the
economic activity of the marketplace. He did not provide a detailed
analysis of the nature of risk and uncertainty; he merely related the
function of the entrepreneur to uncertainty – and by implication, to
risk – in this way giving economic content to the concept. Since the
writings of Frank Knight (1885–1962), it has been customary in eco-
nomics to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Knight pointed out
that some forms of risk can be mitigated by insurance. To be insur-
able, there must be a known probability distribution associated with
risk, either because of large numbers of individuals exposed to risk or
repeated exposures to the same risk by the same individual.1
Although we cannot credit Cantillon with this distinction, it is rea-
sonably clear that the concept of uncertainty central to his analysis is
not of the insurable kind. In Cantillon’s world, not only is the informa-
tion about the future unknown, it is also for the most part, unknowable.
While insurance companies tend to underwrite losses from named perils
that are calculated to occur with predictable frequency, they do not typ-
ically insure against errors in judgment. Yet Cantillon’s entrepreneurs
are constantly called upon to exercise their business judgment, and if
they guess wrong, they must pay the price.
An astute businessman, Cantillon was obviously aware of institu-
tional arrangements that could be invoked to limit risk. But these things
were of little consequence to his theory of entrepreneurship. His discus-
sion of uncertainty is cast in the sense of things unknowable. This kind
1 Knight’s ideas on entrepreneurship are discussed in more detail in Section 7.
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of uncertainty, which we now call “Knightian uncertainty,” is inherent
in the nature of competitive (rivalrous) market activity, so there is liter-
ally no way to separate the concepts of competition and entrepreneur-
ship in Cantillon’s vision of the economy. One is a consequence of the
other.
3.3 Capital and Entrepreneurship
One of the perpetual points of contention in competing theories of
entrepreneurship is to what extent the roles of entrepreneur and capi-
talist can be separated. In any business enterprise, capital is usually
placed at risk. If the entrepreneur does not also supply capital, in
what sense can he be said to bear risk? Does a risk-bearing theory
of entrepreneurship require that an entrepreneur own certain capital
assets that are staked in the game of profit and loss? If the capitalist
and the entrepreneur are one and the same, then it becomes difficult,
if not impossible, to identify the return to each function. But if they
are not the same, in what sense does the entrepreneur bear risk? Can
there be any such thing as a loss if one has nothing to lose?
Cantillon was more expansive on this issue than many of his suc-
cessors. It is clear that his entrepreneur must risk something, but it
need not be capital in the pecuniary sense. He seemed to appreciate
the modern concept of human capital, even though he did not actually
formulate the notion. Cantillon referred to “entrepreneurs of their own
labor who need no capital to establish themselves,” using examples
from commerce (chimney sweeps, water carriers), art (painters), and
science (physicians, lawyers). He even included beggars and robbers as
entrepreneurs (Cantillon, 1931, p. 53).
Contemporary economics recognizes that even the penniless
entrepreneur incurs potential losses to the extent that he faces oppor-
tunity costs for his time and talents. Consider an individual with no
means of his own. Suppose he foresees an opportunity that promises an
uncertain rate of return, and he borrows capital at a fixed, contractual
rate of interest. If the enterprise does so badly that the borrower can-
not repay the contracted amount of principle and interest, the financial
loss falls solely on the lender. But as Kanbur (1979, p. 493) argues,
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the gains and losses of any enterprise must be evaluated relative to the
opportunity cost of the enterprise. If a prospective entrepreneur has
open to him a safe return in an alternative occupation, his decision
to be entrepreneurial involves the possibility of loss – he could end up
worse than if he had taken up a safe occupation. This is the sense in
which the prospective entrepreneur faces risks.
For the man of means who foresees and acts on an uncertain oppor-
tunity, the problem remains how to separate his risk-bearing role as
capitalist from his risk-bearing role as entrepreneur. Conceptually, it is
possible to do this, but we must look to the colleganza of 13th-century
Venice or the societas maris of ancient Greece for a working model. In
these arrangements the functions of capitalist and entrepreneur were
separate; the former was an investing partner and the latter a trav-
eling/managing partner. It should be expected that the opportunity
cost of the capital in such an arrangement will be different from the
opportunity cost of the entrepreneurial effort, and it is in proportion to
these different costs that the respective risks have to be conceptualized
and, ultimately, measured.
3.4 A Harbinger of the Future
Cantillon argued that the origin of entrepreneurship lies in the lack of
perfect foresight individuals have about the future. Rather than con-
sidering this lack of foresight a defect of the market system Cantillon
accepted it as part of the human condition. Uncertainty is a perva-
sive fact of everyday life, and those who must deal with it continually
in their economic decisions are entrepreneurs. Consequently, it is the
function of the entrepreneur, not his personality, that counts for eco-
nomic analysis. Cantillon was quite emphatic that this function lies at
the very heart of a market system, and that without it, the market as
we know it, does not operate.
Some other aspects of Cantillon’s conception are noteworthy. His
portrayal of the entrepreneur’s role in a market economy has a dis-
tinct supply-side emphasis. His entrepreneur does not create demand
through new production or merchandising techniques; he merely fol-
lows the dictates of a class of fashion leaders (the landlords). The
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entrepreneur thus provides appropriate goods or services at the right
time and place in order to satisfy preordained consumer wants. To be
effective, he must be forward-looking. He must be alert, for when par-
ticular supplies and demands do not match, the theory calls for the
entrepreneur to spring into action. But Cantillon’s entrepreneur is not
required to be innovative in the strict sense of the term.
The kind of action that engages the entrepreneur’s effort is not lim-
ited to production, moreover. This is clear from the above passages
about middlemen and retailers, as well as from Cantillon’s recognition
of the arbitrageur as an entrepreneur. Noting the opportunities for
profit created by price differences between the countryside and Paris,
Cantillon (1931, pp. 150–152) asserted that as long as they can cover
transportation costs, entrepreneurs “will buy at a low price the prod-
ucts of the villages and will transport them to the Capital [city] to be
sold there at a higher price.”
Even a pure arbitrage action such as this involves some uncertainty
on the entrepreneur’s part. The arbitrageur can perceive that a product
sells for one price at one place and at a higher price somewhere else;
but if he buys in the first to sell in the second, he must be careful. The
transactions are not instantaneous, and something might occur in the
interim to change seemingly certain profits into losses.
Although we cannot attribute to Cantillon – nor to any early
economist – a complete theory of profit, it is noteworthy that he recog-
nized the legitimacy (and necessity) of entrepreneurial profits in order
that the function of the entrepreneur be carried out. Thus he estab-
lished the economic and social necessity of profit early in the history
of economic theory.
We believe that Cantillon’s conception of the entrepreneur is
extremely important to a proper understanding of the concept in eco-
nomic analysis. But his view did not predominate, nor was it complete
in itself. It was myopic in at least one important respect. Cantillon
excluded the “Prince,” the landlords, and certain laborers from uncer-
tainty. Today we recognize that economic uncertainty is more perva-
sive than he allowed. von Mises (1949, p. 253) was correct when he
asserted that “no proprietor of any means of production, whether they
are represented in tangible goods or in money, remains untouched by
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the uncertainty of the future.” Cantillon’s notion of entrepreneurship
needed to be widened, and at a much later date it was, by Knight and
by Mises. But that is another story.
Cantillon began an important analytical tradition in 18th-century
France. Based on the idea of a circular flow of aggregate income,
he propounded a vision of how a capitalist economy works, giving
the entrepreneur a pivotal role. As a result, continental economists
remained much more alert to the significance of the entrepreneur than
their British counterparts (at least from Adam Smith to John Stuart
Mill). The full flowering of the concept, however, was neither rapid nor
direct.
After Cantillon’s death, economic analysis in France was dominated
by a group of writers who called themselves, simply, “The Economists.”
As the term economist became more generic, however, historians began
to refer to this particular group of French writers as “The Physiocrats”
(the term physiocracy means rule of nature). It was a singular group
with a singular leader, François Quesnay (1694–1774). Quesnay shared
Cantillon’s basic economic vision, and he elaborated Cantillon’s notion
of the circular flow of wealth by developing an explicit analytical model,
which he called the Tableau Économique. It was the first mathematical
formulation of a general-equilibrium system.
3.5 François Quesnay
Quesnay entered economics in his 60s, after enjoying considerable
success as a physician and author of books on medicine, biology, and
philosophy. His renown as a physician brought him into the court
of Louis XV, where he personally attended Madame du Pompadour.
In economics, his fame rests on his pioneer contributions to national
income analysis and his acknowledged leadership of the first cohesive
school of economic thought. Quesnay’s ability to attract adherents to
his views stemmed in part from his magnetic personality and in part
from the substance of his analysis. That analysis was rich in theoretic
and policy implications, but its full import is not at issue here. We
are more interested in the contributions of physiocracy to the theory
of entrepreneurship.
3.6. Nicholas Baudeau 283
Quesnay and his band of disciples analyzed the nature and operation
of agrarian capitalism. Their analytic system features three economic
classes, which can be distinguished from each other by their respective
economic functions. A proprietary class owns property rights in the
land that it leases to the productive class (i.e., farmers), who in turn
produce the raw materials demanded by a third class, the artisans. The
unique feature of physiocracy is that it attributes the production of an
economic surplus to agriculture and agriculture alone. This surplus
is measured by the value of agricultural output over its costs, and is
claimed by the proprietors in the form of rent that is annually paid to
the owners of land.
A chief merit of Quesnay’s analysis is that it underscores the vital
importance of capital to economic growth. In the physiocratic system,
capital comes from the landlords, who are best positioned to accu-
mulate wealth. Entrepreneurs are present in the economy as farmers.
Quesnay (1888, pp. 218–219) distinguished between small-scale farm-
ing (petite culture) and large-scale farming (grande culture), depicting
the entrepreneur as the operator of a large farm. He described the
rich farmer as an entrepreneur who “manages and makes his busi-
ness profitable by his intelligence and his wealth.” He had in mind
a capitalist farmer who owns and manages his business on land owned
by another. Thus, his entrepreneur is the independent owner of a
business.
Quesnay’s emphasis on individual energy, intelligence, and wealth is
suggestive, but he did not develop the idea of the entrepreneur further,
nor did he extend its application beyond agriculture. In general, phys-
iocracy ignored the notion of the entrepreneur as a leader of industry. In
fact, its adherents maintained that manufacturing is “sterile” because
it is incapable of yielding a surplus.
3.6 Nicholas Baudeau
One writer in particular among Quesnay’s disciples developed a theory
of entrepreneurship that foreshadowed future developments. He was a
clergyman, the Abbé Nicolas Baudeau (1730–1792), who began as a foe
of physiocracy but later converted to its system. Baudeau treated the
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agricultural entrepreneur as a risk bearer, in the manner of Cantillon,
but he added a distinctly modern twist. He made the entrepreneur
an innovator as well, one who invents and applies new techniques or
ideas in order to reduce his costs and thereby raise his profit. These
new aspects of entrepreneurship, invention and innovation, represent an
important advance over Cantillon’s theory because they anticipate the
20th-century reformulation of entrepreneurship by Schumpeter, whose
theory of “creative destruction” dominates contemporary discussions
of the subject.
Baudeau’s notion of entrepreneurship paralleled Cantillon’s, but
only to a point. Consider the nature of risk faced by the agricultural
entrepreneur. The rent he pays to the landlord is the surplus of farm
revenue over necessary costs of production, including some payment for
his own services. For the tenant farmer, rent is a cost determined in
advance of production. The Physiocrats favored stabilizing these costs
as much as possible through long-term leases, while wage rates were
usually fixed at or near subsistence levels. Thus, the farmer operating
with a long-term lease faced certain fixed costs, but uncertain har-
vests and hence uncertain sales prices. This is precisely the situation of
Cantillon’s entrepreneur, as we have seen.
Where Baudeau went beyond Cantillon was in emphasizing and
analyzing the significance of ability. Baudeau underscored the impor-
tance of “intelligence,” the entrepreneur’s ability to collect and process
knowledge and information. Intelligence – knowledge and the ability
to act – also gives the entrepreneur a measure of control so that he is
not a mere pawn to the capitalist. Baudeau’s entrepreneur is an active
agent who seeks to increase production and reduce costs (Baudeau,
1910, p. 46).
Physiocratic writings are replete with proposals to improve agricul-
tural techniques, many of which were oriented toward the upgrading
of human capital or the dissemination of better information. Hoselitz
(1960, pp. 246–247) listed several of their proposals: translation of
English texts on agriculture; nationwide distribution of handbooks and
guides describing new tools, crops, or procedures; prizes; honors; agri-
cultural research; model farms; and pilot programs. The Physiocrats
were convinced that when the right knowledge became available, profit
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opportunities would induce desirable innovations. The entrepreneur as
innovator thus appeared relatively early in economic literature.
Baudeau’s theory of entrepreneurship presupposes that economic
events fall into two categories, those that are subject to human control
and those that are not. To the extent that the entrepreneur confronts
events under his control, his success depends upon knowledge and abil-
ity. To the extent that he confronts events beyond his control, he places
himself at risk. In this sense, Baudeau’s theory of entrepreneurship is
more general than Cantillon’s, which concentrated on the effects of
uncertainty without reference to administrative control.
3.7 Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot
A. R. J. Turgot’s (1727–1781) place in history is assured by his distin-
guished administrative career in the French government, culminating in
his service as finance minister to Louis XVI from 1774 to 1776. Born to
a Norman family of ancient nobility, Turgot was a gifted and precocious
young man whose interests ranged widely. One of his many gifts was
lucid exposition in the field of economics, and although he resisted the
label of economist (Meek, 1973), his chief accomplishment as a writer
was in mapping out the theory of an entrepreneurial economy.
Turgot’s ideas did not coincide at all points with those of physioc-
racy. He was, however, on good terms with the members of Quesnay’s
inner circle, and he extended the theory of entrepreneurship by estab-
lishing the ownership of capital as a separate economic function in
business. Turgot’s capitalist must decide whether to loan his capital to
someone else or to invest it in a business enterprise of his own. If he
chooses the latter, he must further choose land, manufacturing, or com-
merce as a form of investment. If he purchases land, then he becomes
both landowner and capitalist. If he invests in various kinds of goods
required for his particular business, he becomes an entrepreneur as well
as a capitalist. And if he decides to lend his funds in the form of money,
he remains a capitalist only. Unlike Cantillon, Turgot did not anticipate
the notion of a “pure” entrepreneur.
In Turgot’s scheme of things, the ownership of capital is a qual-
ification for becoming an entrepreneur, but the two functions are
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nevertheless distinct. One can be a capitalist without being an
entrepreneur, but one cannot be an entrepreneur without also being
a capitalist. The distinguishing feature of Turgot’s entrepreneur, there-
fore, is not his capital but his labor. The entrepreneur looks to his own
labor for his distinctive return.
Turgot reasoned that capital can be employed in different channels:
agriculture, manufacturing, or commerce. Employed in either of these
channels, capital should produce more profit than if merely used to
purchase land, because the former requires “much care and labor” by
an entrepreneur. If not more lucrative, it would make better sense to
acquire the same revenue without doing anything, for example, from
an annuity. Thus Turgot (1977, p. 86) declared: “It is necessary then,
that, besides the interest of his capital, the entrepreneur should draw
every year a profit to recompense him for his care, his labor, his talents
and his risks, and to furnish him in addition that which he may replace
the annual wear and tear of his advances, which he is obliged from the
very first to convert into effects which are liable to deterioration and
which are, moreover, exposed to all kinds of accidents.”
Meek (1973) has argued that Cantillon analyzed a society in which
the capitalist-entrepreneur was just beginning to separate himself from
the ranks of independent workmen, whereas Turgot analyzed an econ-
omy in which this process had been completed, and in which the
capitalist system had consolidated itself in all fields of economic activ-
ity. In his Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth
(1766), Turgot painted a clear picture of an economy in which capital-
ism embraces all spheres of production. In his view, the “industrious”
classes are divided into entrepreneurs and hired workers. He insisted on
a sharp, but somewhat artificial, differentiation between the profit of
the former and the wage of the latter. He also maintained that free com-
petition is widespread and monopoly nonexistent; that land-ownership
is merely another kind of investment in capital; and that a general glut
of goods is impossible because savings are transformed immediately into
investment. He did not incorporate into his theory any built-in specifi-
cation about technological progress, nor any hint that the entrepreneur
is an innovator (or anything more than a capitalist–laborer), nor did
he emphasize the dynamic aspects of the economy.
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It is instructive to compare Turgot’s representation of the
entrepreneur with Quesnay’s and Baudeau’s. Although Quesnay did
not elaborate a complete theory of entrepreneurship, his portrayal
of the entrepreneur as a farmer who produces value by “his intelli-
gence and his wealth” contains an abundance of hidden meaning that
subsequently provided a point of departure for both Baudeau and
Turgot. Baudeau added elements of organization, innovation, and risk.
Turgot ignored innovation, but stressed supervision, and generalized
the entrepreneurial function to all sectors of the economy. Hoselitz
(1960) placed Turgot’s theory of entrepreneurship midway between the
early French view, which holds the entrepreneur to be chiefly a risk
bearer (e.g., Cantillon and to some extent Baudeau), or a coordinator
of production (e.g., Say and to some extent Baudeau), and the English
view, which saw the entrepreneur chiefly as a capitalist.
3.8 Jean-Baptiste Say
Continuing a French tradition inaugurated by Cantillon, J. B. Say
(1767–1832) put the entrepreneur at the core of the entire process of
production and distribution. Hoselitz (1960) claims that Say’s inspira-
tion and strong views on the subject came from his practical expe-
rience as an industrial entrepreneur (he managed a textile mill in
Pas-de-Calais), rather than from his acquaintance with other French
economists. Nevertheless, Say embellished a concept of the entrepreneur
that was fundamentally Turgot’s – minus the common link to the
capitalist.
Say developed his treatment of entrepreneurship most fully in the
later editions of his Traité d’économie politique (1st ed., 1803) and in his
Cours complet d’économie politique pratique (1st ed., 1828–1829). His
analysis proceeds on two different levels. On the one hand, he employed
empirical descriptions of what entrepreneurs in his day actually did
under existing institutional constraints. On the other hand, he exposed
and analyzed the central function of the entrepreneur independently of
any particular social framework. In this last effort Say moved toward
a general theory of entrepreneurship.
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As we have asserted, the vigor of entrepreneurial activity depends
upon the composition, distribution, and security of property rights.
Because entrepreneurial activity is profit seeking, it requires incentives
to propel it. These incentives are provided by the structure of property
rights within a representative government. Say (1845, p. 127) was quite
clear on this, avowing that “political economy recognizes the right of
property solely as the most powerful of all encouragements to the mul-
tiplication of wealth.” Furthermore, where private property exists in
reality as well as in right, “then, and then only, can the sources of pro-
duction, namely land, capital, and industry, attain their utmost degree
of fecundity.”
Say’s theory of the entrepreneur is part of a threefold division of
human industry into distinct operations. The first step is the scien-
tific one. Before any product can be made, such as a bicycle, certain
knowledge about the nature and purpose of it must be understood. It
must be known, for example, that a wheel is capable of continuous,
circular motion and that a force exerted on a chain and sprockets can
propel the wheel forward. The second step, the entrepreneurial one, is
the application of this knowledge to a useful purpose (i.e., the develop-
ment of a mechanism – the bicycle) with one or more wheels capable
of transporting someone from one place to another. The final step, the
productive one, is the manufacture of the item by manual labor.
Say’s entrepreneur performs a social function, even though Say does
not make him a member of a distinct social class. He is a principal agent
of production, whose role is vital to the production of utility. His appli-
cations of knowledge must not be mere random events. They must meet
a “market” test, that is, in order to be entrepreneurial, each applica-
tion must lead to the creation of value or utility. This requires sound
judgment, one of the key characteristics of Say’s entrepreneur. Accord-
ing to Say, an entrepreneur must be able to estimate customers’ needs
and the means to satisfy them; he may lack the personal knowledge of
science, and he can avoid dirtying his own hands by employing others,
but he must not lack judgment, for without it he might “produce at
great expense something which has no value” (Say, 1840, vol. 1, p. 100).
Say’s entrepreneur is an economic catalyst, a pivotal figure. But Say
did not follow Cantillon’s lead in making uncertainty the mainstay of
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entrepreneurship. Risk is incidental to Say’s notion of entrepreneurship
because he saw no necessary dependency of entrepreneurial activity
upon capital accumulation. For the first time in economic literature,
entrepreneurial activity became virtually synonymous with manage-
ment, in the contemporary sense of that term. Management may, but
does not necessarily, supply capital to the enterprise. And Say had no
difficulty, theoretically speaking, separating the entrepreneurial func-
tion from the capitalist function, even though both functions could be,
and often were, combined in the same person.
In the final analysis, Say’s entrepreneur is a superintendent and an
administrator. This person “. . . requires a combination of moral quali-
ties that are not often found together. Judgment, perseverance, and a
knowledge of the world, as well as of business. He is called upon to esti-
mate, with tolerable accuracy, the importance of the specific product,
the probable amount of the demand, and the means of its production:
at one time he must employ a great number of hands; at another,
buy or order the raw material, collect laborers, find consumers, and
give at all times a rigid attention to order and economy; in a word,
he must possess the art of superintendence and administration” (Say,
1840, pp. 330–331).
Hoselitz (1960) drew two distinctions between Say and Cantillon,
both of which are questionable. One distinction is that Say’s
entrepreneur is a universal mediator (e.g., between landlord and cap-
italist; between scientist and laborers; between producers and con-
sumers, etc.), whereas Cantillon’s entrepreneur is not. This claim
is dubious because Say makes no allowance for the most active of
mediators, the arbitrageur, whereas Cantillon explicitly recognizes
the arbitrageur as an entrepreneur. Moreover, Cantillon gives the
entrepreneur the sole function of mediating discrepancies between
quantities demanded and quantities supplied in a market economy. By
sheer frequency of reference in the Essai, the entrepreneur is virtually
everywhere in this capacity.
Hoselitz’s second distinction is that unlike Cantillon and the Phys-
iocrats, Say does not restrict his entrepreneur to a capitalist soci-
ety. Technically, this is correct, but Say’s arguments in general were
calculated to reaffirm the desirable social consequences of individual
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self-interest, and he was fully aware (as was Adam Smith) that a market
economy provided the social framework that permitted the full flower-
ing of self interest. On a lesser point, however, Hoselitz is quite correct:
Say’s entrepreneur (mediator) may appear in a primitive society before
capital has been accumulated. In other words, the entrepreneur could
direct and supervise raw materials and manual labor without the appli-
cation of capital. But surely the same holds for Cantillon’s beggar and
robber “entrepreneurs.”
One aspect of Say’s theory is particularly important because it
established the traditional paradigm and also provided a point of depar-
ture for future breaks with tradition. Say’s entrepreneur may be charac-
terized as a “guardian” of equilibrium. The “judgment” extolled by Say
as a requisite of entrepreneurial activity is confined to relations within a
production process and does not extend beyond that process to the dis-
covery of new processes or to changes inspired by a new social structure.
Because he did not see a necessary relationship between capital accu-
mulation (investment) and entrepreneurial activity, Say did not place
the entrepreneur in a dynamic environment. His role was conceived
within a purely stationary equilibrium characterized by the equality of
prices of products with their costs of production. The primary source
of entrepreneurial income in this system is not profit as a risk premium
but rather wages as a payment for a highly skilled type of scarce labor.
In later works, Say (1845) did portray the entrepreneur as a kind of
superior laborer. He extended the analogy to include a kind of “mar-
ket” for entrepreneurs, in which their wages were determined by supply
and demand, and he went to some length in discussing the determi-
nants of entrepreneurial supply. From a narrow theoretic standpoint,
his treatment of the entrepreneur was a step forward because it distin-
guished between the respective contributions in production of human
and nonhuman agents. But it did not move the concept any closer to
a “pure” theory of entrepreneurship.2 By portraying the entrepreneur
chiefly as a superior form of labor, Say consciously or unconsciously
2 One French economist who took exception to Say’s theory of entrepreneurship was
Courcelle-Seneuil (1813–1892), who insisted that profit is not a wage but is due to the
assumption of risk. Knight (1921, p. 25n) attributes to him a glimpse of “the fact that the
assumption of a ‘risk’ of error in one’s judgment, inherent in the making of a responsible
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directed attention away from the uniqueness of the entrepreneur and
thus from his/her role as a force of change in a dynamic economy.
3.9 A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy and Henri Saint-Simon
Say was a dominant influence on the 19th-century French economics.
Like Smith, he was able to capture the spirit of his times, and the orga-
nizational schema of his Treatise proved to be much more amenable to
the pedagogy of economics, which was becoming commonplace among
institutions of higher learning. It therefore became a major “textbook”
at universities on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly in America,
where it was welcomed by Thomas Jefferson, and its adoption was
widespread. New entrants in the competition for ideas soon appeared,
however. Among the many, two are especially prominent – one for its
clarity, the other for its prophecy.
A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) and Henri de Saint-Simon
(1760–1825) shared the advantage of noble birth at a time when the
rank and privileges of nobility in France were threatened on all sides.
Strictly speaking, neither was an economist, although both confronted
social issues that could not be extricated from economic considerations.
Tracy was one of the last philosophes and along with Say, one of
the earliest members of the French liberal school. He coined the term
ideology, by which he meant the science of ideas. Only later did the
term take on a pejorative sense, primarily because Marx treated it with
disdain. There is no subject in economics to which Tracy contributed
greatly, but he nevertheless had the remarkable ability of attracting
great minds. He rejected the physiocratic notion of value, substituting
in its place a labor theory which was subsequently endorsed by Ricardo.
Like the Physiocrats, Tracy extolled the virtues of an agricultural
economy. But he looked beyond the narrow limits of agriculture and
grasped the essence of a nascent capitalism that was far more perva-
sive than mere farming. He was struck first and foremost by the preva-
lence of economic activities. “The whole of society,” he wrote, “is but
a continual succession of exchanges”; consequently, “we are all more or
decision, is a phenomenon of a different character from the assumption of ‘risk’ in the
insurance sense.”
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less commercial. Commerce and society are one and the same thing”
(Tracy 1970, pp. 36, 67). In this formulation of society, Tracy gave
the entrepreneur wide berth. “Capital precedes all enterprise, large or
small,” he asserted, so the enterpriser must have capital to carry out
his function. But are the entrepreneur and the capitalist necessarily the
same?
Revealing the combined influences of Turgot and Say, Tracy
answered in the affirmative. The world is divided into theory, applica-
tion, and execution, he wrote. Science provides theory; the entrepreneur
applies science to commerce; and labor produces the end product that
science and application creates. The man of science and the workman,
“. . . will always be in the pay of the entrepreneur,” Tracy (1970, pp. 36,
39–40) asserted, “for it is not sufficient to know how to aid an enter-
prise with the head or the hands: there must be first an enterprise; and
he who undertakes it, is necessarily the person who chooses, employs,
and pays those who co-operate. Now who is he who can undertake it?
It is the man who already has funds, with which he can meet the first
expenses of establishment and supplies, and pay wages till the moment
of the first returns.”
Like Cantillon, Tracy underscored the incertitude of the
entrepreneur’s reward. He recognized risk and opportunity costs as fac-
tors affecting the supply of entrepreneurship, but he based the success
or failure of the entrepreneur “solely on the quantity of utility he has
been able to produce, on the necessity that others are under of procur-
ing it, and . . . on the means they have of paying him for it.”
Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon, was a pixilated
figure in a period that abounded in colorful characters. He is usually not
taken seriously by economists because his doctrine is believed to con-
tain elements of socialism, and ultimately, mysticism. He was a prolific
writer and visionary, who indiscriminately mixed nonsense with clair-
voyant prophecy. Above all else, he was obsessed with the nature of
social and economic change. His interest in economics sprang from his
zeal to rationalize the social order.
Saint-Simon believed that social policy should be adapted to the
needs of production. He welcomed the disintegration of feudalism and
the advent of its replacement, industrialism. Industrialisme meant the
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triumph of technology over backwardness, of science and reason over
superstition and custom. Saint-Simon’s vision of the industrial soci-
ety is almost a carbon copy of Galbraith’s (1967) technocracy. Mason
(1931) referred to Saint-Simon’s goal as “the rationalisation of indus-
try.” What this means is the ascendancy of the business leader, the
economic “expert” whose skills are tempered in the crucible of com-
petition. Saint-Simon’s society of producers requires the sort of person
who can apply established principles toward the attainment of rec-
ognized goals. Ultimately this demands that business is brought into
politics and that politicians become producers.
Whether or not society would remain competitive if reorganized
along the lines suggested by Saint-Simon in the 18th century or John
Kenneth Galbraith in the 20th century is problematic. Although Saint-
Simon gave the entrepreneur a prominent place in his economic struc-
ture, he did not develop the concept beyond what is implied in the
notion of a business leader. Nor did he concern himself with economic
analysis, per se, which of necessity precedes the task of reorganization.
He was content with the economic analysis and the economic policy of
Smith and Say. And in the end, his disciples transformed his doctrine
into a kind of religion, thus eroding its appeal to serious economists in
search of operational tools of analysis.
3.10 Postscript
Even a cursory review of the French economic literature in the 18th
and early 19th centuries reveals that the entrepreneur was regarded
as a vital component of a market economy. The development of the
concept, however, did not follow strict evolutionist principles. These
early writers anticipated a number of aspects of the entrepreneur which
would resurface in later writings, including the entrepreneur as one who
assumes risk; supplies financial capital; is an industrial leader, manager,
and coordinator of economic resources; acts as an arbitrageur; and allo-
cates resources. One lonely voice even presaged the entrepreneur as
innovator. As economists attempted to discover and elucidate the laws
of the market, variations were introduced in the definition and function
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of the entrepreneur, first by one author then by another – even among
writers who shared a common language.
On other shores, writers of different languages and cultures also
dealt with the concept. We turn our attention next to developments
in England and Germany during the high time of classical economics,
circa 1776–1870.
4
The English School of Thought
4.1 English Custom before Adam Smith
There were three commonly used English equivalents of the French
term entrepreneur in the 18th century: “adventurer,” “projector,” and
“undertaker.” The first term was applied in the 15th century to mer-
chants operating at some risk, and in the 17th century to land specu-
lators, farmers, and those who directed certain public works projects.
During the 18th century, the term adventurer gradually gave way to
the more general term undertaker, which, by the time Adam Smith
emerged as a progenitor of political economy, had become synonymous
with an ordinary businessman. The term projector was equivalent to
the other two in a fundamental sense, but it more often had the pejora-
tive connotation of a cheat and a rogue. The word undertaker was not
only used more often; it also took on more varied meanings, and its his-
tory more or less paralleled the development of its French counterpart.
At first, an undertaker simply referred to someone who set out to do
a job or complete a project, but the concept evolved into that of govern-
ment contractor – someone who, at his own financial risk, performed a
task imposed on him by the government. The term was later extended
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to include those individuals who held exclusive franchises from the
Crown or the Parliament, for example, tax farmers, or persons com-
missioned to drain the fens. By and by the government connection was
dropped, and the term simply came to designate someone involved in a
risky project from which an uncertain profit might be derived (Hoselitz,
1960, pp. 240–242).1 For unknown reasons by the 19th century the word
undertaker had acquired the special meaning of an arranger of funerals.
Partly because of the way in which Adam Smith employed the term,
among English writers “undertaker” was eventually replaced by the
term capitalist.
4.2 Prodigals, Projectors, and Adam Smith’s
Prudent Man
The locus classicus of economic analysis in the 18th century was Adam
Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776). But Smith discussed entrepreneur types earlier in The Theory
of Moral Sentiments (1759). In Wealth, the entrepreneur is encountered
in three different forms: the adventurer, the projector, and the under-
taker. Smith speaks disparagingly of the first two; and with unqualified
approbation only of the undertaker, who he identified with “the pru-
dent man” – a concept developed at length in Moral Sentiments.
According to Smith, adventurers are those who hazard their capital
on the most difficult of enterprises, spurred on by unbounded con-
fidence in their success despite extraordinary risks. Smith (1976a, I,
p. 128) attributed a measure of irrationality to this kind of behavior
because although “the ordinary rate of profit always rises more or less
with the risk, it does not . . . seem to rise in proportion to it, or so as
to compensate it completely.” Adventurers, therefore, are not stable
agents in a theory of economic development, because although a “bold
adventurer may sometimes acquire a considerable fortune by two or
1 However, as late as 1931, in his English translation of Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la
Nature du Commerce en Général, Henry Higgs replaced Cantillon’s many references to
“entrepreneur” with the word “undertaker,” which imparts a decidedly anachronistic flavor
to contemporary readers.
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three successful speculations,” he “is just as likely to lose one by two
or three unsuccessful ones” (Smith, 1976a, I, pp. 130–131).
According to Postlethwayt’s Dictionary, an established authority in
Smith’s day, projectors are of two types. One type is cunning, lawless,
scheming, and cheating; the other possesses ingenuity and integrity and
engages in honest invention. Postlethwayt added that because “. . . there
were always more geese than swans, the number of the latter are very
inconsiderable, in comparison with the former.” Owing, perhaps, to
the inconsiderable number of honest projectors, Smith (1976a, II, p.
562) was critical of the first class of projectors who devise “expensive
and uncertain projects . . . which bring bankruptcy upon the greater
part of the people who engage in them,” like the “search after new
silver and gold mines.” In this way projectors are injurious to soci-
ety because “every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture,
mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends . . . to diminish the funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labor” (Smith, 1976a, I,
p. 341). Identifying projectors with prodigals, Smith (1976a, p. 340)
minced few words in his judgment: “every prodigal appears to be a
public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.”
Following Postlethwayt, however, Smith allowed that not all projec-
tors are prodigals. Of the prudent man Smith (1976b, p. 215) said that
“if he enters into any new projects or enterprises, they are likely to be
well concerted and well prepared. He can never be hurried or drove into
them by any necessity, but has always time and leisure to deliberate
soberly and coolly concerning what are likely to be their consequences.”
The prudent man is frugal (i.e., he accumulates capital) and is an agent
of slow but steady progress.
This kind of treatment in which the entrepreneur is either a men-
ace or a boon leaves the concept of entrepreneurship muddled. As a
result, erudite scholars have derided Smith. Spengler (1959, pp. 8–9)
characterized Smith’s entrepreneur as essentially passive: “a prudent,
cautious, not overly imaginative fellow, who adjusts to circumstances
rather than brings about their modification.” Joseph Schumpeter, who
established his own distinctly dynamic notion of entrepreneurship, was
unsympathetic to Smith in many ways, not least of which was his
view of the role of the entrepreneur. According to Schumpeter (1954,
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p. 555), if pressed, Smith would not have denied that no business runs
by itself, yet “this is exactly the over-all impression his readers get.
The merchant or master accumulates ‘capital’ – this is really his essen-
tial function – and with this ‘capital’ he hires ‘industrious people,’
that is, workmen, who do the rest. In doing so he exposes these means
of production to risk of loss; but beyond this, all he does is to super-
vise his concern in order to make sure that the profits find their way
to his pocket.”
Pesciarelli (1989, p. 525) has defended Smith, claiming that his dis-
cussion of that class of society “who live by profit” emphasizes the
planning element as well as the possession of capital. Pesciarelli draws
textual support from the following passage in The Wealth of Nations:
“The plans and projects of the employers of stock regulate and direct all
the most important operations of labour, and profit is the end proposed
by all those plans and projects. Merchants and master manufacturers
are, in this order, the two classes of people who commonly employ the
largest capitals. . . As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans
and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding
than the greater part of country gentlemen” (Smith, 1976a, I, p. 266).
Pesciarelli makes a number of useful points, but even so, he tacitly
admits that Smith’s works have to be mined carefully to find the few
useful gems that make up his contribution to the subject. Collecting
the various hints sprinkled throughout theWealth of Nations, and sup-
plementing them with Smith’s “prudent man” concept developed in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Pesciarelli (1989, pp. 527–528) offers
the following composite picture of Smith’s entrepreneur.
• Smith’s undertaker faces risk and uncertainty.
• Smith’s undertaker formulates plans and projects in an effort
to earn profit.
• Smith’s undertaker seeks out the necessary capital for imple-
mentation of his planned undertaking.
• Smith’s undertaker combines and organizes the productive
factors.
• Smith’s undertaker inspects and directs production.
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If one accepts Pesciarelli’s reconstructed view it would seem to put
Smith rather loosely in the tradition of Cantillon, a writer known to
Smith by the time he wrote The Wealth of Nations.
The idea that profit is determined by the labor of organization and
direction comes from Turgot. Smith rejected this notion, arguing that
labor is labor, regardless of who expends it. “The profits of stock,” he
exclaimed, “bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or the
ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction. They
are regulated altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are
greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of this stock” (Smith,
1976a, I, p. 66). Yet in correcting Turgot’s error, Smith appears to
confound production goods, capital, profits, and interest, which led to
the charges of ambivalence (or neglect) that we have seen.
Tuttle (1927, pp. 507–508) claimed that prevailing business prac-
tices of the era account for Smith’s failure to differentiate the function
of the capitalist from that of the entrepreneur. In England and France
at this time the ownership of capital was prerequisite to becoming the
independent head of a business. This fact is reflected in the writings of
both Turgot and Smith, each of whom took the ownership of capital
for granted; yet Smith gave much stronger emphasis to the ownership
of capital as the basis for entrepreneurship.
What is missing from Pesciarelli’s list of elemental characteristics is
any explicit connection between entrepreneur and innovation. We know
that Smith was very sensitive to the effects of innovation in a capitalist
society. In fact, he was one of the first economic writers to recognize
innovation as a professional activity. In a remark on inventions made
by workmen, Smith (1976b, I, p. 21) noted that many improvements in
manufacturing are made by workmen, but that a more learned class of
men – “who are called philosophers or men of speculation” – also play
a key role. Those who belong to this learned class, “whose trade is not
to do anything, but to observe everything . . . upon that account, are
often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and
dissimilar objects.” Thomas Edison might easily fit into this group of
“philosophers–inventors.” This was a potentially fruitful line of inquiry,
which, unfortunately, Smith did not develop to any measurable extent.
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The 18th-century inventor (i.e., Smith’s “philosopher” or “specula-
tor”) was an amateur by contemporary standards; yet Smith’s view of
innovation as professional activity was ahead of its time. He held that
innovation is the product of the division of labor, which in turn depends
on the extent of the market. Innovation therefore appears first in mar-
kets that are enlarged by cheap transportation. Opulence and progress
thereafter accompany the division of labor, and with this progress the
innovator or inventor becomes more specialized, and “the quantity of
science is considerably increased.”
4.3 Jeremy Bentham: The Entrepreneur as Contractor
Smith’s advocacy of usury laws to prevent excessive financial resources
from reaching prodigals and projectors struck a discordant note with
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), a follower of Smith and also an admirer
of the French philosophers. Bentham considered it odd (as did many
later economists) that the apostle of laissez faire would advocate gov-
ernment intervention in financial markets, which he did by defending a
statutory interest rate. Smith’s reference to “sober people” in the fol-
lowing passage is an offhand reference to the prudent undertaker whose
actions he approved.
“The legal rate [of interest], it is to be observed, though
it ought to be somewhat above, ought not to be much
above, the lowest market rate. If the legal rate of interest
in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight
or ten per cent the greater part of the money which was
to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and projectors,
who alone would be willing to give this high interest.
Sober people, who will give for the use of money no
more than a part of what they are likely to make by
the use of it, would not venture into the competition. A
great part of the capital of the country would thus be
kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a
profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into
those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.
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Where the legal interest, on the contrary, is fixed but
a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people
are universally preferred as borrowers, to prodigals and
projectors. The person who lends money, gets nearly as
much interest from the former, as he dares to take from
the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands
of the one set of people than in those of the other. A
great part of the capital of the country is thus thrown
into the hands in which it is most likely to be employed
with advantage.” (Smith, 1976a, I, p. 357)
In his Defence of Usury (1787) Bentham detailed how laws against
usury limit the overall quantity of capital lent and borrowed and how
such laws keep away foreign money from domestic capital markets. Both
these effects tend to throttle the activities of successful entrepreneurs
and impede economic development. He argued that interest rate ceilings
tend to discriminate against entrepreneurs of new projects, because by
their sheer novelty such projects are more risky than those already
proven profitable by experience. Moreover, legal restrictions such as
usury laws are powerless to pick out bad projects from good ones.
Bentham criticized Smith for underestimating the role of talented
individuals whose imagination and inventiveness have been responsible
for the progress of nations. He regarded innovation as the driving force
behind the development of mankind, and the projector as the inno-
vator. Hence, he reprimanded Smith for lumping prodigals and pro-
jectors together. The distinguishing feature of the latter is that they
depart from routine patterns of behavior; break away from the com-
mon herd; and in the process discover new markets, find new sources
of supply, improve existing products, or lower costs of production.
To be a projector, Bentham (1952, p. 177) asserted, requires courage
and genius; those qualities to which we attribute “all those succes-
sive enterprises by which arts and manufactures have been brought
from their original nothing to their present splendor.” Projectors cre-
ate utility, Bentham (1952, p. 170) argued, by effecting improvements,
whether such improvements “consist in the production of any new arti-
cle adapted to man’s use, or in meliorating the quality, or diminishing
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the expense, of any of those which are already known to us. It falls, in
short, upon every application of the human powers, in which ingenuity
stands in need of wealth for its assistant.” The affinity of this view to
Schumpeter’s is unmistakable.2
Pesciarelli argues, cogently, that the nub of controversy between
Smith and Bentham is that each had a different view of human progress.
And as a byproduct of their contrasting views, each had a different con-
ception of the entrepreneur. Bentham’s entrepreneur is an exceptional
individual, one above the common herd; a minority in society. Smith’s
entrepreneur is a common type, widespread in society, one who exer-
cises self-control in the exercise of economic activity in order to receive
the approbation of his fellow man. “The prudent man unconsciously
promotes the interest of society because he consciously sets limits on
the pursuit of his own interests. He is the visible promoter of the invis-
ible hand; he is the fulcrum but also the limit of Smith’s belief in
the working of a self-adjusting mechanism” (Pesciarelli, 1989, pp. 534–
535). These contrasting views lead to different conceptions of economic
development. For Bentham, economic development is activated by dis-
continuous changes involving improvements (in the broadest sense),
and resulting in a nonlinear path of progress. Smith’s notion of eco-
nomic progress is slow, gradual, uniform, and not subject to sudden
variations.
In pleading the cause of the projectors, Bentham, the inventor of
the Panopticon, was to some extent pleading his own case. Panopticon
was the name Bentham gave to his idea of a model prison. The con-
cept involved innovations of both an architectural and an institutional
nature. Bentham’s ideal prison was circular. All the cells were arranged
concentrically around a central pavillion, which contained an inspec-
tor, or at most a small number of inspectors. From his central position
the inspector could see easily everything that was going on, yet he
was rendered invisible by a system of blinds. In this way, too, prison
administrators, even outside visitors, could inspect the prisoners with-
out being seen. According to Bentham, this constant scrutiny of the
2 Pesciarelli (1989, p. 531) points out that four of the five new combinations that com-
prise innovation emphasized by Schumpeter in his Theory of Economic Development (see
Section 8 below) were previously identified by Bentham.
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prisoners would deprive them of the power, and even the will, to do
evil. Bentham was never able to attract enough backers to make his
model prison a reality, and the site that he proposed for his model
prison was subsequently occupied by the Tate Gallery in London.
Bentham’s brother, Samuel, deserves priority for the architectural
idea behind the Panopticon, which he first applied in Russia. Bentham’s
unique contribution was an administrative innovation that is more to
the point of our subject than the general problem of prison reform.
Bentham completed the architectural innovation of the Panopticon by
introducing an administrative arrangement that involved management
by contract. What is especially interesting about this arrangement is
that its success depends on the dynamic activities of the entrepreneur
and the proper structuring of economic incentives.
To Bentham, true reform would occur in prisons only if the admin-
istrative plan simultaneously protected convicts against the harshness
of their warders, and society against the wastefulness of administrators.
The choice, as he saw it, was between contract management and trust
management. Halévy (1955, p. 84) explained the differences between
these two administrative arrangements
“Contract-management is management by a man who
treats with the government, and takes charge of the
convicts at so much a head and applies their time and
industry to his personal profit, as does a master with
his apprentices. Trust-management is management by
a single individual or by a committee, who keep up the
establishment at the public expense, and pay into the
treasury the products of the convicts’ work.”
In Bentham’s mind, trust management could not provide the proper
junction of interest and duty on the part of the entrepreneur. Its suc-
cess therefore depends on “public interest” as a motivating factor. Like
his proclaimed mentor, Smith, Bentham had much more confidence
in individual self-interest as the spur to human action. The beauty of
contract management was that it brought about an artificial identity of
interests between the public on the one hand and the entrepreneur on
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the other. The entrepreneur in this case was an independent contractor
who “purchased,” through competitive bid, the right to run the prison,
thereby also acquiring title to whatever profits might be earned by the
application of convict labor. Such an entrepreneur–manager could max-
imize his long-term gains by preserving the health and productivity of
his worker-convicts. In this manner public interest became entwined
with private interest.
In 1787, Bentham completed the idea of contract management by a
new administrative arrangement; he thought that life insurance offered
an excellent means of joining the interest of one man to the preservation
of a number of men. He therefore proposed that after consulting the
appropriate mortality tables, the entrepreneur (prison manager) should
be given a fixed sum of money for each convict who was about to die
that year in prison, on condition that at the end of the year he must pay
back the same sum for each convict who had actually died in prison.
The difference would be profit for the entrepreneur, who would thereby
have an economic incentive to lower the average mortality rate in his
prison (Bentham, 1962, vol. IV, p. 53).
Aside from the fact that Bentham was virtually alone among British
classical economists in his repeated emphasis on the entrepreneur as
an agent of economic progress, it is noteworthy that his administra-
tive arrangement of contract management recast the entrepreneur in
the position of government contractor, that is, a franchisee who under-
takes financial risk in order to obtain an uncertain profit. Bentham also
explicitly tied his notion of entrepreneur–contractor to the act of inven-
tion. He defended contract management as the proper form of prison
administration on the ground that it is a progressive innovation and
should therefore be rewarded accordingly, no less than an inventor is
rewarded for his invention (Bentham, 1962, vol. IV, p. 47).
4.4 David Ricardo and the “Unfortunate Legacy”
Bentham and David Ricardo (1772–1823) had different notions about
what political economy should be. Ricardo saw political economy as a
means to discover general laws of society. Whatever its practical con-
sequences might ultimately be, Ricardo considered economic theory
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detached from practice. He treated political economy as a science of
laws – laws of equilibrium and laws of progress. By contrast, Bentham,
like Smith, referred to economics as both art and science, and he paid
as much attention to the former as he did to the latter. Bentham and
Smith regarded political economy as a branch of politics and legislation,
never removed from practice.
We cannot be sure whether or not it was Bentham’s large concern
for practice as well as theory that induced him to see the importance
of the entrepreneur in economic activity, but in any event, his idea of
entrepreneurship did not predominate. Instead, Smith carried the day
among economists, and as a result his obscurantism regarding the sep-
aration of functions between entrepreneur and capitalist continued to
plague classical economics. Redlich (1966, p. 715) called it an “unfor-
tunate legacy,” because to deny the separation of functions between
entrepreneur and capitalist implies that profit is not legitimate in a
capitalist economy. This legacy was bequeathed to David Ricardo, and
through him, passed on to Karl Marx, who embellished and continued
the idea of the capitalist bogey, that is, the parasitic “extortionist” who
sucks profit from the “industrious” people of the economy.
Classical economics in general had very little to say about the ori-
gin and nature of investment opportunities. This is especially true of
Ricardo, who assumed that capitalists act rationally in seeking to max-
imize profits but who ignored the trouble and risk involved in investing.
Although he did not fall into the trap of assuming that all investment
was profitable, like most classical economists Ricardo treated innova-
tion as mainly external to the economic system. On occasion, he sup-
posed that as wealth increased, eventually all further opportunities for
profitable investment would disappear. This stands in marked contrast
to the Schumpeterian view, which enlarged the scope and breadth of
entrepreneurial activity and made it a centerpiece of his theory of eco-
nomic development.
There is a sense in which Ricardo is more culpable than Smith for
his neglect of the entrepreneur. Smith was acquainted with Quesnay,
and he may also have known Turgot’s work directly. But aside from a
difference in emphasis, Smith did not view the entrepreneur/undertaker
in terms much different from his French counterparts. Ricardo, on the
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other hand, failed entirely to pursue the suggestion of his contemporary,
Jean-Baptiste Say, that the entrepreneur is distinguishable from the
other agents of production. Smith could not have done so because his
work preceded Say’s, by almost three decades, but Say had formalized
the term entrepreneur and given it definition some fourteen years before
Ricardo’s Principles appeared. Moreover, at least one version of Say’s
work was available to Ricardo in English during this 14-year period.
Yet, as Cole (1946, p. 3) noted, “not merely is the term [entrepreneur]
itself absent in Ricardo’s writings, but no concept of business leaders
as agents of change (other than as shadowy bearers of technological
improvements) is embraced in his treatment of economic principles.”
It is noteworthy that in the correspondence between Say and Ricardo,
neither the nature nor the role of the entrepreneur is once mentioned,
their usual discussion focusing instead on the topic of value.
4.5 The Decline of British Classical Economics
More than any other writer after Smith, Ricardo set forth the “research
program” that was to occupy the next generation of economists. Conse-
quently, his failure to recognize the entrepreneur as a separate agent of
production was a harbinger of later developments in classical economic
theory. One exception to this pattern of neglect can be found in the
work of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) who cut his teeth on Ricardian
economics but who also came under the direct (and indirect) influence
of Jeremy Bentham. In his youth, Mill served as Bentham’s secretary.
His family at one time lived on Bentham’s London estate, and his father
was an ardent disciple of Bentham, who took it upon himself to “home-
school” his son as evidence of his belief in Benthamite principles.
Mill’s Principles of Political Economy (1848) is a watershed in
British classical economics. It consists of a mature statement of the
economic paradigm first enunciated by Smith and successively refined
and developed by David Ricardo, Robert Malthus, Nassau Senior, and
others. It is also a kind of bridge between the economics of the old
school (1776–1870) and the new (1871–1920). Yet Mill contributed lit-
tle that was new to the theory of entrepreneurship. He lamented the
fact that “undertaker” did not adequately convey the desired economic
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meaning, and he noted the superiority of the French term for this pur-
pose (Mill, 1965, p. 406n). But throughout his Principles, Mill spoke
somewhat ambiguously of the entrepreneur and of his economic reward.
He identified the functions of the entrepreneur as direction, control,
and superintendence. In one place he observed that the qualities of
direction and superintendence are always in short supply (Mill, 1965,
p. 108), and in another, he suggested that superior business talents
such as these always receive a kind of rent alongside ordinary profits
(Mill, 1965, p. 476), thus approaching Mangoldt’s important innova-
tion on the theory (discussed below). In the final analysis, he offered
no clear-cut distinction between the capitalist and the entrepreneur,
insisting that the return to the latter is composed of a risk premium
and a wage of superintendence. This view was representative of most
treatments by British classical economists.
Schumpeter (1954, p. 555) claims that Say was the first to assign
the entrepreneur a distinct position in the economic process apart from
the capitalist, but even Say did not make full use of his own insight,
nor did he see clearly all of its analytic possibilities. Bentham was
the first Englishman to offer provocative insights into the nature of
entrepreneurship beyond Say, but he was more concerned with insti-
tutional reform (e.g., the Panopticon and other schemes) than with
the development of a core of analytic principles that were strictly eco-
nomic. Mill had read Bentham and Say, but he did not follow the sug-
gestions on entrepreneurship advanced by either writer. He kept the
entrepreneur in the background of his distribution theory by focusing
mainly on land, labor, and capital as agents of production. By impli-
cation, this suggests that the entrepreneur is either a special laborer,
or a combination of laborer and capitalist. Mill did not seriously enter-
tain the idea of the entrepreneur as innovator. Where he discussed the
labor of invention and discovery, for example, Mill treated its reward
as merely a kind of wage.
Mill outlined the capitalist’s return as the sum of an opportu-
nity cost for postponing consumption (i.e., Nassau Senior’s concept
of “abstinence”), plus an indemnity for risk of capital, plus the “wages
of superintendence.” He asserted further that the wages of superin-
tendence are not regulated by the same principle as wages in general.
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Specifically, he maintained that the wages of superintendence are not
advanced from capital, like the wages of other workers, but arise in
profit, which is not realized until production is completed.
In Mill’s time, the wages of labor were explained by the wages-fund
doctrine, which viewed the source of wages as capital (i.e., accumula-
tion) that is advanced to workers prior to realization of final output.
In this view, the total amount that can be paid to labor is limited
by the amount of capital previously accumulated. Mill’s distinction
between ordinary wages and the wages of superintendence therefore
implies that there is no such limit on the wages of superintendence. But
we are still left with the somewhat unhappy alliance of the entrepreneur
and the capitalist. Because of this functional “merger” British classi-
cal economics offered no focal point for viewing the pivotal role of the
entrepreneur in the economic process.
4.6 Postscript
The English school of thought is, perhaps, best know for reinforc-
ing the concept of the entrepreneur as one who supplies financial
capital. The idea of the entrepreneur as innovator was advanced by
Jeremy Bentham, but Bentham’s idea did not take root among other
classical economists. The Smith–Ricardo–Mill tradition that dominated
the English classical economic thought essentially preserved a some-
what sterile notion of entrepreneurship.
5
The German Tradition
The 18th-century German economic thought was associated most
closely with cameralism, the study of national finance. Cameralism
represented an economic theory in which public revenue was the sole
measure of economic prosperity. Not surprisingly, there was little room
for the individual entrepreneur in such a field. Owing to the burgeon-
ing influence of Adam Smith and J. B. Say, political economy began
to gradually displace German cameral science around 1800. By 1814,
Say’s Treatise had been translated into German and was beginning to
make an impact on German economics.
Given this belated start to German political economy it is surprising
that the attempt to establish the entrepreneur’s profit as a distinctive
functional share in the theory of income distribution accelerated faster
in Germany than in either France or England. Major advances were
made by J. H. von Thünen (1785–1850) and H. K. von Mangoldt (1824–
1858), with earlier help from Gottlieb Hufeland (1760–1817), Friedrich
Hermann (1795–1868), and especially Adolph Riedel (1809–1872).
Hufeland (1815) recognized that every wage contains a premium for
scarcity. He generalized this idea to explain entrepreneurial profit as a
special kind of wage consisting of the rent-of-ability. Hermann’s (1832)
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theoretical economics undermined the British classical wages-fund the-
ory by asserting that all factor returns are ultimately paid from con-
sumers’ income. Like Hufeland, he generalized the concept of rent to
all factors, including the entrepreneur. And like Say, he viewed the
entrepreneur as one who organizes production within the institutional
structure of a firm.
Riedel (1838) extended Cantillon’s conception of the entrepreneur
as the economic agent who takes on uncertainty so that others may
escape the same uncertainty (e.g., through the establishment of fixed-
price contracts). He perceived that uncertainty is inevitable in the
acquisition of income and that the entrepreneur provides a useful ser-
vice to income earners who are risk averse and who would therefore
willingly trade uncertainty for the security of a “sure thing.” As a sup-
plier of “certainty,” the entrepreneur is rewarded for his foresight or
penalized for lack of it. If he sells goods at a price above his contracted
fixed-input costs, he gains; if not, he loses. Riedel also explored the
notion of the entrepreneur as innovator, and as organizer of “team pro-
duction.” By connecting the problems of the organization of firms with
the entrepreneurial function of reducing income uncertainty for cer-
tain inputs, he anticipated (along with Mangoldt) the nature of trans-
action costs later expounded by Ronald Coase (discussed below, in
Section 10).
Von Thünen is best known in the history of economics for his
contributions to the location theory, but in the second volume of
The Isolated State (1850) he put forth an explanation of profit that
clearly distinguished the return of the entrepreneur from that of the
capitalist. What von Thünen labeled “entrepreneurial gain” is profit
minus (1) interest on invested capital, (2) insurance against busi-
ness losses, and (3) the wages of management. This residual rep-
resents a return to entrepreneurial risk, which von Thünen (1960,
p. 246) identified as uninsurable risk, insofar as “there exists no
insurance company that will cover all and every risk connected with
a business. A part of the risk must always be accepted by the
entrepreneur.”
As Kanbur (1980) has argued, opportunity costs provide the
basis for measuring this element of risk that is uninsurable. Von
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Thünen (1960, p. 247) seems to have been alert to this fact, as demon-
strated in the following passage:
“He who has enough means to pay to get some
knowledge and education for public service has a
choice to become either a civil servant or, if equally
suited for both kinds of jobs, to become an industrial
entrepreneur. If he takes the first job, he is guaranteed
subsistence for life; if he chooses the latter, an unfortu-
nate economic situation may take all his property, and
then his fate becomes that of a worker for daily wages.
Under such unequal expectations for the future what
could motivate him to become an entrepreneur if the
probability of gain were not much greater than that of
loss?”
Moreover, von Thünen clearly appreciated the difference between
management and entrepreneurship. He maintained that the effort of an
entrepreneur working on his own account was different from that of a
paid substitute (i.e., “manager”), even if they have the same knowledge
and ability. The entrepreneur is forced to bear the anxiety and agita-
tion that accompanies his business gamble; he spends many sleepless
nights preoccupied with the single thought of how to avoid catastro-
phe, whereas the paid substitute can sleep soundly at night, secure in
the knowledge of having performed his (minimal) duty. Anyone who
has nursed along a new enterprise knows the anxiety that accompanies
such entrepreneurial effort.
What is especially interesting about von Thünen’s treatment is how
he turns the discussion from the trials of the entrepreneur into a kind
of “crucible” theory of the development of entrepreneurial talent. The
sleepless nights of the entrepreneur are not unproductive; it is then that
the entrepreneur makes his plans and arrives at solutions for avoiding
business failures. Adversity in the business world thereby becomes a
training ground for the entrepreneur. “Necessity is the mother of inven-
tion,” von Thünen (1960, p. 248) wrote, “so the entrepreneur through
his troubles will become an inventor and explorer in his field.” As such,
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the entrepreneur supplies “greater mental effort in comparison with the
paid manager,” for which he deserves “compensation for his industry,
diligence, and ingenuity.” This extra reward is a justifiable payment
to the entrepreneur no less than that surplus which is payable to the
inventor of a new and useful machine.
What makes this a significant step forward in the theory of
entrepreneurship is the fact that von Thünen successfully married the
separate strands of entrepreneurial theory that, on the one hand, char-
acterized the entrepreneur as risk bearer (Cantillon, Mill), and, on the
other hand, portrayed him as innovator (Baudeau, Bentham). Eco-
nomic analysis having come this far by 1850, we may well question
whether Schumpeter took a step backward in the next century by
excluding risk-bearing from the nature of entre-preneurship, confining
its meaning instead solely to innovative activity (see Section 8).
Von Thünen was quite explicit about the fact that there are two
elements in entrepreneurial income: a return to entrepreneurial risk and
a return to ingenuity. Labeling the sum of these two as “business profit,”
he drew a sharp distinction between entrepreneurship and capital use:
“Capital will give results, and is in the strict sense of the
term capital, only if used productively; on the degree of
this usefulness depends the rate of interest at which we
lend capital. Productive use presupposes an industrial
enterprise and an entrepreneur. The enterprise gives
the entrepreneur a net yield after compensating for all
expenses and costs. This net yield has two parts, busi-
ness profits and capital use.” (von Thünen, 1960, p. 249)
A second landmark performance on the subject of the entrepreneur
was produced by Hans Mangoldt, professor at the universities of
Gottingen and Freiburg. Mangoldt’s writings remain mostly inacces-
sible to those unfamiliar with the German language, but we know of
his contributions indirectly through Knight (1921), Schumpeter (1954),
Hutchison (1953), and Hennings (1980). Knight (1921, p. 27) credits
Mangoldt with “a most careful and exhaustive analysis of profit,” and
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Schumpeter (1954, p. 556n) judges his work on entrepreneurship “the
most important advance since Say.”
Mangoldt attempted to reform Hermann’s theory, which sought the
essential characteristic of entrepreneurship in the personal activity of
entrepreneurs. Hermann maintained that certain kinds of labor are
inseparable from the nature of entrepreneurship, and if these tasks are
delegated to anyone else, the delegator ceases to be an entrepreneur.
Among these tasks Hermann listed the assembling of capital, the super-
vision of business, the securing of credit and trade connections, and the
assumption of risk connected with the prospect of irregular gains.
Mangoldt discarded Hermann’s first three entrepreneurial tasks as
inessential to a “pure” notion of entrepreneurship. He argued that
although entrepreneurs customarily participate in their own enterprises
with their own capital and personal supervision, these services could be
furnished just as well by salaried labor. After extracting these two ele-
ments what remains from Hermann’s theory is risk-bearing. According
to Mangoldt (1907, p. 41): “That which alone is inseparable from the
concept of the entrepreneur is, on the one hand, owning the output of
the undertaking – control over the product brought forth, and, on the
other hand, assuming responsibility for whatever losses may occur.”
Thus, Mangoldt’s theory of entrepreneurship was production ori-
ented and risk centered. He distinguished between “production to
order” and “production for the market.” The former is safe because
service and payment are simultaneous, which thereby eliminates the
uncertainty of changing market conditions between the start of produc-
tion and sale of the final product. The latter is speculative because the
product is destined for exchange on a market of uncertain demand and
unknown price. Mangoldt (1907, p. 37) found this distinction useful,
even though it is imprecise, because, strictly speaking, “every possibil-
ity of a change in the subjective estimate of the service, or the remuner-
ation [of it], offers such an uncertainty,” and “since such a possibility is
excluded only by a perfect simultaneity of service and payment, every
business which needs for its carrying through any time whatever, could
not, in the strictest sense of the word, be undertaken to order.”
This distinction therefore provides a means of discussing degrees
of risk that confront the entrepreneur. By Mangoldt’s reckoning, those
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enterprises that require the longest time to bring their products to the
point of final sale involve the most uncertainty, whereas those that
involve the shortest time require the least amount of entrepreneurship.
Risk and uncertainty go to the heart of the matter. The distinctiveness
of the entrepreneur is that he assumes the burden of the fluctuations in
expenditure that must be made in any business and in the consequent
outcome of the enterprise. In this respect, Mangoldt stood squarely in
the tradition begun by Cantillon.
Mangoldt also developed the notion that entrepreneurial profit is
the rent of ability, and he insisted that the entrepreneur be treated
as a separate factor of production. He divided entrepreneurial income
into three parts: a premium on uninsurable risks; entrepreneur interest
and wages, including only payments for special forms of capital or pro-
ductive effort that did not admit of exploitation by anyone other than
the owner; and entrepreneur rents, that is, payments for differential
abilities or assets not held by anyone else. Alfred Marshall took special
note of this last item, citing Mangoldt approvingly in his development
of the principle of quasi-rent.
Mangoldt’s theory did not concentrate on an ideal type of
entrepreneur but rather on the decisions he must make in an uncer-
tain, competitive environment: the choice of techniques, the allocation
of productive factors, and the marketing of production. He recognized
successful innovation as part of entrepreneurship, but expressed more
interest in the allocative function of the entrepreneur. His contribution
therefore belongs more to the static theory of resource allocation than
to the dynamic theory of growth and development.
5.1 Postscript
The German tradition in political economy nurtured the concept of
business leader, or unternehmer. Both von Thünen and Mangoldt were
important anticipators of Frank Knight (see Section 7), who in the next
century revived Cantillon’s idea of the entrepreneur as risk bearer. In
one sense, von Thünen’s contribution may be judged the more signif-
icant of the two, insofar as it combined elements of risk-bearing and
innovation in a way that pointed past the concept of entrepreneurship
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that became dominant in the next century. But Tuttle (1927, p. 518)
said of Mangoldt that after his treatment, “economists could no longer
consider the function [of the entrepreneur] as a mere incident to some
other function, or ignore it altogether, as had been the case hitherto.”
And Rectenwald (1987, p. 299) adds that “Mangoldt definitely antici-
pates Schumpeter’s theory of the entrepreneur.”
6
Early Neoclassical Perspectives
6.1 The Neoclassical Era
Casson (1987, p. 151) has rightly exclaimed that the “disappearance” of
the entrepreneur is associated with the rise of the neoclassical school of
economics. Classical political economy focused on the market process,
which is in many respects a discovery process: producers and sellers
must discover consumer wants, resource availability, and resource costs;
buyers and consumers must discover products, prices, and quality. In
a discovery process, entrepreneurs have an important role in acquiring
and using information.
After 1870 economic theory de-emphasized information as it turned
toward the fundamental laws of price formation and resource alloca-
tion in individual markets and away from macroeconomic concerns of
growth and income distribution. The deterministic models pioneered by
neoclassical writers emphasized perfect information and perfect mar-
kets. The former trivializes entrepreneurial decision making, and the
latter makes the entrepreneur superfluous by eliminating the coordi-
nation problem (cf., Baumol, 1968). With few exceptions, economic
analysis after 1870 became increasingly abstract and mechanistic. The
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economic problem came to be perceived as the allocation of certain
scarce means among given ends, rather than the selection of the ends
themselves. In this era, no longer did the great macroeconomic issues of
the classical period – such as population, capital supply, and economic
growth – dominate economic inquiry.
The new economic analysis was developed by a breed of professional
economists who, unlike their predecessors trained mostly in philosophy,
received more focused training in the subject. As a sign of the “matu-
rity” of the new discipline, which acquired separate standing as a field
of study, the phrase political economy gradually gave way to the term
economics. The new professionals were less firmly rooted in the parent
discipline of philosophy and more open to the applications of mathe-
matics to economic reasoning.
Although the issues of the new economics were fundamentally the
same, three distinct viewpoints vied for supremacy during the neoclas-
sical era. These three approaches may be loosely identified as Austrian,
French, and British. Each had a different intellectual tradition behind
it, and each emphasized different things in its redirection of economic
analysis. Of the three, the Austrian approach proved most fertile for
advancing the theory of the entrepreneur because it alone retained a
focus on market process.
6.2 The Austrian School
With the publication of his Principles of Economics in 1871, Carl
Menger (1840–1921) established himself as the founder and early leader
of a distinctive school of economic thought that later included two
able disciples, Friedrich von Wieser (1851–1926) and Eugen von Böhm-
Bawerk (1851–1914). The central concern of Menger’s economics was to
establish the subjectivist act of human valuation as the starting point
of economic theory. In the subjectivist view, economic change arises not
from circumstances themselves but from an individual’s awareness and
understanding of them. Menger’s analysis, in particular, relied heavily
on the role of knowledge in individual decisions.
Although Menger’s theory of production is secondary to his theory
of value, we must nevertheless look to his theory of production for an
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appreciation of the entrepreneur. Menger’s theory of production starts
with the general theory of the good. For something to be a good in the
economic sense requires recognition of the causal connection between
a useful thing and its ability to satisfy human wants, as well as action
which directs the useful thing to this satisfaction. In other words, the
goods character of any useful thing is not innate; it must be acquired
through human action, which requires that a person recognizes a need
and strives to satisfy it.
In the Austrian framework, goods are ranked according to their
causal connections. To use Menger’s (1950, p. 56) example, the bread
we eat, the flour from which it is baked, the grain milled into flour,
and the field on which the grain is grown are all goods. But some goods
serve individual needs directly, and some stand in a more remote causal
connection. The former are called goods of “lower order”; the latter,
goods of “higher order.” The farther removed a good is from satisfying a
want directly, the higher the number assigned to it in Menger’s scale of
goods-ordering. Thus bread is a good of first order because it satisfies
hunger directly. Flour is a second-order good because it is one step
removed from the direct satisfaction of need. The grains from which
flour is milled, along with the mill and labor expended on it, are third-
order goods. The field, farmers, and equipment used to grow grain are
fourth-order goods, and so on.
From the foregoing we can see that to designate the order of a
particular good is to indicate that in some particular employment it
has a closer or more distant causal relationship with the satisfaction
of a human need. For Menger, the ultimate character of higher-order
goods depends on the power to transform goods of higher order into
goods of lower order. Economic production is the process by which
this transformation takes place and by which the goods of lower order
are directed finally into the satisfaction of human needs. This process
takes time. Over time improvements in technology and transportation
tend continually to shorten the time between phases of transforming
higher-order goods into lower-order goods, but the time gaps never
disappear completely. It is impossible to transform higher-order goods
into lower-order goods by a mere wave of the hand. Production is never
instantaneous.
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Although Menger never elaborated his conception of the
entrepreneur in great detail, it fits into the vision of production just out-
lined. According to this general theory of production, the entrepreneur
is the person who handles the intertemporal coordination of the factors
of production (i.e., higher-order goods). Menger recognized that indus-
try is vertically disintegrated and that somebody has to align produc-
tive resources over time. That somebody is the entrepreneur. Ironically,
the entrepreneur’s own technical labor services are usually among the
higher-order goods he has at his command for purposes of production.
Nevertheless, it is not the supply of such services that makes one an
entrepreneur; it is instead his calculating and decision-making abilities
that make his function unique. Menger (1950, p. 160) established that
entrepreneurial activity includes (a) obtaining information about the
economic situation; (b) economic calculation – all the various compu-
tations that must be made if a production process is to be efficient;
(c) the act of will by which goods of higher order are assigned to a
particular production process; and (d) supervising the execution of the
production plan so that it may be carried through as economically as
possible.
An obvious corollary of Menger’s conception of entrepreneurial
activity is that the entrepreneur must face uncertainty with regard
to the quantity and quality of final goods he can produce by means
of the higher-order goods in his possession. The degree of uncertainty
faced by the entrepreneur depends on the extent of his knowledge of the
productive process and upon the measure of control he exercises over
it. “This uncertainty,” Menger (1950, p. 71) said, “is of the greatest
practical significance in human economy.”
Menger did not attempt to link the entrepreneur with the capital-
ist, and, indeed, it would have been a step backward for entrepreneurial
theory if he had done so. But his position with regard to risk-bearing
is curious, especially in the face of his repeated emphasis on the sig-
nificance of uncertainty in economic affairs. Despite the fact that the
entrepreneur confronts uncertainty continually in the process of pro-
duction, Menger held that risk-bearing cannot be the essential func-
tion of the entrepreneur. Noting his departure from Mangoldt on
this issue, Menger (1950, p. 161) asserted that risk is insignificant to
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entrepreneurship because in the final analysis the chance of loss is off-
set by the chance of gain.1 Schooled in the Austrian tradition, Joseph
Schumpeter (see Section 8) also denied risk-bearing as an essential char-
acteristic of entrepreneurship. But in a certain sense Schumpeter stood
Menger on his head. Whereas Menger saw economic progress as lead-
ing to the development of entrepreneurial activity, Schumpeter viewed
entrepreneurial activity as leading to economic progress.
Friedrich Wieser was a student of Karl Knies but a disciple of
Menger. He extended Menger’s ideas and added several important
dimensions to his entrepreneur, among them leadership, alertness, and
risk-bearing. Wieser (1927, p. 324) defined the entrepreneur in a “legal-
istic” but otherwise sweeping fashion: he claimed that the entrepreneur
is the director of economic enterprise by “legal right and at the same
time by virtue of his active participation in the economic management
of his enterprise.” Performing the various functions of legal represen-
tative, owner, employer, creditor and debtor, and lessor or lessee, the
entrepreneur’s “economic leadership commences with the establishment
of the enterprise; he supplies not only the necessary capital but origi-
nates the idea, elaborates and puts into operation the plan, and engages
collaborators. When the enterprise is established, he becomes its man-
ager technically as well as commercially.”
Clearly, Wieser tried to bring everything connected with the the-
ory and practice of enterprise under his umbrella-like definition of
the entrepreneur. He spoke of entrepreneurs as the “great personali-
ties” of capitalism: “bold technical innovators, organizers with a keen
knowledge of human nature, farsighted bankers, reckless speculators,
the world-conquering directors of the trusts” (Wiesser, 1927, p. 327).
This is painting with a broad brush. Not only is Wieser’s multifarious
entrepreneur required to be multi-talented, “he must [also] possess the
quick perception that seizes new terms in current transactions as his
1 The meaning of this statement and its implications are not quite clear. A counterbal-
ancing tendency between gains and losses might be posited in a long-run analysis where
all “projects” are lumped together (cf. Wieser, 1927, p. 355). But from an individualist
perspective, this assertion seems tantamount to the statement that each entrepreneurial
opportunity has a 50–50 chance of success. Surely there is no a priori nor observed reason
why this should be the case. In fact, Hawley and Clark later refuted this position (see
Section 7).
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affairs develop; [and] he must possess the independent forcefulness to
regulate his business according to his views.” Finally, he must have the
courage to accept risk and be driven forward by “the joyful power to
create” (Wiesser, 1927, p. 324).
Wieser touched upon themes that would be expounded again in
the next two generations of theories on entrepreneurship. Schumpeter
(see Section 8) zeroed in on the innovating spirit and the creativity
of entrepreneurs. Israel Kirzner (see Section 7) elaborated the percep-
tiveness theme. As a rule, modern theories of entrepreneurship have
averted the multifarious personality of the entrepreneur in favor of a
more narrowly defined figure. Eventually Wieser admitted that institu-
tional changes, primarily in forms of business organization, had gradu-
ally transformed the notion of entrepreneur to a mere legal concept. In
the wake of such changes Wieser (1927, p. 328) declared: “The require-
ment of economic management is no longer fulfilled in all cases. Today
the enterprise is a voluntary community of commercial operation in the
money economy subject to one entrepreneur. It may be a unified group of
such operations. The entrepreneur is any legal owner of an enterprise.”
The third member of the Austrian triumvirate, Eugen Böhm-
Bawerk, wrote very little about the entrepreneur, concerning himself
primarily with the theory of capital and interest. Schumpeter (1954,
p. 893) has alluded to Böhm-Bawerk’s uncertainty theory of profits, in
which the source of entrepreneurs’ profits is that things do not work out
as planned. According to the theory, persistence of positive profits in a
firm is a consequence of superior judgment in the face of uncertainty.
We also have it on Rothbard’s (1985) authority that Böhm-Bawerk
clearly identified the entrepreneur with the capitalist and that he in no
way suggested that they could be separated. Be that as it may, Böhm-
Bawerk did not develop his theory of profit and loss to any great extent,
leaving this task to be accomplished by his student, Ludwig von Mises
(see Section 9), and by Frank Knight (see Section 7).
6.3 Léon Walras
The French economist, Léon Walras (1834–1910), was a leading neoclas-
sical economist who is recognized today as the founder of the general-
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equilibrium theory. The hallmark of the general-equilibrium theory is
the all-pervasive interdependence of economic affairs and markets. As
developed by Walras, the theory was static, rather than dynamic, but
it offers, nevertheless, a limited view of economic change. Walras’s eco-
nomics shows us a state of ultimate and timeless adjustment maintained
by the competitive self-interest of the individual suppliers of productive
services. In this world, each productive service contributes technically
and essentially to the production, transport, and sale of goods, thereby
earning each day that amount by which the withdrawal of one such pro-
ductive unit would reduce the daily output of the system as a whole.
Furthermore, in this analytic system the total of all the payments to the
suppliers of productive services exactly exhausts their total product.
Walras’ lasting contribution to economic theory was architectonic,
that is, it was more a contribution of form than of substance. He con-
structed an elegant system of mathematical equations to represent the
totality of the economic system and to emphasize the interdependence
of its constituent parts. The actual numbers (i.e., coefficients) that
enter these equations in specific circumstances were left to others to
discover.
Outwardly Walras considered the entrepreneur an important figure.
In his Elements of Pure Economics (1874), he carefully delineated four
classes of productive factors, thus setting the mode of modern practice.
His disquisition is reminiscent of Cantillon’s three-class presentation of
landowners, workers, and entrepreneurs, with the important difference
that Walras (1954, p. 222) recognized the capitalist apart from either
the landowner or the entrepreneur. He was quite explicit about the
separation and distinction of economic factors of production. After dis-
pensing with the usual categories of landowner, laborer, and capitalist,
Walras wrote:
“In addition, let us designate by the term entrepreneur
a fourth person, entirely distinct from those just men-
tioned, whose role it is to lease land from the landowner,
hire personal faculties from the laborer, and borrow
capital from the capitalist, in order to combine the
three productive services in agriculture, industry or
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trade. It is undoubtedly true that, in real life, the
same person may assume two, three, or even all four
of the above-defined roles. In fact, the different ways in
which these roles may be combined give rise to differ-
ent types of enterprise. However that may be, the roles
themselves, even when performed by the same individ-
ual, still remain distinct. From the scientific point of
view, we must keep these roles separate and avoid both
the error of the English economists who identify the
entrepreneur with the capitalist and the error of a cer-
tain number of French economists who look upon the
entrepreneur as a worker charged with the special task
of managing a firm.”
Walras’s argument with the English economists concerned a point
of scientific method. He argued that although in practice the functions
of capitalist and entrepreneur may frequently be merged, in theory they
must be treated separately in order to advance clear thinking about the
nature and consequences of each. Surprisingly, he reserved his harshest
criticism for his own countrymen. He accused Say of misunderstanding
the very nature of the entrepreneurial function, declaring that “this
person [the entrepreneur] is absent from his [Say’s] theory” (Walras,
1954, pp. 425–426). In view of Say’s widely recognized preeminence
in the history of entrepreneurial theory, this is an astounding indict-
ment. Yet Walras justified his position by excluding the activities of
coordination and supervision from the entrepreneur’s functions. Those
activities, he argued repeatedly, are part of routine management and
are therefore rewarded by the payment of the wages of management
(cf., Walker, 1986, p. 5).2
A study of Walras’ correspondence shows that he maintained his
position on the entrepreneur consistently over a long period of time. In
his Elements, first published in 1874, he characterized the entrepreneur
2 In listing his criticisms of past writers Walras’s distinction between “English” and “French”
was somewhat artificial: Turgot was guilty of the same “error” as the English classical
economists (i.e., not separating capitalist and entrepreneur); and Mill was guilty of the
same “error” as Say (i.e., identifying entrepreneurship with the coordination and supervi-
sion of productive factors).
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as an intermediary between production and consumption, an equilibrat-
ing agent egged on by profit opportunities in the marketplace. Profit
opportunities exist whenever the selling price is greater than costs of
production. Thus it would appear that the entrepreneur operates in
an arena of disequilibrium. Walras (1954, p. 225) described how the
entrepreneur adjusts supplies in line with manifest demands in a man-
ner evocative of Cantillon:
“[I]f the selling price of a product exceeds the cost of the
productive services for certain firms and a profit results,
entrepreneurs will flow towards this branch of produc-
tion or expand their output, so that the quantity of the
product [on the market] will increase, its price fall, and
the difference between price and cost will be reduced;
and, if [on the contrary], the cost of the productive ser-
vices exceeds the selling price for certain firms, so that a
loss results, entrepreneurs will leave this branch of pro-
duction or curtail their output, so that the quantity of
the product [on the market] will decrease, its price will
rise and the difference between price and cost will again
be reduced.”
In 1887, Walras (1965, vol. II, p. 212) wrote to the American
economist, Francis Walker, that “the definition of the entrepreneur is,
in my opinion, the thing that binds all of economics together.” He per-
sistently argued against the admixture of economic functions, declaring
the entrepreneur to be “exclusively . . . the person who buys productive
services on the market for services and sells products on the market for
products, thus obtaining either a profit or a loss.”
Walras repeated his position on the entrepreneur several years later,
in a letter to his disciple, Vilfredo Pareto, explaining how he dif-
fered from Alfred Marshall on the subject: “Marshall reasons mainly
by assumption that the owner of services is a worker who takes it
upon himself to make goods and sell them,” whereas “I interpose
the entrepreneur as a distinct person whose role is essentially that of
demanding services and selling products” (Walras, 1965, vol. II, p. 629).
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We may take this evidence as confirmation of the fact that the
entrepreneur held a prominent place in Walras’s view of the world as it
actually operates. The extent to which he integrated the function of the
entrepreneur into the core of his analytical system is another matter,
however. At issue is the idealized nature of Walras’s theoretic model and
whether it bears any resemblance to real-world practice. William Jaffé,
a leading Walrasian scholar, and to a lesser extent, Schumpeter, an
avowed admirer of Walras, occupy one extreme in this debate. Michio
Morishima (1980) and Donald Walker occupy the opposite extreme.
Walras himself obscured matters by introducing the “zero-profit
entrepreneur” into his static, general-equilibrium system, a model
devoid of time or uncertainty. Since the entrepreneur neither gains nor
loses in competitive equilibrium, his raison d’etre disappears in that
state. In order to arrive at a determinate mathematical solution, Wal-
ras expunged all of the things from his model that gave meaning to the
entrepreneur. Mathematical nicety and practical necessity inevitably
clashed, and Walras was not able to reconcile the two. This explains
why there are very few mathematical models that formally analyze
entrepreneurial behavior within a closed economic system. Enmeshed
in this dilemma and seeing no way out, Walras developed a theoretic
construct of an economy that worked like a predictable, impersonal,
and frictionless machine. In G. L. S. Shackle’s phrase, it was an “inhu-
man model,” incapable of conveying the full range of economic activity
(Shackle, 1955, p. 91). On this account, Schumpeter (1954, p. 893)
concluded that Walras’s contribution to the theory of entrepreneurship
was essentially negative.
Morishima (1977) defended Walras by re-asserting the centrality
of the entrepreneur in Walras’s theoretic model, but he was roundly
criticized by Jaffé (1980, p. 535), who insisted that “in his whole the-
oretical construct, Walras deliberately abstracted from uncertainty.”
This explains the absence of the entrepreneur, qua entrepreneur, from
the Walrasian model in its “normal” operation. Jaffé (1980, pp. 529–
530) concluded that “as for the role of the entrepreneur in Walras’s
analytical model, the Elements restricted it to that of arbitrageur, and
nothing else.” But Jaffé’s position has been challenged by his former
student, Walker (1986, p. 18), who asserts that Walras made important
326 Early Neoclassical Perspectives
and lasting contributions to the theory of the entrepreneur, and that
Schumpeter built his own novel concept of the entrepreneur on a Wal-
rasian foundation.
Thus, diversity of opinion continues to beset Walras’s contribu-
tion to the theory of entrepreneurship. On the one hand it appears
that Walras had an unambiguous notion of real-world entrepreneurs
and that he assigned them great importance in the practical world of
business. But on the other hand his chief scientific achievement, the
mathematical general-equilibrium model, systematically eliminated –
by assumption (and perhaps by necessity) – the centrality of the
entrepreneur.3 As theory goes, Walras’s general-equilibrium system was
a momentous contribution. But as a suitable showcase for the essen-
tiality of the entrepreneur it was a total void.
6.4 Alfred Marshall and His Disciples
In an earlier section we showed how the English variant of classical
economics (Smith–Ricardo–Mill) tended to conflate the roles of cap-
italist and entrepreneur. For its part, the British neoclassical value
theory did not develop a theory of enterprise, and only grudgingly did
it yield a theory of capital. Consequently, the introduction of marginal
utility theory did not limit the range of possible differences of opinion
concerning the entrepreneur. The new economics took ends as given,
explained allocation of scarce resources to meet these given ends, and
focused attention on equilibrium results rather than on adjustment pro-
cesses. It therefore left little or no room for entrepreneurial action. The
entrepreneur became a mere automaton, a passive onlooker with no
real scope for individual decision-making. Certain British writers kept
the concept alive, however, so that at least sub rosa, the entrepreneur
remained in economic theory.
3 The noted Swedish economist, Knut Wicksell, offered a similar criticism. Wicksell (1954,
p. 95) claimed that Walras’s entrepreneur is a mere fiction, because (a) the buying of
services and selling of goods in which he supposedly engages are more apparent than real
(i.e., involves mere exchanges of productive services against each other) and (b) Walras
completely overlooked the significance of time in production. Unhappily, in his own work
Wicksell repeatedly blurred the distinctions between entrepreneur, landowner, capitalist,
and worker.
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The leading British economist at the turn of the century was Alfred
Marshall (1842–1924), who built a durable bridge between classical
and neoclassical economics. Marshall dominated British theoretical eco-
nomics and its pedagogy for a generation (1890–1920). His approach to
the meaning and function of the “undertaker” and the “business leader”
was influenced by the principles of biological evolution expounded by
Darwin and Wallace. The peculiar skill and ability of the entrepreneur,
Marshall argued, are shaped by an economic struggle for survival in
the competitive marketplace.
Marshall elaborated a concept of entrepreneurship that is rooted in
the writings of Say and Mill, but is more expansive than either’s theory.
The core of his concept remained steadfast, but at the periphery its
facets evolved over time. Marshall (1920a, pp. 356, 358) described the
elements of “business genius” as alertness, sense of proportion, strength
of reasoning, coordination, innovation, and willingness to take risks.
He argued that this combination of abilities could be acquired through
experience, but not taught by formal education.
In his writings, Marshall reserved a special place for the human
agent that directs rather than follows economic circumstances. He
divided entrepreneurs into two classes, active and passive. Active
entrepreneurs are “those who open out new and improved methods of
business,” whereas passive entrepreneurs are “those who follow beaten
tracks” (Marshall, 1920b, p. 597). He made it clear that entrepreneurs
of the latter group receive “wages of superintendence,” but he care-
fully elaborated the elements of superintendence so as to add greater
substance to Mill’s notion of entrepreneurship. However, he reserved
his main attention for the active entrepreneur, whose reward is subject
to risk. The venturesome entrepreneur cannot avoid risk, because he
directs capital and labor to an uncertain end. In order to be success-
ful, therefore, he must be capable of conceiving “wise and far reaching
policies, and . . . carry[ing] them out calmly and resolutely” (Marshall,
1920b, p. 606).
At bottom, Marshall’s entrepreneur was a business manager,
although he used the term management to mean more than mere super-
intendence. Following Darwin, Marshall argued that professional busi-
ness managers emerge as a special group from an evolutionary process
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that is driven by specialization and division of labor. This “Darwinism”
may explain Marshall’s inability or unwillingness to tie the entrepreneur
to a single function or set of abilities. The concept itself seems to evolve
endlessly in Marshall’s writings, but in the final analysis, he placed
more emphasis on the existence and necessity of business ability than
on anything else.4
In his early work, Marshall stressed duty as an important stimu-
lus to human action. But his faith in the widespread application of
this Victorian virtue dwindled during the 1880s. After 1890, Marshall
placed the chief responsibility for the economic and moral progress of
society on the restless, farsighted, pioneering, but unsung entrepreneur.
By 1907, duty had receded farther into the background, and Marshall
(1925, pp. 332–333) was extolling the entrepreneur for his imagination
as well as his leadership:
“Men of this class live in constantly shifting visions,
fashioned in their own brains, of various routes to their
desired end; of the difficulties which nature will oppose
to them on each route, and of the contrivances by which
they hope to get the better of her opposition. This imag-
ination gains little credit with the people, because it is
not allowed to run riot; its strength is disciplined by a
stronger will; and its highest glory is to have attained
great ends by means so simple that no one will know,
and none but experts will even guess, how a dozen other
expedients, each suggesting as much brilliancy to the
hasty observer, were set aside in favour of it.”
In a purely analytical sense, the most important contribution Mar-
shall made to the theory of entrepreneurship was to extend Mangoldt’s
notion of rent-of-ability, though he did not, as Schumpeter (1954,
p. 894) points out, restrict the idea to the entrepreneur. Freeing himself
from the analytical impediments of the classical wages-fund doctrine,
4 In a parallel vein, Marshall made the simple declaration, “Knowledge is our most powerful
engine of production” – an insight that is especially resonant in the digital age, which is
often referred to as “the knowledge economy.”
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Marshall attempted to cut through the amorphous nature of “labor”
to capture the uniqueness of individual ability. Observation and expe-
rience told him that “business genius” was unevenly distributed, and
that unique skills received a kind of surplus, or rent. But he some-
times treated entrepreneurs as members of a class and sometimes as
individuals. According to Marshall (1920b, p. 623):
“[T]he class of business undertakers contains a dispro-
portionately large number of persons with high natural
ability; since, in addition to the able men born within
its ranks it includes also a large share of the best natural
abilities born in the lower ranks of industry. And thus
while profits on capital invested in education is a spe-
cially important element in the incomes of professional
men taken as a class, the rent of rare natural abilities
may be regarded as a specially important element in the
income of business men, so long as we consider them as
individuals.”
Marshall’s tendency to speak of entrepreneurs sometimes as a class
and sometimes as individuals has not helped the cause of clear thinking
on the subject. For example, Frederick Harbison asserts that Marshall’s
notion of the entrepreneur applies not to a single individual but rather
to a hierarchy of individuals. Thus, he argues that the Marshallian
entrepreneur is essentially “an organization which comprises all of the
people required to perform entrepreneurial functions” (Harbison, 1956,
p. 356). We find it difficult to reconcile this interpretation with the idea
of the entrepreneur as a person of unique abilities who receives a quasi-
rent, insofar as quasi-rents can only be ascertained for individuals, and
any aggregation of these magnitudes seems specious at best.
Despite the fact that Marshall wrote during the high tide of com-
petitive capitalism, his theory of entrepreneurship gave little promi-
nence to invention and innovation (Shove, 1942). Also, despite his lip
service to evolution as a vital force in economics, he devoted his intel-
lectual energies mainly to advancing the theory of comparative statics
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and partial equilibrium. For the most part, his students and disciples
followed suit.
Francis Y. Edgeworth (1845–1926), a disciple of Marshall and an
important neoclassical economist in his own right, recognized the
importance of the entrepreneur, but added no new dimensions to the
concept. Initially, Edgeworth (1925, vol. I, p. 16) raised the proverbial
question, “What is an entrepreneur?” By way of answering, he reviewed
the four “type-specimens” promulgated, in turn, by (1) the classical
economists (i.e., the entrepreneur as capitalist), (2) F. A. Walker (i.e.,
the entrepreneur as non-capitalist employer), (3) F. B. Hawley (i.e., the
entrepreneur as risk taker), and (4) Léon Walras (i.e., the entrepreneur
who makes no profit). Unfortunately, he neither reduced the list to a
single definition, nor attempted a workable synthesis. Instead, Edge-
worth suggested that the choice of definition is dictated by the type
of economic inquiry undertaken. But he registered his objection to the
zero-profit entrepreneur, regardless whether this creature follows Wal-
ras’s or Walker’s construction.
Edgeworth returned to the issue of the zero-profit entrepreneur sev-
eral years later, in a sustained attempt to defend Marshall’s version of
the entrepreneur against the “errors” of Walras. The real debate, how-
ever, was not about the action and significance of the entrepreneur; it
was about the reward for the entrepreneur’s effort. Edgeworth acknowl-
edged Walras’s contribution, but rejected his conclusion as paradoxical
and unsound. Ostensibly, Edgeworth shared Walras’s definition of the
entrepreneur as a buyer of services and a seller of products. But he
did not understand Walras’s notion of profits. He speaks, therefore, of
the entrepreneur’s remuneration in terms of wages and interest (i.e.,
Marshallian profits). Walras (1965, vol. II, p. 629) maintained that in
equilibrium the entrepreneur would receive no profit as entrepreneur,
but that he would get non-entrepreneurial income in the form of inter-
est, rent, or (managerial) wages. Thus, Edgeworth’s attack on the
“paradoxical” notion of the zero-profit entrepreneur was based on a
misunderstanding of the nature of Walrasian profits, and was therefore
wide of the mark. Finally, Edgeworth was unable to complete satisfacto-
rily the analysis of income distribution by partitioning the entrepreneur
from the other factors. “To determine at what point the capitalist ends
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and the entrepreneur begins,” he wrote, “appears to defy analysis”
(Edgeworth, 1925, vol. I, p. 48).
Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, A.C. Pigou (1877–1959), also
took up the subject of the entrepreneur, but he was less interested
in the theory of distribution than in the macroeconomic consequences
of the entrepreneur’s activities. From a microeconomic standpoint, his
view of the entrepreneur was passive and unenlightening. He saw the
entrepreneur as an owner and a broker, merely one link in the economic
chain that connects production and distribution. “The entrepreneurs,”
he wrote simply, “by whom the stream of goods that comes to comple-
tion every year is legally owned, sell these goods for money to wholesale
houses and shopkeepers” (Pigou, 1929, p. 132).
When he turned to the macroeconomy, however, Pigou emphasized
the element of uncertainty, which has an impact on industrial fluctua-
tions because of its effect on entrepreneurs’ decisions. “Business men in
making [production] forecasts are shadowed by immense uncertainties,”
he said; and the “immediate cause lying behind general movements of
employment consists in shifts in the expectation of business men about
future prospects, or, if we prefer a looser term, business confidence”
(Pigou, 1949, p. 216).
British thinking on the subject of the entrepreneur developed little
in the generation after Marshall, an era that came to be dominated
by Marshall’s brilliant student, John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946).
Keynes treated the concept rather perfunctorily, retaining some basic
notions of the entrepreneur as financier and employer – the residual
claimant of profit. Like Marshall, Keynes placed the entrepreneur in
the role of decision maker within the individual firm, proclaiming that
his function is to “fix the amount of employment at that level which
[is] expect[ed] to maximize the excess of the proceeds over the factor
costs” (Keynes, 1964, p. 25).
As an active factor of production, the entrepreneur must con-
front uncertainty in his attempts to forecast “effective demand.” The
significance of uncertainty in the Keynesian paradigm has generally
been understated by all but a few of Keynes’s disciples; yet in many
respects it was his most revolutionary contribution. The well-worn
story in the history of economic thought is that Keynes’s concern
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with macroeconomic variables subsequently shifted economists’ atten-
tion away from the entrepreneur toward the performance of certain
aggregates in the economy. However true this may be, there is another
side to The General Theory. Keynes’s focus on uncertainty in decision
making, and more generally on expectations, provides a link between
Marshall’s notion of “the entrepreneur as manager” and the contempo-
rary theory of enterprise and radical uncertainty advanced, for example,
by G. L. S. Shackle, a disciple of Keynes (see Section 9).
Be that as it may, Keynes’ discussion of the animus behind
entrepreneurial activity is distinctly uneconomic and must be
approached with caution. His comment on the nature of the uncertainty
faced by entrepreneurs is that “businessmen play a mixed game of skill
and chance, the average results of which to the players are not known
by those who take a hand” (Keynes, 1964, p. 150). This statement is
innocuous enough, but in its wake Keynes did something extraordinary.
He linked enterprise not to calculations of expected profit alone but to
“animal spirits” – the spontaneous urge to action that Keynes declared
to be innate in the human psyche. Keynes hardly gave precise meaning
to this phrase, and one rarely encounters it in subsequent treatments of
the entrepreneur. He was obviously keen to insert psychological traits
into the discussion. “It is safe to say that enterprise which depends on
hopes stretching into the future benefits the community as a whole,”
he wrote. “But individual initiative will only be adequate when reason-
able calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so
that the thought of ultimate loss which overtakes pioneers, as experi-
ence undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy man puts
aside the expectation of death” (Keynes, 1964, p. 161).
In the final analysis, Keynes’ explanation of entrepreneurial activity
rests as much on whim, sentiment, or chance as it does on rational
expectations of profit opportunities. Psychologically this may be on
the mark, but from an analytical standpoint, it is a dead end.
6.5 Postscript
Among the neoclassical writers, French thinking followed Walras
toward a mechanistic market model that tended to squeeze out the
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entrepreneur. Neoclassical British writers never seemed to escape the
kind of straight-jacket that was bequeathed to them by the Smith–
Ricardo–Mill tradition. Only the Austrians advanced the theory of the
entrepreneur in a substantial way as the 19th century drew to a close.
Their analysis of the subject bore fruit in the later work of Ludwig
von Mises and Joseph Schumpeter, who were schooled in the Austrian
tradition.
7
The View from America
With the Civil War behind it in 1865, the United States began a
period of recovery and reconstruction. This era produced little in the
way of leading economists, as American intellectuals looked to Europe
for stimulation and guidance. Lacking an extensive pedigree in grad-
uate education, the new nation sent many of its leading intellectu-
als to Germany for advanced training. But as the 19th century drew
to a close, American economists began to emerge from the shadows
of European influence and assert themselves more independently. Not
surprisingly, given its rise from colonial status to full-fledged market
economy, economists in the United States revealed a lively and ongo-
ing interest in the place of the entrepreneur within economic theory.
From the outset, U.S. economists improved upon the English treat-
ment by insisting that the entrepreneur be separated from the capi-
talist. Cochran (1968) attributes this fact to the early development of
modern corporations in the United States. But in all likelihood, this
theoretic turn was also affected by a pervasive German influence on
U.S. scholars, many of whom received postgraduate economics degrees
in that country.
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7.1 Amasa and Francis A. Walker
As early as 1866, Amasa Walker (1799–1875) of Amherst College
lamented the confusion in the English political economy between the
capitalist and the entrepreneur. Walker recognized the important role of
the entrepreneur in creating economic wealth, but his discussion of this
special resource did not range beyond the act of production. He defined
the entrepreneur simply as one who brings about “an advantageous
union between labor and capital,” and he identified this special agent,
variously, as employer, manager, entrepreneur, projector, contractor,
businessman, merchant, farmer, or “what-ever else he may be called,
whose services are indispensable” (Walker, 1866, p. 279).1 Although he
called the reward of the entrepreneurial effort “profit,” Walker offered
no real distinction between the reward to the entrepreneur and the
return to labor. “Profits are merely wages received by the employer
(entrepreneur),” he declared, and as such, they are regulated by sup-
ply and demand.
Ultimately, Walker traded one confusion (entrepreneur-as-
capitalist) for another (entrepreneur-as-worker). However, he also
hinted at the notion of profit as a scarcity rent, an idea that his
son, Francis Amasa Walker (1840–1897), later seized and expanded
into a unique theory of profits. Walker (1866, p. 285) noted that
entrepreneurs, like workers, will experience a rise or fall in their
remuneration depending on whether there is excess demand for, or
excess supply of, their services. “If there are too many competing for
profits, the rate will fall until the excess is driven back into the ranks
of labor,” he wrote. “As there are, however, comparatively few, in
proportion to the whole number of persons capable of labor, who have
the requisite capacity and training required for transacting business
successfully, and fewer still who can command the necessary means of
capital, it will follow that the rewards of the employer will be larger
than those of the persons employed.”
1 Schumpeter (1954, p. 519) labeled Walker’s Science of Wealth (1866) “a representative
performance of the ‘non-American’ line of United States economics,” alluding perhaps to
the German influence mentioned above.
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Amasa Walker’s son, Francis, rose to the rank of general in the Civil
War; later became president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology; and served as the first president of the American Economics
Association. He emphasized the fact that the entrepreneur, as distinct
from the capitalist, is the chief agent of production. Like his father, he
depicted the entrepreneur as an employer of other economic resources.
Declaring that French economists since Say had been on the right track,
he criticized English and U.S. economists who depicted the capitalist
as the employer of labor merely by the fact that he possesses capital.
Walker’s clearest description of the entrepreneur’s function is contained
in The Wages Question, where he declared that the entrepreneur’s role
is “to furnish technical skills, commercial knowledge, and powers of
administration; to assume responsibilities and provide against contin-
gencies; to shape and direct production, and to organize and control
the industrial machine” (Walker, 1876, p. 245).
Walker allied himself with the French economists in terms of his
theory of income distribution (1884, p. 203), but he also declared its
affinity with Marshall’s theory (1887, p. 275). Like Marshall, Walker
maintained that profit is the return to the differential skill and talent of
practicing entrepreneurs. In other words, it is in the nature of a rent.
“The term wages cannot be applied thereto,” Walker (1884, p. 204)
declared, “without inducing a wholly unnecessary and mischievous con-
fusion of ideas, leading directly to false results.”
Like Marshall, Walker realized that the successful conduct of busi-
ness under free and active competition depends upon exceptional abil-
ities or exceptional opportunities (the former dominated his thinking).
Both writers recognized as well that these abilities are not equally dis-
tributed throughout mankind, just as land of equal fertility is not uni-
formly distributed over geographic space. Successful entrepreneurs have
the power of foresight, a facility for organization and administration,
unusual energy, and other leadership qualities – traits that are gener-
ally in short supply. By analogy, profit is due to differential ability, just
as land rent is due to differential fertility (or differential location).
Focusing on the analogy between rents and profits, Walker con-
templated a theoretical, no-profits stage of production. Assuming
a homogeneous supply of entrepreneurs (clearly distinguished from
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non-entrepreneurs) sufficient to meet demand, Walker (1884, p. 207)
asserted that either the entrepreneurs would combine to create a
monopoly price for their services, “which is altogether improbable, or,
else, they would, by competing among themselves for the amount of
business, bring down its rate to so low a point that the remuneration
of no one of this class would exceed what he could earn for himself
in other avocations.” This “no-profits” stage of production, Walker
asserted, is directly analogous to the “no-rent” stage of land cultiva-
tion. Consequently, he concluded that profits form no part of the price
of manufactured products, any more than rent constitutes a part of the
price of agricultural commodities (as Ricardo had argued).
In recognition of the random distribution of entrepreneurial talent
across populations, Walker identified four levels of entrepreneurs, each
distinguished by its degree of qualifications. “First,” he said, “we have
those rarely-gifted persons . . . whose commercial dealings have the air
of magic; who have such power of foresight; who are so resolute and
firm in temper that apprehensions and alarms and repeated shocks of
disaster never cause them to relax their hold or change their course;
who have such command over men that all with whom they have to do
acquire vigor from the contact.” Next, in descending order, is a second
class of high-ordered talent, persons of “natural mastery, sagacious,
prompt, and resolute in their avocations”; followed by a third class of
those who do reasonably well in business, although more by diligence
than by genius; and finally, the fourth group of never-do-wells of the
“zero-profit” class, those “of checkered fortunes, sometimes doing well,
but more often ill; men who are in business because they have forced
themselves into it under a mistaken idea of their own abilities, perhaps
encouraged by the partiality of friends who have been willing to place in
their hands the agencies of production, or intrust them with commercial
or banking capital” (Walker, 1884, pp. 208–209).
Except for the different gradations of entrepreneurs, it should be
noted that the view of profit as a return to differential abilities was not
original with Walker. We have seen that Mangoldt sketched the out-
lines of the theory decades earlier, and that Marshall upheld the con-
cept. In fact, it is curious that Walker aligned himself with the French
economists in this matter, insofar as his theory had a greater affinity
with Mangoldt’s, who represented a more familiar German tradition.
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7.2 Frederick Hawley and John Bates Clark
Axnother U.S. economist who insisted on the functional separation
of entrepreneur and capitalist was Frederick B. Hawley (1843–1929).
Hawley had a background in cotton brokerage and the lumber business.
He was a keen student of classical economics, but he was also a fiercely
independent thinker who made up his own mind on analytic issues.
His confrontation with Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital and interest
led him to undertake a more intense study of entrepreneurship. Hawley
(1892, p. 281) firmly believed that it is impossible to understand why
capital has a price unless “we study industrial phenomena from the
undertaker’s point of view.”
In a series of turn-of-the-century articles in the Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, Hawley established a risk theory of profit that he
set against Böhm-Bawerk’s theory. He equated enterprise with risk-
taking and characterized the entrepreneur as the great dynamic force
of a capitalist economy. Stressing risk and uncertainty, Hawley ranked
enterprise with land, labor, and capital as the four fundamental pro-
ductive factors. He regarded risk and uncertainty as commonplace in
the industrial system. He claimed that final consumers must pay for
the risk entailed in every industrial undertaking whether or not capital
is involved. “And the reason is this: that everybody except the gam-
bler – everybody, that is, engaged in industry – prefers a certainty to
an uncertainty” (Hawley, 1892, p. 285).
Here again we find a bonding of entrepreneurship and uncer-
tainty, reminiscent of Cantillon’s early treatment. Although Hawley
was apparently unaware of Cantillon’s performance, he echoed the
phrases of his predecessor. The special peculiarity of every business
risk, Hawley (1893, p. 464) asserted, is nothing more than “the uncer-
tainty of how the selling price of an unsold product will compare with
the cost, or how the cost of an unfinished product will compare with the
selling price, if the latter has been agreed upon.”2 There is a slight Ben-
thamite strain to Hawley’s argument because he recognized that some
elements of cost could be fixed through insurance. But it was John
2 Compare with Cantillon’s vision, as portrayed by Hoselitz (1960, p. 240), that the
entrepreneur is someone who buys at a certain cost price and sells at an uncertain sales
price.
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Bates Clark (1847–1938) who made Hawley aware of the distinction
between insurable and uninsurable risk.
Hawley’s ideas on entrepreneurship were provocative enough to
spark a lively debate between him and Clark, who was the preemi-
nent American economist at the turn of the century. Clark (1892, p. 40)
acknowledged that Hawley and Mangoldt were correct in asserting that
“men do not hazard their capital for an amount of annual gains that
in a long term of years will just offset their losses. They demand more
than this, and they get it.” However, Clark refused to concede that
risk-bearing was an entrepreneurial activity. He argued, as Schumpeter
did at a later date, that all risk is borne by the capitalist.
Clark (1892, pp. 45–46) used the term entrepreneur “in an unusually
strict sense, to designate the man who coordinates capital and labor
without in his own proper capacity furnishing either of them.” It was
his view that “the entrepreneur, as such, is empty-handed,” a phrase
evocative of Israel Kirzner’s “pure and penniless entrepreneur.” In other
words, the entrepreneur cannot risk anything because he has nothing
to risk.
In later works, Clark couched his discussion in terms of statics and
dynamics, giving support to the distinction that inclined Schumpeter
to a more dynamic view of entrepreneurship. In Clark’s analysis the
static state is a situation where demand, capital, and technology are
given. Static conditions do change over time; however, populations
grow, wants change, and improved production technologies are discov-
ered and implemented. But in Clark’s world, departures from static-
state equilibria are evolutionary. The mobility of labor and capital is
requisite to the restoration of new, albeit temporary, equilibria.
In the dynamic economy, Clark made the entrepreneur respon-
sible for the coordination that restores the economy to an equilib-
rium position.3 According to Clark (1907, pp. 82–83), this coordinator
(entrepreneur) may perform several functions: “He may, for example,
both labor and furnish capital, and he may, further, perform a special
coordinating function which is not labor, in the technical sense, and
3 On the deficiencies of the argument that the entrepreneur is a mere coordinator, see Hawley
(1900, pp. 84–89).
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scarcely involves any continuous personal activity at all, but is essen-
tial for rendering labor and capital productive.”
This notion of the entrepreneur as the dynamic force that moves
the economy back to equilibrium after some disturbance is still very
much alive in contemporary theories, but it was soon to be chal-
lenged by Schumpeter’s counter claim that the entrepreneur is the agent
that causes disequilibrium. On the related matter of insurance, Clark
(1892) recognized the differences between insurable and uninsurable
risks (which he termed “static” and “dynamic”), but he did not go
so far as to integrate this distinction into a general theory that based
profit on risk as well as dynamic change.
Hawley offered two rejoinders to Clark’s criticism, one in 1893 and
a summary statement seven years later designed to answer Clark and
other intervening critics. In the second rejoinder Hawley (1900, p. 78)
advanced the view that “all individual incomes are composite, and
that it is hard to imagine one that does not contain an element of
profit and loss, as there is an element of uncertainty in the income
of everybody.” In its time, this was an unorthodox view because it
went against the prevailing tendency to compartmentalize distribu-
tional returns to factors of production. Yet it was particularly stim-
ulating to academic economists who stubbornly resisted the idea that
the theory of enterprise was a dark corner of economics that hid nothing
of real importance.
7.3 Herbert Davenport and Frank Taussig
The theme that engaged Hawley in the 1890s was picked up again
by Frank Knight in the 1920s and expanded into a more robust the-
ory of risk, uncertainty, and profit. But before Knight’s harvest, two
other writers sowed the field. In a much neglected book entitled The
Economics of Enterprise (1913), Herbert J. Davenport (1861–1931)
unveiled the first carefully orchestrated and sustained attempt to
understand economics from the point of view of the entrepreneur. Like
his teacher, Veblen, Davenport was considered something of a maverick
and iconoclast. His book created a minor furor. Fetter (1914, p. 555),
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a leading contemporary, denounced it as radical and unsound, which
may account for its comparative neglect thereafter.
While Fetter ranted about Davenport’s “riotous rhetoric” and off-
beat examples, he failed utterly to confront the genuine uniqueness
of the book – its concerted attempt to reorient economics from the
entrepreneur’s point of view.4 Davenport held that economics consists
of analyzing and explaining the actions of entrepreneurs. “We live in
a society organized under competitive entrepreneur production,” he
declared, and on this axiomatic base, he attempted to reconstruct eco-
nomic theory. The fact that he did not succeed totally does not lessen
the value of his attempt.
The Economics of Enterprise is a general treatise, purporting to
explain production and distribution as well as the roles of money and
credit. It is about competitive economics and its distinguish charac-
teristic, price formation. Davenport’s analysis bears certain imprints
of the Austrian School, such as methodological individualism, empha-
sis on causal sequences (1913, pp. 110–111), recognition of elements
of time preference (1913, pp. 219–222), the significance of opportunity
costs (1913, pp. 62–63), and the necessity of decision making under
uncertainty (1913, p. 74).
Davenport (1913, p. 140) made the entrepreneur the pivotal figure
in the competitive price regime, adopting the Walrasian perspective
that “the entrepreneur is a buyer of services and a seller of products.”
He also proclaimed that “the entrepreneur is the independent, unem-
ployed manager; the one who carries the risks and claims the gains of
the enterprise” (Davenport, 1913, p. 67). Doing Cantillon one turn bet-
ter, Davenport argued that the entrepreneur faces uncertain costs as
well as uncertain sales prices. The entrepreneur’s true costs are uncer-
tain for various reasons (some exogenous), but chief among them is
the indeterminacy of his opportunity costs. Rather than be frozen in
4 To quote Fetter (1914, pp. 562–563) on Davenport: “Peruna, as an example of harmful yet
valued products, is administered in large doses; and burglars with their jimmies, and loose
women with their flaunting appeals, appear so often that they make some chapters of this
book appear like an evening at the uncensored movies.” It is noteworthy that Irving Fisher,
commenting on Davenport’s (1908) earlier work, Value and Distribution, recognized the
“radical if not heretical” nature of that book, but warmly praised its practical side and
declared his hearty assent.
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inactivity by uncertainty, however, it is the nature of the entrepreneur
to hazard a guess and to get on with it. Thus, the entrepreneur “esti-
mates and surmises and hazards where he cannot know, and as a sort
of general summary, setting many things over against many others, he
decides upon his line of largest net advantage, making often not better
than a rough guess, but none the less, a decision” (Davenport, 1908,
p. 74).
Cantillon told us long ago that the entrepreneur adjusts supplies in
line with demands. Davenport went into greater details. He said that
entrepreneurs adjust relative supplies, each by working out his indi-
vidual cost computations, including opportunity costs. These costs are
themselves the manifestation of the fundamental relations of demand
and relative scarcity. He made it clear that the entrepreneur does
not determine prices. However, it is necessary to study the causes of
price from the entrepreneur’s point of view, he argued, because “it is
through the entrepreneur process that the ultimate causes are forced to
obtain expression in a competitive society” (Davenport, 1913, p. 109).
This viewpoint puts him at odds with later writers such as Ronald
Coase, Kenneth Arrow, and Oliver Williamson, who take the exis-
tence of markets as a starting point and who theorize that, in an ideal
world, the price system can and will do everything, with no need of
entrepreneurship.
Davenport was careful always to distinguish between the man
of science (e.g., the economist) and the man of action (e.g., the
entrepreneur). Despite the subjective and uncertain nature of eco-
nomic costs, Davenport (1913, pp. 74–75) asserted that the task of
the entrepreneur is relatively simple. He makes decisions based on cal-
culations as best he can, taking the imperfect nature of the information
that confronts him. He does not concern himself with things he cannot
change; he merely adjusts to them. To do otherwise would “waste his
energies as an entrepreneur” and make of him a “mere scientist.”
According to Davenport, the degree and the direction of
entrepreneurial activity are dictated by costs and by prospective
demands. He did not suggest that the entrepreneur engages in anything
like “creative destruction,” to use Schumpeter’s term (see Section 8).
Rather, the entrepreneur’s role is to oversee the competitive market
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process, which is made intelligible through the interaction of demand
and supply. Davenport hinted at the pervasiveness of entrepreneurial
activity while emphasizing the elements of direction and supervi-
sion. “In the main,” he wrote, the price “process is captained by the
entrepreneur, is guided and supervised by him, and worked out through
him.” Moreover, “all employers of labor or of instrumental goods for
hire are entrepreneurs, no matter whether the prospective product is
to be offered for sale or not” (Davenport, 1913, p. 139).
In the final analysis, Davenport’s entrepreneur, like Walker’s, is an
employer of the other factors of production. His reward, in Davenport’s
view, should properly be considered a subcategory of wages. Strictly
speaking, profit is neither a return to risk, nor a payment for the labor of
superintendence. It is a payment “to the entrepreneur for entrepreneur
activity as such. This profit goes, truly, to him who takes the risk, but
does not, therefore, go as compensation for the risk or in proportion to
it” (Davenport, 1908, p. 98).
By denying risk-bearing as an entrepreneurial activity, Davenport
aligned himself with Clark. Yet he rejected Clark’s marginal produc-
tivity theory of distribution on the grounds that it requires informa-
tion that is unobtainable, even by the wisest entrepreneur. In practice,
entrepreneurs are limited in terms of their ability to assess the precise
contributions of other agents of production. Davenport (1913, p. 148)
concluded that about all the entrepreneur can do is “. . . to attribute to
each factor a degree of serviceability for his ends commensurate with
what he has to pay for it and to treat whatever is left as due to his own
personal activity in the quest for gain. But this is crude in theory; his
profit is partly due to the fact that he is able to make an intermediate
good or agent signify more to him than he has to pay for it in wages
or rent.”
Frank W. Taussig (1859–1940), of Harvard University, reprised
Davenport’s claim that profit is a subcategory of wages, but he
also characterized the entrepreneur as a residual claimant, which
explains the irregularity of his income (Taussig, 1915, p. 159). Taussig’s
entrepreneur guides and directs economic activity. He is a multifaceted
individual, but above all, requires imagination and judgment (Taussig,
1915, p. 163). Differential abilities do exist and are unevenly distributed
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among businessmen, according to Taussig (1915, p. 175), but he insisted
that Walker’s “rent-theory” of profits cannot explain the fundamentals
of profit, only the differences in profits among entrepreneurs.5
Taussig flirted with the Schumpeterian notion of the innovative
entrepreneur as the singular architect of economic progress. He rec-
ognized that in a static world of perfect competition the managers of
industry would receive nothing but wages, which would be determined
in the same manner as other payments for labor. “But in a dynamic
state – a state of unstable equilibrium, of transition, of advance – there
is opportunity for businessmen to secure something more. By taking the
lead in utilizing inventions or improving organization they make extra
gains, which last so long as they succeed in holding the lead. Business
profits, so considered, are ever vanishing, ever reappearing. They are
the stimulus to improvement and the reward for improvement, tending
to cease once the improvement is fully applied” (Taussig, 1915, p. 185).
Taussig studied in Berlin, so he obviously read German.
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development appeared in German
in 1912, but was not translated to English until 1934. Although the
timing is fortuitous, it is not clear that Schumpeter had any influence
on Taussig. Despite some Schumpeter-like phrases, Taussig could not
totally break the link between profits and wages in his own mind. He
maintained that a sharp separation of business profits from wages is
artificial:
“Even the routine conduct of established industries calls
for judgment and administrative capacity, and so for the
exercise of the same faculties that are more conspicu-
ously and more profitably exercised under conditions of
rapid progress. To separate even roughly the earnings
of a successful business man into two parts – one wages,
the other ‘profits’ in the sense of gains from progress –
would seem to be quite impracticable. Looking over the
whole varied range of earnings among those engaged in
5 This same criticism had been leveled unsuccessfully against Walker by Macvane (1887,
pp. 9–11). Taussig took no notice of Macvane’s critique, nor of Walker’s (1888, p. 282)
response.
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the business career, it is simplest to regard them all as
returns to labor, – returns marked by many peculiari-
ties, among which the most striking are the risks and
uncertainties, the wide range, the high gains from able
pioneering.” (Taussig, 1915, p. 185)
In the final analysis, Taussig held that although innovation is one of
the activities that may be performed by the entrepreneur, it is not the
only one, and probably not even the most important one. Rarely, he
asserted, do the requisite business qualities and inventive traits reside
in the same person (Taussig, 1915, p. 164).
7.4 Frank Knight
Of all the American writers, the one to whom we owe the fullest and
most careful examination of the role of the entrepreneur is Frank Knight
(1885–1972), whose contribution was twofold. First, he provided a very
useful emphasis on the distinction between insurable risks and non-
insurable uncertainty. Second, he advanced a theory of profit that
related this noninsurable uncertainty on the one hand to rapid eco-
nomic change and on the other to differences in entrepreneurial ability.
In so doing Knight established a meaningful synthesis of the Hawley–
Clark formulations.
Knight charged that previous “risk theories” were ambiguous
because they did not distinguish sufficiently between two very differ-
ent kinds of risk. On the one hand, risk signifies a quantity capable of
being measured, that is, the objective probability that an event will
happen. Because this kind of risk can be shifted from the entrepreneur
to another party by an insurance contract, it is not an uncertainty in
any meaningful sense. On the other hand, “risk” is often taken to mean
an unmeasurable eventuality, such as the inability to predict the con-
sumer demand. Knight dubbed the latter “true” uncertainty and geared
his theories of profit and entrepreneurship to its magnitude. The best
summary statement of this theory comes from Knight himself:
“[N]ot all “risks” necessarily give rise to profit, or loss.
Many kinds can be insured against, which eliminates
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them as factors of uncertainty . . .. The essential point
for profit theory is that insofar as it is possible to insure
by any method against risk, the cost of carrying it is
converted into a constant element of expense, and it
ceases to be a cause of profit and loss. The uncertain-
ties which persist as causes of profit are those which
are uninsurable because there is no objective measure
of the probability of gain or loss. This is true especially
of the prediction of demand. It not only cannot be fore-
seen accurately, but there is no basis for saying that the
probability of its being of one sort rather than another is
of a certain value – as we can compute the chance that
a man will live to a certain age. Situations in regard
to which business judgment must be exercised do not
repeat themselves with sufficient conformity to type to
make possible a computation of probability.” (Knight,
1951, pp. 119–120)
Modern practice has refined Knight’s distinction in the following
way. Things once considered uninsurable because of lack of a measur-
able probability distribution have, in fact, been insured. Recent liter-
ature therefore makes three distinctions where Knight made two. Risk
refers to the situation where the probability distribution of possible
outcomes is calculable and known. Uncertainty refers to a situation
where the possible outcomes are identifiable but the probability dis-
tribution of outcomes is not known. Radical uncertainty refers to a
situation in which the possible outcomes of a given event are unknown
and unknowable.
By isolating the concept of risk and refining its meaning, Knight
gave new clarity to Cantillon’s theory of the entrepreneur as the bearer
of uncertainty. He also attributed the evolutionary nature of enterprise
organizations to the presence of uncertainty. He asserted that the mere
presence of uncertainty transforms society into an “enterprise organiza-
tion” that is characterized by specialization of functions. The function
of the entrepreneur becomes paramount in this kind of organization as
a specialized agent who reduces uncertainty (Knight, 1921, p. 271).
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This Knightian uncertainty is not easily compartmentalized, for it
pervades all human decision making. But it helps establish a bound-
ary between management and entrepreneurship. According to Knight
(1921, p. 276), the function of manager does not in itself imply
entrepreneurship, but a manager becomes an entrepreneur when his
performance requires that he exercise judgment involving liability to
error. Moreover, the assumption of responsibility for the correctness of
his actions is a prerequisite to getting the other members of the firm
to submit to an entrepreneur’s direction.
An interesting corollary of Knight’s theory is that profit could
not exist without error. Entrepreneurial profit depends on whether an
entrepreneur can make productive services yield more than the price
fixed upon them by what other people think they can make them yield.
Therefore, its magnitude is based on a margin of error in calculation by
entrepreneurs (and nonentrepreneurs) who do not force the successful
entrepreneurs to pay as much for productive services as they could be
forced to pay. It is this margin of error in judgment that constitutes the
only true uncertainty in the workings of the competitive organization.
Furthermore, in Knight’s view it is this uncertainty that is borne by
the true entrepreneur, and explains profit.
Knight took the same position as Cantillon regarding the sepa-
ration of the capitalist and the entrepreneur. Both agreed that the
entrepreneur may or may not be a capitalist – usually he must of
necessity own some property, just as all property owners can hardly
be freed from risk and responsibility. The point both writers stressed
is that whether or not an entrepreneur owns capital, the essence of
entrepreneurship is not to be found therein. As Knight (1921, p. 310)
emphasized, “the only ‘risk’ which leads to [entrepreneurial] profit is a
unique uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility
which in its very nature cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried.”
The range of possible activities undertaken by Knight’s
entrepreneur are wide indeed. Taking inspiration from Knight, Schon
(1963, p. 84) portrays the entrepreneur as a champion of new ideas and
technologies, accepting the risk of failure, but willing to “put himself
on the line for an idea of doubtful success.” Schon (1976, p. 118) sees
the entrepreneur as a kind of “broker” of new technologies, noting that
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“technological innovation requires leaps that cannot be justified before
the fact by those charged with the task. So, there comes into being
a man who takes the burden of risk on his shoulders without formal
justification . . . , entrepreneurs without authority.”
Forrester (1965), however, cautions that today’s entrepreneur gets
but one chance to succeed – a dubious assertion, but one seconded by
Maidique (1980). Not all economists have found Knight’s formulation
appropriate. Redlich (1957) contends that Knight’s theory is of no use
to the historian of entrepreneurship because it offers no distinction
between ownership and control, on the one hand, and management
and decision making, on the other.
7.5 Postscript
American economists took up the notion of the entrepreneur with
increasing intensity as the 19th century drew to a close. The gulf
between the capitalist and the entrepreneur was widened by the Amer-
icans during this period. Despite some disparity in perceptions and
theories among American economists, the idea that the entrepreneur
is not a risk bearer began to assert itself. This represents a break with
the tradition begun by Cantillon. Frank Knight steered the discussion




The writers surveyed up to this point worked mainly within the equi-
librium tradition of mainstream economics. The Austrians and Knight
were exceptions because they were particularly interested in dise-
quilibrium processes. In the main, however, neoclassical economics
concentrated on end-states (i.e., solutions in which the effects of uncer-
tainty have been expunged from consideration). Uncertainty in the
sense of the incalculable has no meaning in this mainstream approach,
because solutions to economic problems require that the actual and
the calculable coincide. Deviations of one from the other, such as true
uncertainty allows, cannot be fully accommodated within the equi-
librium tradition. Thus, Dobb (1937, p. 559) correctly asserted that
“in a system of economic equilibrium the work of the entrepreneur
cannot be qualitatively different from that of any other agent of
production.”
A more robust functional theory of entrepreneurship must allow
some potential for the entrepreneur to engage in decision making that
alters the equilibrium position of the enterprise. J. B. Clark took tenta-
tive steps in this direction, but he did not complete the process. Both
Clark and Joseph Schumpeter were influenced to some extent by the
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German Historical School, a group of writers who were critical of the
received economic doctrine, especially the English variant. Schumpeter,
as we shall see, made the innovative entrepreneur an endogenous vari-
able and placed him at the vortex of his theory of economic develop-
ment. Almost all modern theories of entrepreneurship take their origin
from Schumpeter.
8.1 The German Historical School
The development of economic thought in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries progressed differently in Germany than it did in England or
the rest of the continent. This was due in part to the influence on
the economic method of the German Historical School. The histori-
cists believed that in order to understand man’s economic behavior
and the institutions that constrain it, economics must describe human
motives and behavioral tendencies in psychologically realistic terms.
This group of writers specifically rejected the individualistic under-
pinnings of the English political economy and the notion that man
is a “hedonistic atom” (cf., Spengler and Allen, 1960, pp. 500–524).
The founders of the German Historical School were Wilhelm Roscher
(1817–1894), Karl Knies (1821–1898), and Bruno Hildebrand (1812–
1878). It was their contention that a thorough analysis and a complete
understanding of historical data were prerequisites to a proper devel-
opment of economic theory. Roscher showed an early interest in the
concept of the entrepreneur by expounding Turgot’s version of the the-
ory. His Grundlagen der Nationalöekonomie, originally published in
1854, avoided altogether the term profit, representing the entrepreneur
as a managerial laborer who owns and directs a business on his own
responsibility. His income, besides interest and rent, is described by
Roscher as basically a wage.
The second generation of historicists is represented best by Gustav
Schmoller (1838–1917). Scholler rejected David Ricardo’s abstract
deductive reasoning in favor of a broad historical and empirical
approach to economic theory. Consequently, he amassed mountains of
historical data in order to analyze actual economic behavior. From
his examination of these data he discovered a unique central factor
8.1. The German Historical School 351
in all economic activity – the enterprising spirit, the unternehmer, or
entrepreneur. Schmoller’s entrepreneur was a creative organizer and
manager, whose role was innovation and the initiation of new projects
(Zrinyi, 1962). This creative organizer combined factors of production
to yield either new products or new methods of production. Schmoller’s
entrepreneur possessed imagination and daring. He was a more distinc-
tive force than Roscher’s “superior laborer.”
Schmoller’s ideas were extended by third-generation historicists,
Werner Sombart (1863–1941) and Max Weber (1864–1920). Sombart
introduced a “new leader” who animates the entire economic sys-
tem by creative innovations. This entrepreneur combined the pow-
ers of organization described by Schmoller with the personality
and talent to elicit maximum productivity from individuals engaged
in the productive process. Whether he is a financier, manufac-
turer, or trader, Sombart painted the entrepreneur as a profit
maximizer.
The German historicists characterized the entrepreneurial process
as a breaking away from the old methods of production and creation
of new ones. This disequilibrating process was particularly emphasized
by Weber. He sought to explain how a social system, as compared
to an individual enterprise, could evolve from one stable form (per-
haps under an authoritarian structure) to another type of system. His-
torically, Weber identified such changes with a charismatic leader, or
entrepreneur-like person (cf., Carlin, 1956).
Weber (1930, p. 67) began his analysis of change with a stationary
state construct which visualizes “an economic process which merely
reproduces itself at constant rates; a given population, not changing in
either numbers or age distribution.” In this stationary state the wants
of households are given and do not change; the means of production
are optimal from the standpoint of the firm’s interest and likewise do
not change, “unless some datum changes or some chance event intrudes
upon this world.”
In such a stationary society there is nothing that requires the activ-
ity traditionally associated with the entrepreneur. “No other than ordi-
nary routine work has to be done in this stationary society,” declared
Weber (1930, p. 67), “either by workmen or managers.” Yet, inevitably,
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change occurs. One likely example occurred in pre-industrial revolution
Europe:
“Some young men from one of the putting-out families
went out into the country, carefully chose weavers from
his employ, greatly increased the rigor of his supervi-
sion of their work, and thus turned them from peasants
into laborers . . . he would begin to change his market-
ing methods . . . he began to introduce the principle of
low prices and large turnover. There was repeated what
everywhere and always is the result of such a process of
rationalization: those who would not follow suit had to
go out of business. The idyllic state collapsed under the
pressure of a bitter competitive struggle. . . .” (Weber,
1930, p. 68)
Here we have an entrepreneur at work, upsetting the reigning equi-
librium and provoking the “bitter competitive struggle” alluded to
in the passage above. The critical characteristics of Weber’s success-
ful entrepreneur are his religious imperatives, which make up what
is called the Protestant ethic. This reliance on religious imperatives
makes Weber’s theory unique and challenging, but in a way that blurs
distinctions between sociology and economics. Perhaps for this reason,
Weber (like Marx, and for the same reasons) remains on the periphery
of mainstream economics.
8.2 The Schumpeterian Perspective
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883–1950) defended an instrumentalist
methodology that holds theories to be meaningful only to the extent
that they derive useful results. For Schumpeter the main instrument of
change in a theory of economic development is the entrepreneur. Devel-
opment is a dynamic process, a disturbing of the economic status quo.
Schumpeter regarded economic development not as a mere adjunct to
the central body of orthodox economic theory, but as the basis for
reinterpreting a vital process that had been crowded out of main-
stream economic analysis by the static, general-equilibrium approach.
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The entrepreneur is a key figure for Schumpeter because, quite simply,
he is the persona causa of economic development.
Schumpeter combined ideas from Marx, Weber, and Walras along
with insights from his Austrian forebears, Menger, Wieser, and his
teacher, Böhm-Bawerk. Rather than slavishly imitate the work of others,
he melded these elements into something uniquely his own. He shared
Marx’s views that economic processes are organic and that change comes
from within the economic system, not merely from without (also Clark’s
view). He also admired the blend of sociology and economics that char-
acterized the works of Marx and Weber. From Walras he borrowed
the notion of the entrepreneur, but in place of the phantom-like figure
of Walras’ general-equilibrium system, Schumpeter substituted a liv-
ing, breathing entrepreneur of flesh and spirit. Reflecting the Austrian
economists’ interest in disequilibrium processes, Schumpeter made the
entrepreneur the mechanism of economic change.
8.3 Entrepreneurs and Innovation
To Schumpeter, competition involved mainly the dynamic innovations
of the entrepreneur. This view is most clearly and completely set forth
in his Theory of Economic Development (1912), and echoed in later
works of 1939 and 1950. Although the nature of competition may
change over time, the essential and pivotal role of the entrepreneur
does not.1 Schumpeter used the concept of equilibrium as Weber used
the stationary state – a theoretical construct, a point of departure. He
coined a phrase to describe this equilibrium state, calling it “the circu-
lar flow of economic life.” Its chief characteristic is that economic life
proceeds routinely on the basis of past experience; there are no forces
evident for any change of the status quo. In this circular flow, only
1 Frank (1998) argues that failure to understand or appreciate Schumpeter’s instrumen-
talist methodology has led to a misguided debate about the dichotomous nature of
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur. The alleged dichotomy is said to involve conflicting visions of
the entrepreneur in Schumpeter’s “European period” (1911–1931) versus his “American
period” (1932–1950). In the former, Schumpeter characterized entrepreneurial innovation
as the highly individualized actions of visionaries who create small, new firms, whereas
in the latter (when he was preoccupied with the transformation of capitalism to social-
ism), Schumpeter made the exemplar entrepreneur much less individualistic, arguing that
corporations and government agencies might assume the entrepreneurial mantle.
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products that were produced in the previous period are consumed in
each period, and only products that will be consumed in the following
period are produced.
“Therefore workers and landlords always exchange their
productive services for present consumption goods only,
whether the former are employed directly or only indi-
rectly in the production of consumption goods. There
is no necessity for them to exchange their services of
labor and land for future goods or for promises of future
consumption goods or to apply for any “advances” of
present consumption goods. It is simply a matter of
exchange, and not of credit transactions. The element
of time plays no part. All products are only products
and nothing more. For the individual firm it is a mat-
ter of complete indifference whether it produces means
of production or consumption goods. In both cases the
product is paid for immediately and at its full value.”
(Schumpeter, 1934, pp. 42–43)
In this system the production function is invariant, although fac-
tor substitution is possible within the limits of known technological
horizons. The only real function that must be performed in this state
is “that of combining the two original factors of production, and this
function is performed in every period mechanically as it were, of its
own accord, without requiring a personal element distinguishable from
superintendence and similar things” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 45). In this
artificial situation, the entrepreneur is a nonentity. “If we choose to call
the manager or owner of a business ‘entrepreneur,’ ” wrote Schumpeter
(1934, pp. 45–46), then he would be an entrepreneur of the kind
described by Walras, “without special function and without income
of a special kind.”
But the circular flow is a mere foil. The relevant problem,
Schumpeter (1950, p. 84) wrote in Capitalism, Socialism and Democ-
racy, is not how capitalism administers existing structures, but how
it creates and destroys them. This process – what Schumpeter called
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“creative destruction” – is the essence of economic development. In
other words, development is a disturbance of the circular flow. It occurs
in industrial and commercial life, not in consumption. It is a process
defined by the carrying out of new combinations in production. And it
is accomplished by the entrepreneur.
Schumpeter reduced his theory to three elemental and correspond-
ing pairs of opposites: (1) the circular flow (i.e., tendency toward equi-
librium) versus a change in economic routine or data; (2) statics versus
dynamics; and (3) entrepreneurship versus management. The first pair
consists of two real processes; the second, two theoretical apparatuses;
the third, two distinct types of conduct. The theory maintained that
the essential function of the entrepreneur is distinct from that of the
capitalist, land-owner, laborer, and inventor. According to Schumpeter,
the entrepreneur may be any and all of these things, but if he is, it is by
coincidence rather than by function. Nor is the entrepreneurial func-
tion, in principle, connected with the possession of wealth, even though
“the accidental fact of the possession of wealth constitutes a practical
advantage” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 101). Moreover, entrepreneurs do not
form a social class, in the technical sense, although they come to be
esteemed for their ability in a capitalist society.
Schumpeter admitted that the essential function of the entrepreneur
is almost always mingled with other functions, hence the appeal of
Marshall’s definition of the entrepreneur as manager. But manage-
ment, he asserted, does not elicit the truly distinctive function of the
entrepreneur. “The function of superintendence in itself, constitutes no
essential economic distinction,” he declared (1934, p. 20). The function
of making decisions is another matter, however. In Schumpeter’s the-
ory, the dynamic entrepreneur is the person who innovates, who makes
“new combinations” in production.
Schumpeter described innovation in several ways. Initially he spelled
out the kinds of new combinations that underlie economic development.
They encompass the following: (1) creation of a new good or new quality
of good; (2) creation of a new method of production; (3) the opening of
a new market; (4) the capture of a new source of supply; and (5) a new
organization of industry (e.g., creation or destruction of a monopoly).
Over time, of course, the force of these new combinations dissipates,
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as the “new” becomes part of the “old” (circular flow). But this does
not change the essence of the entrepreneurial function. According to
Schumpeter (1934, p. 78), “everyone is an entrepreneur only when he
actually ‘carries out new combinations,’ and loses that character as
soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to running
it as other people run their businesses.”
Technically, Schumpeter defined innovation with reference to the
production function. The production function, he said, “describes the
way in which quantity of product varies if quantities of factors vary.
If, instead of quantities of factors, we vary the form of the function,
we have an innovation” (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 62). Mere cost-reducing
adaptations of knowledge lead only to new supply schedules of existing
goods, however, so this kind of innovation must involve a new com-
modity, or one of higher quality. However, Schumpeter recognized that
the knowledge that kindles an innovation need not be new. On the
contrary, it may be the existing knowledge that has not been utilized
before. There is probably no time at which the existing store of scientific
knowledge can be completely exploited, but according to Schumpeter
(1928, p. 378), “it is not the knowledge that matters, but the success-
ful solution of the task sui generis of putting an untried method into
practice – there may be, and often is, no scientific novelty involved at
all, and even if it be involved, this does not make any difference to the
nature of the process.”
In Schumpeter’s theory, successful innovation requires an act of
will, not of intellect. It depends, therefore, on leadership, not intelli-
gence, and it should not be confused with invention. Schumpeter (1934,
pp. 88–89) was insistent that innovation and invention require “entirely
different kinds of aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may be
inventors just as they may be capitalists, they are inventors not by
nature of their function but by coincidence and vice versa. Besides, the
innovations, which it is the function of entrepreneurs to carry out, need
not necessarily be any inventions at all.”2
2 The idea of entrepreneurship as innovation has had practical applications as well as an
analytic impact. Sweeney (1985) contends that the goal of the Six Countries Programme
of growth in Europe is to promote innovation by supporting entrepreneurship rather than
other mechanisms of growth, such as research.
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The leadership that constitutes innovation in the Schumpeterian
system is not homogeneous. An aptitude for leadership stems in part
from the use of knowledge, and knowledge has aspects of a public good.
People of action who perceive and react to knowledge do so in various
ways; each internalizes the public good in potentially a different way.
The leader distances himself from the manager by virtue of his apti-
tude. According to Schumpeter (1928, p. 380), different aptitudes for
the routine work of “static” management result merely in differential
success at what all managers do, whereas different leadership aptitudes
mean that “some are able to undertake uncertainties incident to what
has not been done before; [indeed]. . . to overcome these difficulties inci-
dent to change of practice is the function of the entrepreneur.”3
8.4 Entrepreneurial Profits
Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial function contrasts sharply with the man-
agerial function described by Mill, but it has a modest affinity with
Marshall’s entrepreneur, who is also a leader and a person of creative
imagination. Like Marshall, Schumpeter separated the entrepreneur’s
profits from the earnings of management. However, Schumpeter flatly
rejected the idea of profit as a differential rent, insisting that it not
be confused with other factor returns. He argued that the “jumbling
together of interest and profit,” has historically caused much mischief in
economics, leading many writers to the erroneous conclusion that prof-
its are always tending “towards equalization . . . which does not exist at
all in reality” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 153).
Like Clark, whose theory of profits he judged nearest his own,
Schumpeter argued that the very existence of entrepreneurial profits
means that equilibrium has been disturbed. Although entrepreneurs
and profits disappear in “the circular flow of economic life,” Schumpeter
conceived economic reality as a dynamic process of churning from
one equilibrium to the next. The real action (e.g., economic devel-
opment) occurs in disequilibrium. Thus we have his claim: “Without
3 Brown and Atkinson (1981) express similar notions of the distribution of entrepreneurial
talent on aspects of performance.
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development there is no profit, without profit no development”
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 154).
But what is the fundamental nature of profit? For Schumpeter,
entrepreneurial profit is a residual, a surplus of revenue over costs.
A surplus may arise either because an entrepreneur’s new combination
of existing resources lowers costs or raises values (e.g., through produc-
tion of new products). Either way, the size of the surplus is related to
the entrepreneur’s productivity, but not in the same way as the returns
to the other factors of production.
The paradox of profits in the Schumpeterian system is that they
are simultaneously like and unlike other factor returns. Although the
analogy is tempting, Schumpeter (1934, p. 153) denied that profit is
wages. Elaborating further, he added:
“It is certainly not a simple residuum; it is the expres-
sion of the value of what the entrepreneur contributes
to production in exactly the same sense that wages are
the value expression of what the worker ‘produces’. . ..
However, while wages are determined according to the
marginal productivity of labor, profit is a striking excep-
tion to this law: the problem of profit lies precisely in
the fact that the laws of cost and of marginal pro-
ductivity seem to exclude it. And what the ‘marginal
entrepreneur’ receives is wholly a matter of indiffer-
ence for the success of the others. Every rise in wages
is diffused over all wages; one who has success as an
entrepreneur has it alone at first. Wages are an element
in price, profit is not in the same sense. The payment of
wages is one of the brakes to production, profit is not.
One might say of the latter, but with more right, what
the classical economists asserted of rent of land, namely
that it does not enter into the price of the products.”
Many earlier writers – from Cantillon to Hawley – had emphasized
the connection between the entrepreneur’s profit and risk. Schumpeter
rejected this view. Risk falls on the capitalist, he argued, or on the
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owner of goods, not on the entrepreneur qua entrepreneur. Despite
unusual will and energy, Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is a person with
no capital. On this issue, Schumpeter sided with Clark and departed
from his mentor, Böhm-Bawerk, for whom the entrepreneur was clearly
the capitalist, with no possibility of separation.
Schumpeter’s profit theory has been roundly criticized by
Kanbur (1980) for ignoring other forms of risk besides mere
financial risk. Kanbur cites opportunity costs as an ingredient of
entrepreneurial risk, especially for the entrepreneur who is not a
capitalist. One kind of opportunity cost is the risk to reputation,
of which Schumpeter (1934, p. 137) said: “Even though he [the
entrepreneur] may risk his reputation, the direct responsibility of fail-
ure never falls on him.” Kanbur vigorously rejects this proposition. He
claims that the individual need not run an enterprise himself. Every
entrepreneur may confront uncertainty in the form of self-doubt as
to his entrepreneurial ability. Such uncertainty can be circumvented
by taking up employment in which one is less uncertain of his ability
and lending his capital to someone who offers better returns. To
do otherwise is to risk one’s reputation, as well as his capital, at
least in relation to the safe alternative. Thus Kanbur (1980, p. 493)
concludes: “The two risks can indeed be separated out for conceptual
or analytical purposes, not least because the opportunity cost of
the capital will, in general, be different from the opportunity cost of
entrepreneurial effort, and it is relative to these opportunity costs
that gains and losses, and hence risks, have to be conceptualized.”
Kanbur (1979) finds the Cantillon–Knight formulation of
entrepreneurship more amenable to the task of modeling
entrepreneurial behavior, especially for the purpose of discover-
ing the relationship between risk-taking and the distribution of
personal income. Having departed the scene, Schumpeter is unable to
answer modern critics. But many years ago he defended his conception
as non-idiosyncratic and historically legitimate:
“As it is the carrying out of new combinations that
constitutes the entrepreneur, it is not necessary that
he should be permanently connected with an individual
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firm; . . . our concept is narrower than the traditional
one in that it does not include all heads of firms or
managers or industrialists who may operate an estab-
lished business. . . . Nevertheless I maintain that . . . [my]
definition does no more than formulate with greater
precision what the traditional doctrine really means to
convey. In the first place our definition agrees with the
usual one on the fundamental point of distinguishing
between ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘capitalists’ – irrespective
of whether the latter are regarded as owners of money,
claims to money, or material goods. . . . It also settles
the question whether the ordinary shareholder as such
is an entrepreneur, and disposes of the conception of the
entrepreneur as risk bearer.” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 75)
Schumpeter’s defense notwithstanding, other economists have
chided him for his relative neglect of the topic of uncertainty in the
theory of entrepreneurship. Andreas Papandreou argued decades ago
that uncertainty is fundamental to the understanding and appreciation
of the environment in which entrepreneurs break away from the routine.
To compensate for the deficiency in Schumpeter’s theory, Papandreau
(1943, p. 23) posited an alternative definition that makes uncertainty
more explicit: “The entrepreneur would be the one who carries out
innovation under conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability.”
8.5 Postscript
Schumpeter’s influence on the theory of economic development has
been enormous, even among those economists who reject his theory
of entrepreneurship outright. Those who would modify the theory
are forced to deal with it on its original terms. Over the long haul
Schumpeter’s vision and theoretical apparatus have proven more win-
some to economists than Weber’s. In part, this is undoubtedly because
Schumpeter’s theory does not depend on extra-economic factors. Both
thinkers advanced leadership theories of the entrepreneur. Whereas
Weber conceived the innovator as an “ideal type” of the Protestant
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worldly ascetic, Schumpeter portrayed him as the supernormal eco-
nomic agent. The latter is a more plausible analytic stratagem, because
in a theory of economic evolution it is more meaningful to postulate the
appearance of someone of extraordinary economic ability as a mecha-
nism of change than to postulate the random appearance of a John
Calvin or a similar charismatic figure.
Macdonald (1971) has argued perceptively that insofar as theo-
ries of economic change go, Schumpeter’s analysis occupies the middle
ground between Marshall and Weber. Marshall’s theory adapted incre-
mentally to shifts in preference and production functions, the result
being a continuous improvement in moral qualities, tastes, and eco-
nomic techniques. Its shortcoming was that it did not explain busi-
ness cycles, a deficiency that Marshall’s student Keynes set about to
remedy. Marshall’s approach also implied a theory of linear progress,
which Schumpeter’s theory denies. Weber’s theory developed its own
set of moral imperatives and used them to explain rapid social and eco-
nomic transitions that punctuate long periods of historical continuity.
Schumpeter postulated the continuous occurrence of innovations and
waves of adaptation, simply because entrepreneurs are always present
and are a persistent force for change.
Ultimately, the appeal of Schumpeter’s theory of economic devel-
opment derives from its simplicity and its power. This simplicity and
power are summed up in the Schumpeterian phrase, “The carrying out
of new combinations we call ‘enterprise’; the individual whose func-
tion it is to carry them out we call ‘entrepreneurs”’ (Schumpeter, 1934,
p. 74). Yet despite the importance of Schumpeter’s contribution to
economic development, the larger dynamics of his theory have failed
to penetrate deeply into conventional economic analysis. However, eco-
nomic historians have been more ready to apply the Schumpeterian
paradigm.4 On the pragmatic side, Albert Hirschman has tried to bol-
ster Schumpeter’s perspective by emphasizing a “cooperative” compo-
nent of entrepreneurship in addition to the creative component. For
Hirschman (1958, p. 17), an entrepreneur must be more than a cre-
ative “rebel”; he must also embody “the ability to engineer agreement
4 For a recent example, see Hughes (1986).
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among all interested parties, such as the inventor of the [new] pro-
cess, the partner, the capitalist, the supplier of parts and services, the
distributors, etc.” Like many theories developed in the aftermath of
Schumpeter’s performance, however, this added perspective is a com-
plement to, rather than a substitute for, the basic theory.
9
Beyond Schumpeter
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development and the theory of
entrepreneurship within it stimulated a new wave of research on
entrepreneurship in the 20th century. Reaction by the 20th-century
writers has been quite diverse, however. At Harvard University,
Schumpeter’s academic base of operations in the United States, a tra-
dition began that studied the entrepreneur from the standpoint of
economic history. Other writers have been more concerned with the
analytics of Schumpeter’s theory, especially the question of whether
the entrepreneur is an equilibrating or disequilibrating force. Still other
writers divide themselves along neoclassical and Austrian lines. In this
section, we expose and examine these different approaches and the writ-
ers who advanced them.
9.1 Harvard Historical Studies
In the wake of Schumpeter’s treatment of economic development, a
tradition of historical studies of entrepreneurship began at Harvard
University’s Research Center in Entrepreneurial History, established
by Arthur H. Cole (1889–1974). Cole’s interest in the entrepreneur and
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his views on the subject were influenced by Edwin. F. Gay (1867–
1946), founder of the Economic History Association and a follower of
Schumpeter. The entrepreneur as a disequilibrating agent of change
occupies a prominent place in Gay’s philosophy of history, which asserts
that the amount of permissible free competition existing in society
varies with the social need. In this system of free competition the
entrepreneur is a self-centered actor and a disruptive force, but accord-
ing to Gay (1923–1924, p. 12), “there are periods in the rhythm of
history when . . . that disruptive, innovating energy is socially advanta-
geous and must be given freer opportunity.”
Following Gay’s lead, Cole decried the neglect of the entrepreneur
by economic historians and by economic theorists. In order to discover
the uniqueness of entrepreneurship and its importance to economics,
Cole advocated a case study approach that employed various methods,
including cross-sectional investigations of specific individuals over time,
longitudinal studies of particular entrepreneurial functions (e.g., trends
in personnel policies), and conceptual studies in historical entrepreneur-
ship that might provide solutions to current problems.1
Cole’s entrepreneur posseses two noteworthy features, each of which
has early antecedents in economics. First, he is a productive agent who
utilizes other productive factors for the creation of goods. Second, he
makes decisions under uncertainty. In what was the most comprehen-
sive (if not the most wordy) definition of entrepreneurship since Wieser,
Cole (1949, p. 88) defined entrepreneurship as
“. . . the purposeful activity (including an integrated
sequence of decisions) of an individual or group of asso-
ciated individuals, undertaken to initiate, maintain, or
aggrandize a profit-oriented business unit for the pro-
duction or distribution of economic goods and services
with pecuniary or other advantage the goal or measure
of success, in interaction with (or within the conditions
1 See also, Deutsch (1949), who outlined a functional analysis of the study of entrepreneur-
ship resembling Cole’s. Deutsch proposed that the analyst should identify the single, most
important technical or social function performed by the entrepreneur, then investigate this
function (both primary and secondary effects) with respect to a particular time and place.
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established by) the internal situation of the unit itself or
with the economic, political, and social circumstances
(institutions and practices) of a period which allows an
appreciable measure of freedom of decision.”
“Purposeful activity” is potentially a multifarious concept. We take
it to mean that entrepreneurial activity is directed toward some goal,
presumably profit maximization. However, it may also refer to the ratio-
nal ability to make decisions and to implement them.2 “An integrated
sequence of decisions” suggests the importance of organization in the
conceptual understanding of entrepreneurship, a theme amplified by
Jenks (1949).3 The “business unit” as an institutional datum therefore
constitutes the basis for a theory of entrepreneurial action in this view.
Jenks (1949, p. 151) asserted that, “Business unit and entrepreneur
are interdependent conceptions. A business unit consists of a system of
entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial roles structured as a system of
exchange sets, productive performers, and cooperative activities.”
This passage illustrates a major theme of the Harvard economic
historians, namely that the definition and meaning of entrepreneurship
must be associated with environmental characteristics that influence
the entrepreneur’s decision-making process. In this, Cole and the others
have followed Schumpeter’s lead, since he perceived that the innovative
actions of the entrepreneur impact upon the environment in symbiotic
fashion.
9.2 Shackle’s Anti-Equilibrium Approach
Across the Atlantic, G. L. S. Shackle (1903–1992) expressed his belief
that entrepreneurs make history. Shackle focused his attention on the
psychic act of decision in the world of enterprise. At an early point
in his investigation of the nature and essence of business enterprise,
2 Aitken (1949) stressed decision-making parameters in the entrepreneur’s environment,
such as advances in technical knowledge.
3 More recently, Minkes and Foxall (1980) and Alvarez and Barney (2005) have raised orga-
nizational issues in the study of entrepreneurship. Evans (1949), Spengler (1949), and Cole
(1959) maintain that entrepreneurship is really a plural concept. Spengler has suggested
that the entrepreneurial function can be conceived as a set of tasks that needs to be done
and is done by an entrepreneurial group.
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Shackle (1955) identified two roles that must be performed. One is
bearing uncertainty; the other is making decisions. These two roles are
not unrelated, because decision making involves improvisation or inven-
tion – actions that are genuinely possible only in a world of unknowns
and uncertainties.
Shackle was at his best in explicating the nature of business
decisions and the scope for human action within them. An astute
Marshallian, he was critical of mainstream economic theory’s failure to
recognize Marshall’s primary discovery – the role of time in the world
of affairs. Time, Shackle said, weaves a historical tapestry, the threads
of which are the consequences of human decisions. Thus, “we take it
for granted that a responsibility lies upon us for our acts; that these
acts are in a profound sense creative, inceptive, the source of histori-
cal novelty; that each such act is, as it were, the unconnected starting
point of a new thread in the tapestry which time is weaving” (Shackle,
1966, p. 73).
Time and uncertainty are close kin. Shackle’s approach to
entrepreneurship faces uncertainty squarely and rejects deterministic
models, but affirms that some sort of order holds in the world of
practical affairs. In sum, his research agenda calls for the reconcili-
ation of uncertainty and imaginative experience, two elements that
comprise every business decision. But what is uncertainty? To Shackle,
uncertainty is a state of mind, something subjective. This subjective
magnitude is nevertheless bounded by possibility, a condition required
to keep the problem under investigation within the scope of analytic
manipulation. Shackle (1966, p. 86) maintains that without bounds to
human action, an individual is powerless to affect the course of events;
hence, “It is only a bounded uncertainty that will permit him to act
creatively.”
According to Shackle, business decisions involve imagination and
choice in the face of bounded uncertainty. Most of Shackle’s work elab-
orates the second of these two elements. Eschewing the ambiguous term
entrepreneur, Shackle calls decision makers “enterprisers.” He reserves
this term for those engaged in production who actually bear uncer-
tainty, recognizing that “those who wish can contract out of uncer-
tainty” (Shackle, 1955, p. 82). Whereas making decisions and bearing
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uncertainty could be considered two roles instead of one, for Shackle
the enterpriser is the single individual who takes on both roles.
Although the motive behind this shift in terminology is plain,
there is nevertheless strong kinship between Shackle’s enterpriser
and Cantillon’s entrepreneur. Shackle attempts to get inside the
entrepreneur’s head, as it were, in order to discover the basis of
enterprising decisions. In the process, he reflects a combination of
Marshallian, Keynesian, and Austrian concerns. Like Marshall, he seeks
to integrate fully the effects of time into the economics of decision mak-
ing. Like Keynes, he confronts the matter of uncertainty of business
decisions. Like Menger et al., he is a radical subjectivist. Yet there
are important differences, too. Unlike either of the above, Shackle’s
approach to economics is psychological and anti-equilibrium.
Shackle regards his own work as an extension of a Keynesian
problem, namely the determinants of business investment. He per-
ceived a fundamental inconsistency in the Keynesian paradigm. He
called Keynes’s General Theory “a paradox, for its central concern is
with uncertainty, decisions based on conjecture, and situations alto-
gether lacking in objective stability, yet it uses an equilibrium method”
(Shackle, 1955, p. 222). In reaction to this anomaly, Shackle jettisons
the equilibrium method – a radical stroke which probably accounts
for the failure of mainstream economics to take him more seriously.
Shackle’s true followers are relatively few. The most prominent is
Ludwig Lachmann, who also exhibits strong Austrian tendencies.
9.3 Entrepreneurship and Human Capital
Nobel laureate T. W. Schultz (1902–1998) has advanced a theory of
entrepreneurship fully within the neoclassical paradigm. Schultz finds
in contemporary economic literature a persistent failure to see the
rewards that accrue to those who bring about economic equilibra-
tion, especially as it occurs in certain nonmarket activities. A leading
pioneer of the human capital theory, Schultz approached entrepreneur-
ship from this angle. He criticized the standard concept and treat-
ment of entrepreneurship on mainly four grounds: (1) the concept is
usually restricted to businessmen, (2) it does not take into account
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the differences in allocative abilities among entrepreneurs, (3) the
supply of entrepreneurship is not treated as a scarce resource, and
(4) entrepreneurship is neglected whenever general equilibrium consid-
erations dominate economic inquiry (Schultz, 1975, p. 832).
Schultz made two major advances. First, he redefined the concept
of entrepreneurship as “the ability to deal with disequilibria,” and
extended the notion to nonmarket activities (e.g., household decisions,
allocation of time, etc.) as well as market activities. Second, he provided
evidence on the effects of education on people’s ability to perceive and
react to disequilibria. He argued that Schumpeter did not go far enough
in his formulation. “Whether or not economic growth is deemed to be
‘progress,”’ declared Schultz (1975, p. 832), “it is a process beset with
various classes of disequilibria.” To be sure Schumpeter’s entrepreneur
“creates developmental disequilibria,” but Schumpeter did not extend
the entrepreneur’s function successfully to “all manner of other dis-
equilibria,” including laborers who are reallocating their labor ser-
vices; or students, housewives, and consumers who are reallocating their
resources, mainly time.
Schultz (1980, p. 438) also contended that Schumpeter’s
entrepreneurs have become a decreasing part of the technological story
in the present-day society because of the growth of research and devel-
opment in the public sector, a development that Schumpeter could not
have anticipated. In point of fact, Schumpeter spent many pages in his
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed., 1950) explicitly lament-
ing the fact that the growth of bureaucracy dampens the pioneering and
innovating spirit.
Unlike Shackle, Schultz has vigorously defended the equilibrium
method. He claimed that, “Unless we develop equilibrating models, the
function of this particular ability [entrepreneurship] cannot be ana-
lyzed” (Schultz, 1975, p. 843). Therefore, Schultz widened the concept
of entrepreneurship so that it embraced any economic agent that has
the ability to deal with disequilibria; and he insisted that the supply of
entrepreneurial ability is a scarce economic resource.
The supply of entrepreneurial ability is a sticking point for some
economists. Schultz’s theory attempted to discriminate between the
disequilibria faced by firms, households, and individuals in order to
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trace out supply functions for the useful ability to deal with disequilib-
ria. Supply, in this sense, “depends upon the stock of a particular form
of human capital at any point in time and on the costs and the rate
at which the stock can be increased in response to the rewards derived
from the services of these abilities” (Schultz, 1975, p. 834). Testing the
effects of education in this connection, Schultz found it to be a strong
explanatory variable.4
At base, Schultz’s approach to entrepreneurship was shaped by
his firm commitment to the neoclassical paradigm. According to
this paradigm, because entrepreneurial ability is a useful service,
entrepreneurs must have an identifiable marginal product. Accrod-
ingly, there must be a “market” for the service in the sense of normal
supply and demand functions. Schultz summarized his argument in
the following manner, in which he resurrected the Mangoldt–Marshall
position that the value of entrepreneurial activity is a differential
return to ability.
“The substance of my argument is that disequilibria
are inevitable in [a] dynamic economy. These disequi-
libria cannot be eliminated by law, by public policy,
and surely not by rhetoric. A modern dynamic econ-
omy would fall apart were it not for the entrepreneurial
actions of a wide array of human agents who reallo-
cate their resources and thereby bring their part of the
economy back into equilibrium. Every entrepreneurial
decision to reallocate resources entails risk. What
entrepreneurs do has an economic value. This value
accrues to them as a rent, i.e., a rent which is a reward
for their entrepreneurial performance. This reward is
earned. Although this reward for the entrepreneurship
of most human agents is small, in the aggregate in a
dynamic economy it accounts for a substantial part
of the increases in national income. The concealment
4 In addition to works cited by Schultz (1975), especially Huffman (1974), see also Roberts
and Wainer (1971), who conclude that in addition to education a person’s home and
religious background have strong influences on goal orientation and motivation.
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of this part in the growth of national income implies
that entrepreneurs have not received their due in eco-
nomics.” (Schultz, 1980, p. 443)
According to Schultz (1975, p. 843) explicitly recognizing the con-
nection between entrepreneurship and education is merely “the first
step on what appears to be a long new road.” This new road is sure
to contain many potholes and detours. At the most basic level, for
example, it is not clear what the precise connection is between edu-
cation and knowledge. Fritz Machlup (1902–1983), reflecting the influ-
ence of Friedrich Hayek, argued that formal education is only one form
of knowledge; knowledge is also gained experientially and at different
rates by different individuals. Individuals can accrue knowledge from
their day-to-day experiences, claimed Machlup (1980, p. 179) which
“will normally induce reflection, interpretations, discoveries, and gen-
eralizations . . ..” Moreover, the cost of acquiring knowledge is related to
differential abilities: “Some alert and quick-minded persons, by keep-
ing their eyes and ears open for new facts and theories, discoveries and
opportunities, perceive what normal people of lesser alertness and per-
ceptiveness, would fail to notice. Hence new knowledge is available at
little or no cost to those who are on the lookout, full of curiosity, and
bright enough not to miss their chances” (Machlup, 1980, p. 179).
Should we, therefore, synthesize Schultz and Machlup to construe
that entrepreneurial abilities stem from cognitive and experiential
events? Investments in factual knowledge are clearly possible, but there
may yet remain innate differences in individual capacities to receive and
assimilate knowledge from their surroundings. If so, the human capital
approach to entrepreneurship may ultimately rest on a genetic base.
A noteworthy feature of the human capital approach is that it rejects
the idea of entrepreneurial rewards as a return to risk. Schultz main-
tained that although risk is omnipresent in a dynamic economy, there is
no exclusive connection between risk and entrepreneurial activity. In his
words, “the bearing of risk is not a unique attribute of entrepreneurs.
Whereas entrepreneurs assume risk, there also are people who are not
entrepreneurs who assume risk” (Schultz, 1980, p. 441). Thus the ten-
sion between risk and uncertainty continued to mount in the economics
literature well into the 20th century.
9.4. The Austrian Revival 371
9.4 The Austrian Revival
Before the dark shadow of Hitler’s Third Reich crept over the entire
continent, a number of second-generation Austrian economists emi-
grated from Europe in the 1930s. Friedrich Hayek (1889–1992) went to
London. Ludwig von Mises (1881–1972) and Joseph Schumpeter, both
students of Böhm-Bawerk, came to America. Although Schumpeter
quickly found an academic home in the United States, Mises had a
difficult time. Eventually he joined the faculty at New York University
under special arrangement. There he became the standard bearer of
Austrian economics, reaching out intellectually to a small but capable
group of students and followers.
Mises defined economics as the study of human action. Obviously
human action embraces a wide range of activities. Human action that
is distinctly economic takes place in a market framework. According to
Mises, the nature of market activity is that it is an entrepreneurial pro-
cess. Like Clark, Knight, and Schumpeter, who developed their theories
by first introducing artificial constructs of the economy (i.e., the static
state; the circular flow), and then hypothesizing how entrepreneurial
activity alters these states, Mises built his theory upon the notion of
“the evenly rotating economy.” The evenly rotating economy represents
a rigid picture of the world – a state of equilibrium characterized by the
absence of change in date and time, a world of perfect price stability
where market prices and final prices coincide. In such a setting, human
behavior can be nothing more than involuntary response. According
to Mises (1949, p. 249), “this system is not peopled with living men
making choices and liable to error; it is a world of soulless unthinking
automatons; it is not a human society, it is an ant hill.” Only when
human action is viewed as “purposeful behavior,” will change occur,
because “action is change.” The express purpose of the evenly rotating
economy is merely to provide a point of departure for construction of
a realistic theory.5
5 Mises (1949, pp. 248–249) defended the concept on methodological grounds: “There is no
means of studying the complex phenomena of action other than first to abstract from
change altogether, then to introduce an isolated factor provoking change, and ultimately
to analyze its effects under the assumption that other things remain equal.”
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A fundamental aspect of the Misesian human action is that it influ-
ences the future and is influenced by the future. Mises (1949, p. 253)
declared that “the outcome of action is always uncertain. Action is
always speculation.” Thus, participants in the actual economy make
choices and cope with the subsequent uncertainties of the future. In
this context, “the term entrepreneur . . . means . . . acting man exclu-
sively seen from the aspect of uncertainty inherent in every action”
(Mises, 1949, p. 254). It follows that in the evenly rotating system,
no one is an entrepreneur; but in the actual economy, “every actor is
always an entrepreneur” (Mises, 1949, p. 253).
By this view, capitalists who lend their assets with less than perfect
certainty of repayment are entrepreneurs (although this does not imply
that entrepreneurs must be capitalists). So too, are farmers; in fact, no
proprietor of any factor of production is untouched by uncertainty.
Laborers are also entrepreneurs because their wages are determined by
uncertain market activities. What we have here is a logical extension
of Cantillon’s original view of the entrepreneur. Casting a wider net,
Mises brought the landowners and laborers excluded by Cantillon into
the entrepreneurial fold. In other words, Mises generalized uncertainty
to all market activities.
Like many writers before him, Mises examined the role of the
entrepreneur in the context of the theory of income distribution. He
distinguished between functional distribution and historical distribu-
tion, drawing attention to the entrepreneur in each, and exposing the
ambiguity of the concept in its dual use. On the one hand, Mises said,
economics uses the term entrepreneur in a general sense (those who
receive a functional share of aggregate income) and on the other hand
it uses the term in the narrower sense of those “who are especially
eager to profit from adjusting production to the expected changes in
conditions, those who have more initiative, more venturesomeness, and
a quicker eye than the crowd, the pushing and promoting pioneers of
economic improvement.” He concluded that it is awkward to use the
same to signify two different notions and that it might be “more expe-
dient to employ another term for this second notion – for instance, the
term ‘promoter”’ (Mises, 1949, pp. 254–255).
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It is tempting to identify this second type of economic agent with
the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, especially inasmuch as Mises (1949,
p. 255) argued that “The driving force of the market, the element
tending toward unceasing innovation and improvement, is provided
by the restlessness of the promoter and his eagerness to make prof-
its as large as possible.” But Mises took pains to distinguish his con-
ception of the entrepreneur from Schumpeter’s. Referring to “errors
due to the confusion of entrepreneurial activity and technological
innovation and improvement,” Mises (1951, p. 11–12) argued that
“changes in . . . consumers’ demand, may require adjustments which
have no reference at all to technological innovations and improve-
ments.” The entrepreneur’s job is not merely to experiment with
new technological methods, he asserted, but to select from a host
of technologically feasible methods “. . . those which are best fit to
supply the public in the cheapest way with the things they are ask-
ing for most urgently. Whether a new technological procedure is
or is not fit for this purpose is to be provisionally decided by the
entrepreneur and will be finally decided by the conduct of the buying
public.” So although it is the function of the entrepreneur to make
decisions, decisions involving innovation and technological improve-
ments do not constitute an exhaustive set where the entrepreneur is
concerned.
In the capitalist tradition of economic development, profit and
loss are the carrot and stick of entrepreneurial activity. “It is the
entrepreneurial decision,” said Mises (1951, p. 21), “that creates either
profit or loss,” not capital itself, as Marx thought. Capital can be used
in support of either good or bad (mistaken) ideas. If utilized in support
of a good idea, profit results; if used to underwrite a bad idea, losses
occur. He added: “It is the mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur,
from which profits ultimately originate. Profit is a product of the mind,
of success in anticipating the future state of the market.”
However one perceives the differences between Mises’s theory of
entrepreneurship and Schumpeter’s, there appears to be no signif-
icant differences at all between Mises and Knight on this issue.
Mises, of course, brought some traditional Austrian concerns to the
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discussion, but on practically every fundamental point dealing with
the subject of entrepreneurship he comes across as a “Knightian.”
His precise intellectual debt to Knight remains, however, a matter of
speculation.
The most provocative of the “new” theories of entrepreneurship
from the Austrian camp has been put forward by Mises’s student, Israel
Kirzner (1930– ). For Kirzner, the essence of entrepreneurship is alert-
ness to profit opportunities. Acknowledging the combined influence of
Mises and Hayek, Kirzner offers his theory as a halfway house between
the “neoclassical” view of Schultz and the “radical” view of Shackle. He
bases his approach to entrepreneurship on three important ideas. The
first is Mises’s central vision of the market as an entrepreneurial pro-
cess. The second is Hayek’s vital insight that the marketplace engenders
a learning process. And the third is the conviction that entrepreneurial
activities are creative acts of discovery (Kirzner, 1985, p. x).
Like Shackle, Kirzner is critical of mainstream economics because
it leaves no room for purposeful human action. But unlike Shackle,
Kirzner does not wish to abandon the framework of economic equilib-
rium. Therefore, Kirzner accepts that the role of the entrepreneur is
to achieve the kind of adjustment necessary to move economic mar-
kets toward the equilibrium state. This crucial role is overlooked, he
contends, by economic models that focus on equilibrium results rather
than the process of equilibrium.
Following Mises, Kirzner (1979b, p. 110) maintains that mainstream
neoclassical economics – as equilibrium analysis – defines “a state in
which each decision correctly anticipates all other decisions,” one in
which decisions are made and actions taken by mere mechanical cal-
culations; judgment has no place; and each market participant makes
decisions that merely adjust given means to suit a given end. By con-
trast, in the Misesian dynamic economy, knowledge is neither complete
nor perfect, therefore markets are constantly in states of disequilib-
rium, and it is disequilibrium that gives scope to the entrepreneurial
function.
In his earliest formulation of entrepreneurship, Kirzner seemed to
depart from Mises in several ways, thereby drawing fire from otherwise
friendly critics. One objection has been leveled against Kirzner’s “pure
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and penniless entrepreneur,” that is, an entrepreneur who does not
own any capital. The gist of the criticism is that if one has nothing to
lose, there is no sense in which he can be said to bear risk, which
is the essence of Mises’s concept of entrepreneurship. Mises (1951,
p. 13) wrote: “There is a simple rule of thumb to tell entrepreneurs
from non-entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are those on whom the inci-
dence of losses on the capital employed falls.” Independently of Mises,
yet allegedly in the same tradition, Kirzner argues that the essence of
entrepreneurship is alertness to perceived profit opportunities, an idea
that is implicit in the works of Wieser and Mises, but they failed to
develop its full implications.
In his lectures, Kirzner likes to stress the analogy that the
entrepreneur is a person who, upon seeing a $10 bill on the ground in
front of him, is alert to the opportunity and quickly grabs it. The alert
person will seize it quickly; the less alert will take longer to recognize
the opportunity and to act upon it. Not all entrepreneurs are created
equal. By stressing pure alertness in this fashion, Kirzner emphasizes
the quality of perception, recognizing an opportunity that is a sure
thing; whereas in reality every profit opportunity is uncertain. Kirzner’s
best known case for illustrating alertness is that of the arbitrageur,
the person who, because of differences in intertemporal or interspa-
tial demands, discovers the opportunity to buy at low prices and sell
the same items at high prices. In these cases, Kirzner’s entrepreneur
requires neither capital, as does Mises’s entrepreneur, nor imagination,
as does Shackle’s enterpriser.
In response to critics, Kirzner has elaborated his view of
entrepreneurship vis-a-vis uncertainty. White (1976) and Rothbard
(1985) – in his endorsement of a discussion by Hébert (1985) – ques-
tioned the role of uncertainty in Kirzner’s view of the entrepreneur.
The issue raised by these writers is that arbitrage deals with
present, known opportunities to exploit price differences that exceed
transactions/transfer costs over time or space, whereas uncertainty
exists solely with respect to the future. By confining entrepreneurial
activity to the practice of arbitrage, therefore, Kirzner downplays
the importance of uncertainty in human decision making. The
consequences are important to economic analysis because a theory
376 Beyond Schumpeter
that ignores uncertainty cannot explain entrepreneurial losses, only
entrepreneurial gains.6
Kirzner has recently confronted this asymmetry and has altered his
position somewhat. He now contends that uncertainty is central to the
notion of entrepreneurial activity, but the relationship is more subtle
than formerly supposed. Entrepreneurship that is also arbitrageurship
involves discovery of past error (i.e., a single-period market decision),
whereas entrepreneurship in the face of uncertainty involves multi-
period market decisions requiring the imagination and creativity of
Shackle’s enterpriser. Both views define profit opportunities, but the
latter gives wider scope to the framework-constructing talents of the
entrepreneur and therefore stresses his history-making role. The for-
mer view, by contrast, emphasizes calculation and judgment by the
entrepreneur within a given framework.
As a result, Kirzner now defends a synthetic view of entrepreneur-
ship that combines the epoch-making activities of the entrepreneur (à
la Shackle) with the corrective adjustments of the arbitrageur, which
he formerly stressed. In this new form, the nature of entrepreneurship
is more directly traced backwards through Mises to the original formu-
lation of Cantillon. Time and uncertainty may alter the form of action
called entrepreneurship but they do not change the entrepreneur’s
essential function. This realization is the basis for Kirzner’s wider view
that, “In the single-period case alertness can at best discover hitherto
overlooked current facts. In the multiperiod case entrepreneurial alert-
ness must include the entrepreneur’s perception of the way in which
creative and imaginative action may vitally shape the kind of trans-
actions that will be entered into in future market periods” (Kirzner,
1985, pp. 63–64). In other words, one must specify the nature of the
market process under investigation in order to understand the concrete
manifestation of the entrepreneurial function within that process.
6 Rothbard (1985, p. 282) argues that even the arbitrageur is subject to uncertainty: “The
arbitrageur can perceive that a product sells for one price at one place and at a higher
price somewhere else, and therefore buy in the first place to sell in the second. But he
better be cautious. The transactions are not instantaneous, and something might occur
in the interim to change the seemingly certain profits into losses. It is, after all, possible
that the other entrepreneurs, far from purblind to the profit opportunity lying await for
arbitrage, knew something which our would-be arbitrageur does not.”
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The notion of a normal supply curve of entrepreneurial ability
became a major issue of contention between Kirzner and Schultz.
Schultz (1980, p. 439) criticized Kirzner for neglecting entrepreneurship
as a scarce resource (i.e., failure to treat it in terms of a supply curve).
Kirzner responded that it is simply not useful to do so, because alert-
ness involves no identifiable costs or required amounts (1985, p. 89).
There has been no rapprochement on this issue because the two con-
testants have been at cross purposes. Schultz conceives entrepreneurial
ability as a service – which, if it can be narrowly defined, may be
amenable to the notion of a schedule of prices and quantities.7 However,
Kirzner regards alertness (i.e., entrepreneurship) as a human character-
istic which is either present or not. For Kirzner, alertness, like beauty,
cannot be fundamentally augmented once nature has bestowed its indi-
vidual allotments.
Despite this fundamental disagreement, the theories of Kirzner and
Schultz touch on a number of important issues. Both writers view the
entrepreneur as someone who perceives the opportunity for gain in a
disequilibrium situation and acts accordingly. Both believe that the
concept is all-important and much more extensive in scope than it has
heretofore been represented in economic literature. The lines of demar-
cation between the two theories tend to be drawn on methodological
rather than analytical grounds.
9.5 Entrepreneurship and X-Inefficiency
Neo-Austrian economists like Kirzner offer a theoretical alternative
to the general equilibrium paradigm of neoclassical economics. Their
framework eschews the comparative-statics, perfect-markets vision of
economic activity in favor of a system that emphasizes change, error,
and imperfections in markets and in human decision making. Yet theirs
is not the only challenge to the dominant paradigm, for we have seen
that Clark, Schumpeter, and Shackle have all launched criticisms and
7 While admitting the analytical intractability of entrepreneurship, Baumol (1983) has
endorsed the notion of a supply curve of entrepreneurial ability based on a number of
exogenous influences (e.g., genetics, cultural conditions, educational systems, attitudes
toward economic success, and so forth). Both Baumol and Schultz are squarely in the
neoclassical tradition of economic theory.
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alternative visions of the neoclassical framework that have met with
some success. Another recent challenge that has come from outside
the Austrian circle is the theory of X-efficiency devised by Harvey
Leibenstein (1922–1994).
It is debatable whether entrepreneurship is central or incidental to
Leibenstein’s theory. What is clear is that the X-efficiency paradigm
excludes precisely those aspects of the neoclassical framework that
virtually eliminated the role of the entrepreneur. In a perfectly com-
petitive world of general equilibrium, all participants are viewed as
successful maximizers of utility and all firms are seen as producing
efficiently. Leibenstein rejects this vision, substituting inefficiency as
the norm. The market imperfections that account for X-inefficiency in
Leibenstein’s (1979) theory arise chiefly from organizational entropy,
human inertia, incomplete contracts between economic agents, and con-
flicting agent-principal interests. In the X-inefficient world, firms do
not necessarily maximize profits, nor do they always minimize costs.
Obviously, one’s view of what the entrepreneur does depends on his
vision of the market. The X-inefficient world is one of persistent slack,
which implies the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities. According
to Leibenstein (1968), these opportunities fall into four categories: the
connection of different markets, correction of market deficiencies (gap
filling), completion of inputs, and creation or extension of time-binding,
input-transforming entities (i.e., firms). But Leibenstein’s entrepreneur
must work hard to discover such opportunities. The existence of slack
and the fact that not all inputs are marketed tend to obscure profit sig-
nals, so that they must be ferreted out. A world with as many market
imperfections as Leibenstein’s must nevertheless give as wide a scope
for entrepreneurial activity as a perfectly competitive situation takes
away from it.
Leibenstein emphasizes the input-completing function as the critical
role of the entrepreneur. This involves filling gaps in the production pro-
cess and overcoming obstacles to production. Leibenstein (1979, p. 134)
asserts that “there are both empty spaces and fuzzy areas between
what is being bought, and what can be done for productive purposes
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with what is bought.”8 In his view motivation is the one input that
is always missing. He treats individual effort as a variable in produc-
tion, and because of this, denies the existence of a unique production
function. This last fact adds a dimension of entrepreneurial uncer-
tainty that is augmented by organizational entropy within the firm,
which the entrepreneur must try to overcome. According to Leiben-
stein (1979, p. 135): “. . . product space is not continuous. It is not so
dense everywhere that every variety of product exists. Products come
in discontinuous chunks, as it were, and not as individual characteris-
tics or qualities. Hence the entrepreneur has to marshal enough of the
missing or difficult to get inputs to produce an integrated collection of
qualities.”
Leibenstein’s vision leads to an open-ended theory of profits. In
answer to the question what do entrepreneurs get, Leibenstein replies
“whatever they can, or are clever enough to arrange to get.” The X-
inefficiency framework does not favor one theory of profit over another;
it emphasizes a menu of contractual possibilities. As a consequence
of his activities as an incomplete completer, the entrepreneur is put
in a strategic position to work out favorable contracts that determine
the size and form of his reward. He may become a residual claimant,
either individually or as a member of a group of residual claimants.
He can take a fixed and immediate share of the capitalized value of
the enterprise. Or he can appoint himself a manager so that he may
receive both a wage and a share in the residual claims (Leibenstein,
1979, p. 136).
Leibenstein’s paradigm seems to intersect the Austrian theory at a
number of critical junctures, yet neo-Austrian theorists have remained
somewhat skeptical of its analytical potency. Neo-Austrians have a
tendency to interpret Leibenstein’s entrepreneurship as merely one
interesting feature of the economic landscape, not as a factor cen-
tral to the economic process. Kirzner (1979a, p. 142) has written that
Leibenstein’s entrepreneurship “is a feature that indeed seems to come
8 Less hostile critics of Leibenstein maintain that the existence of “fuzzy areas” is charac-
teristic of his theory as well, while more hostile antagonists (e.g., Stigler, 1976) question
the very existence of the concept of X-inefficiency.
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into focus when observed through the X-efficiency lens; but the X-
efficiency paradigm can be presented without any special reference to
entrepreneurs.” By contrast, neo-Austrians treat the entrepreneur as
the key to understanding the entire course of economic phenomena. It
is through the entrepreneur’s thoughts and actions that what happens
in the disequilibrium state is made intelligible.
9.6 Postscript
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development and the prominence it
gave to the entrepreneur sparked a host of studies at Harvard Uni-
versity and elsewhere that attempted to put a historical face on the
entrepreneur. But throughout most of the 20th century, theories about
the nature and role of entrepreneurship have focused on one issue or
the other: either the cleavage between risk and uncertainty or the issue
of equilibration versus disequilibration. These issues remain mostly
unresolved as we nudge our way into the 21 century. Nevertheless,
20th-century writers showed a marked tendency to widen the notion
of entrepreneurship to the point that almost every economic action
involving uncertainty and/or adjustment to disequilibria involves some
element of entrepreneurship.
10
The Entrepreneur and the Firm
Economic theory and tradition present us with two basic explanations
of why things are produced and distributed as they are. One explana-
tion says that the price mechanism is the allocator of resources, the inte-
grative force in a market economy. Another says that the entrepreneur
performs this function. The first economist to ask why one integrating
force, the entrepreneur, should substitute for another, the price sys-
tem, was Ronald Coase (1910– ). In a pioneer article, The Nature of
the Firm, Coase (1937) questioned why firms are commonly used as
resource allocation mechanisms, when economic theory dictates that
the price mechanism is an efficient allocator in competitive markets. If
the competitive price system is an efficient allocator of resources, why
do we have firms? And given that firms exist, does their presence imply
market failure, or the absence of competition?1
1 Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1975), among others, have argued that the existence of
economic organizations is evidence of market failure.
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10.1 Transaction Costs and the Firm
In answering these questions, Coase applied the Marshallian principle
of substitution-at-the-margin to his investigation of the internal work-
ings of organizations. He asserted that firms exist because using the
price system imposes costs that can be reduced or overcome by admin-
istrative arrangements. These costs are numerous and varied, but to
Coase the most significant was the cost of discovering what the rel-
evant prices are in a market system. Contract and transaction costs
for multiple exchanges make up most of the other costs he identified.2
In Coase’s view, production can be organized through the price mech-
anism, an impersonal means of allocating resources, or through the
administrative channels of a firm guided by a person or persons we
shall call the entrepreneur.
Coase’s theory of the firm offers an economic explanation for verti-
cal integration. The entrepreneur’s function within the firm is to detect
where the costs of transferring resources from one stage of production
to another via the price system (i.e., exchange) are high relative to the
costs of transferring them via an administrative act. Boudreaux (1986,
p. 18), an economist who has studied Coase carefully, summarized: “If
an entrepreneur notices ‘excessive’ costs hindering the movement of
resources from one stage to another, he internalizes the various stages
of production so that they come under one roof of common ownership.
This internalization economizes on transaction costs that would other-
wise attend the transfer of resources from one stage of production to
the next.”
The limit to this kind of activity by the entrepreneur is determined
by the costs of establishing and maintaining administrative arrange-
ments that supplant the price mechanism. The costs of administrative
direction rise with the size of the firm, that is, with the increasing num-
ber and complexity of administrative arrangements that comprise the
firm’s institutional network. Thus, the efficient entrepreneur is always
substituting at the margin. He increases the size of the firm whenever
the costs of exchanging resources across lines of ownership exceed the
2 For a detailed analysis of these costs, and of the effect of cost differentials on the firm size,
see Boudreaux (1986, pp. 18–30).
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costs of doing so by administrative action. He decreases the size of the
firm whenever the costs of administrative transfer exceed the costs of
market transfer. It follows that the entrepreneur’s profit is equal to
the cost saving achieved by changing the firm’s size in line with this
principle.
In this view the firm is a true and literal substitute for the price
mechanism because – as in general-equilibrium price theory – the
entrepreneur’s task is pre-ordained. He is merely required to calculate
administrative versus market costs and adjust his organization accord-
ingly in line with the profit incentive. On close examination, the nature
of decision making in this kind of firm involves neither human discretion
nor uncertainty bearing. The chief merit of this view has been the illu-
mination of transaction costs and how they affect the nature of the firm.
A “transaction costs” approach to the firm was pioneered indepen-
dently by Plant (1937), who attempted to explain why firms become
centralized or decentralized. Subsequent independent inquiries into the
organization theory by Edith Penrose, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and
H. B. Malmgren also extended the analysis initiated by Coase. Penrose
(1959) theorized that firms evolve in a dynamic state of rivalrous com-
petition as a consequence of the plans and willful acts of entrepreneurs.
The growth and prosperity of each firm, therefore, depends on the
entrepreneur’s ability to plan effectively and to devise efficient admin-
istrative mechanisms and hierarchies.
Chandler (1962) advanced the thesis that a firm’s administrative
structure is primarily a function of its business strategy. The connec-
tion to entrepreneurship is that he regards business strategy as an
entrepreneurial activity because it involves foresight, deliberation, plan-
ning, and dealing with uncertainty.
Malmgren (1961) refined Coase’s analysis by his thoughtful elab-
oration of the costs involved in using the price system to allocate
resources. These costs are attributable primarily to market imperfec-
tions and uncertain input prices. Malmgren (1961, p. 399) concluded
that “the market operates between firms, but the entrepreneur is the
planning and coordinating agent within the bounds of any one firm.”
Unlike Coase, he stressed uncertainty, but he confined uncertainty only
to input prices and quantities. Both Coase and Malgrem considered
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the final end of the production process as fixed, so the entrepreneur’s
judgment in either case does not extend to the choice of which product
to produce.
10.2 Entrepreneurs and Output-Price Uncertainty
This last issue affords a point of contrast between theories of the firm
advanced by Coase on the one hand and Knight on the other. Like all
theories that forsake uncertainty, Coase’s theory focused on the exe-
cution of economic activity rather than its conception and planning.
Knight emphasized conception and planning, noting how the presence
of uncertainty induces major changes in the organon of economic the-
ory. “With uncertainty present,” Knight (1921, p. 268) wrote, “doing
things, the actual execution of activity, becomes in a real sense a sec-
ondary part of life: the primary problem or function is deciding what to
do and how to do it.” Knight recognized that producers take the respon-
sibility of forecasting consumers’ wants. But he insisted that “. . . the
work of forecasting and at the same time a large part of the technolog-
ical direction and control of production are still further concentrated
upon a very narrow class of the producers, and we meet with a new
economic functionary, the entrepreneur.”
According to Knight, this rise of the entrepreneur class brings
about major changes in the basic form of business organization.
Internal organization of a business cannot be entrusted to chance or
to mere mechanical formula in the face of uncertainty. Entrepreneurs
are required to make discretionary decisions. Firms are compelled to
recognize the disparity among individuals regarding intellect, judg-
ment, and venturesomeness. The successful business must establish
an organizational structure to promote successful decision making. It
does so, according to Knight (1921, pp. 269–270), by encouraging the
confident and venturesome to assume the risk which the doubtful and
timid wish to avoid. In a phrase, entrepreneurs “insure” the latter
group by guaranteeing them a specified income in return for a share
of the enterprise’s outcome.
In sum, the Knightian firm exists because the real world can-
not meet all the conditions for competitive equilibrium dictated by
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economic theory. Knight held that the price system is effective in allo-
cating resources among alternative uses but that it does not establish
the pattern of alternative uses, which is established by entrepreneurs.
Thus, the essence of entrepreneurship is judgment, born of uncertainty.
“Any degree of effective exercise of judgment, or making decisions,”
Knight (1921, p. 271) wrote, “is in a free society coupled with a cor-
responding degree of uncertainty-bearing, of taking the responsibility
for those decisions.” This responsibility is expressed in the collateral
guarantees of fixed remuneration given to resource suppliers by the
entrepreneur.
As we noted previously, in its basic form and content, Knight’s the-
ory of entrepreneurship is the logical extension of Cantillon’s early and
rich insight into how markets work. It is also a logical antecedent to
Coase’s theory. The opportunity for transactions to take place must
exist before the cost of such transactions can be used to explain
the nature of the firm. Coase’s analysis takes for granted the pri-
mary question of what to produce. Insofar as it emphasizes calculation
rather than judgment, it provides no meaningful way to distinguish
the entrepreneur from other hired inputs. In other words, Coase
worked within the confines of the standard, neoclassical price theory.
He adopted the static, general-equilibrium method of analysis, which
abstracts from time and uncertainty. As a theory of the firm, his anal-
ysis is imaginative and insightful. As a theory of the entrepreneur,
however, it is limited in scope and substance.
Like Coase, Knight, too, considered it anomalous that firms exist in a
regime of perfect competition. To explain the anomaly, he pushed eco-
nomic analysis outside the standard neoclassical paradigm. In place of
the perfect foresight hypothesized in static, general-equilibrium models,
he substituted entrepreneurial judgment. He made uncertainty the cor-
nerstone of his theory, and he adopted Cantillon’s concept of uncertainty
(refined to distinguish between insurable and uninsurable risks). This
practice places uncertainty at the point of final consumer goods and ser-
vices. One can almost hear the echo of Cantillon in the following passage:
“[T]he main uncertainty which affects the entrepreneur
is that connected with the sale price of his product. His
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position in the price system is typically that of a pur-
chaser of productive services at present prices to convert
into finished goods for sale at the prices prevailing when
the operation is finished. There is no uncertainty as to
the prices of the things he buys. He bears the technolog-
ical uncertainty as to the amount of physical product
he will secure, but the probable error in calculations
of this sort is generally not large; the gamble is in the
price factor in relation to the product.” (Knight, 1921,
pp. 317–318)
Thus for Knight (as compared to Coase), output price uncertainty
accounts for the unique nature of the firm. Transaction costs do not
enter the picture at this stage of inquiry, because they are secondary
to the originative acts of (1) deciding what goods are to be produced
and (2) establishing the appropriate administrative organization to do
so. Whereas Coase took markets for granted, Knight wished to under-
stand the dynamic problem of how markets are created. The creation
of markets, he believed, is an entrepreneurial function. Prices allocate
resources, but they do not create markets; entrepreneurs do. From
Knight’s perspective, therefore, the price system could never be viewed
as a complete substitute for the entrepreneur.
Coase criticized Knight’s theory because it neglected the role of
contracts in defining entrepreneurial activity. However, we have seen
that the chief function of Knight’s entrepreneur is to contract away
uncertainty by offering collateral guarantees (i.e., fixed payments) to
resource suppliers. Ironically, Coase (1937, p. 347) found this element
of contracting in Knight “irrelevant.” What mattered most to him was
finding the reason why the price mechanism should be superseded, and
he could not discover this reason in Knight’s treatment of the firm.
Coase’s perceptive analysis of transaction costs eventually spawned
a new literature which embellishes the idea of the entrepreneur
as contractor.3 The transactions cost literature has flowered in the
3 The classic reference to the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm is Alchian and Demsetz
(1972). See also, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rubin (1978), Klein and Leffler (1981).
More recently, Barzel (1987) has used this approach to explore the moral hazard aspects
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contemporary microeconomic theory, thanks to Coase. Nevertheless,
because he did not understand the true nature of Knight’s inquiry his
criticisms of Knight were mostly misplaced. Coase advanced the anal-
ysis of the firm within a neoclassical framework that accepts the choice
of product as given. He therefore assumed away the uncertainty which
Knight openly confronted. Coase argued that firms emerge because of
the costs of using the price mechanism, costs that can be reduced or
avoided by bringing more internal transactions within a single admin-
istrative network. But as Boudreaux (1986, pp. 127–128) correctly
asserted, this approach is more germane to questions of the firm size
(i.e., vertical integration) than to a theory of entrepreneurship.
Knight, like Schumpeter, was interested in explaining the nature of
economic progress in a market system, the chief components of which
are firms and entrepreneurs. By firm he meant a basic form of busi-
ness organization in which the entrepreneur takes direction, control,
and responsibility. Contracting alone does not capture the full role
of the entrepreneur for Knight (1921, p. 353) because “In the world
as it is the interests affected by contracts are never all represented
in the agreements.” In Knight’s view, entrepreneurs are more than
contractors. They are specialists at uncertainty bearing, and while
the contract is one way to reduce uncertainty, some uncertainty can
never be eliminated. For Knight (1921, p. 283), therefore, the size
of firms depends, among other things, upon the available supply of
entrepreneurial qualities.
10.3 Is the Firm the Entrepreneur?
Knight’s theory offered a balanced perspective on the functions of
risk-taking and management. It set up a broad class of entrepreneurs
because it did not limit the function of making provisional guaranties
to the possessor(s) of the ownership equity in the firm. Indeed, one
may have to move far up the management hierarchy in a Knightian
firm in order to locate the function of ultimate control. Knight main-
tained that management’s primary function is selection of people who
of entrepreneurship. In a more fundamental historical sense, the idea of the entrepreneur
as contractor harks back to Bentham.
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make the decisions required by operation of the firm. The basic struc-
ture of the decision-making organization is a hierarchy of functionaries
in which persons at each higher level select the functionaries below.
Therefore, each functionary leaves the consequences of his activity to
his selector, thereby continually shifting economic responsibility to a
higher level, until it finally rests with the controlling functionaries (i.e.,
the guarantors of the contractual remunerations of resource suppliers).
For Knight (1921, pp. 267–270, 276–277, 291–302), only this last deci-
sion is crucial; all subordinate decisions are routine, and consequently,
non-entrepreneurial.
In a paper published in 1944, James H. Stauss argued that Knight’s
theory, although logically correct, is neither the only solution to the
problem of entrepreneurial control nor the most relevant one. Stauss
claimed that the facts of modern business deny the notion of a unique
class having primacy in undertaking the functions of risk-taking and
management. He proposed that the appropriate frame of reference for
such undertakings is the firm. More specifically, he asserted that the
firm is the entrepreneur (Stauss, 1944, pp. 112, 117, 120).
According to Stauss, the central problem in defining entrepreneur-
ship is determination of the locus of control. He argued that Knight’s
entrepreneur is not unique because it is impossible to locate primacy
in exercising the function of control formally in any one class of the so-
called “entrepreneurs” grouped on the basis of some uniform relation
to the firm, such as possession of the ownership equity or extension of
provisional guaranties. “The circumstances of time and place demand
consideration in locating the controllers and deciding upon the impor-
tance of their decisions. Likewise, decision-making within jurisdictional
spheres is in the face of managerial problems of greater or less impor-
tance concerning the conduct of the firm. Cruciality of decisions is thus
a relative matter” (Stauss, 1944, p. 118).
Stauss justified his view on the basis of two developments of mod-
ern enterprise that Knight neglected: (1) the rise of the corporation, in
which the functions of ownership and decision making were largely sep-
arated and (2) the expansion of government regulation, which tended
to blur distinctions between ownership, regulation, and administra-
tion. Because of these developments, he argued that ownership was less
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important as a central relation of entrepreneurship than the decision-
making apparatus, which normally resides in the administrative struc-
ture of the firm. Even when the corporation is fully under private
ownership, Stauss (1944, p. 119) maintained that “other governmen-
tal agencies, and various authorities, may dominate the policies of the
firm in many respects, possibly to the extent of governing the selection
of hired executives.”
Stauss claimed affinity with Schumpeter, whose overall economic
framework he shared. This framework consists of an assembly of firms,
supply functionaries, consumers, and government. According to Stauss
traditional theories of entrepreneurship (including Knight’s), confuse
the actions of supply functionaries and some managerial laborers with
the actions of entrepreneurs. However, if the traditional perspective is
reversed so that the firm is the entrepreneur, then according to Stauss
(1944, p. 121), “the functionaries introducing new [Schumpeterian]
combinations would be, in the main, firms (old or new) acting through
their aggregates of individual members with specified powers of deci-
sion.” The new frame of reference would be competent to analyze the
basic responsibilities of laborers to yield productive services and to
initiate and continue relations with the firm, including the productive
services of managers that are not entrepreneurs.
Although it is provocative to think of the firm as the entrepreneur,
certain questions are raised by reversing the traditional concept of the
entrepreneur operating through the medium of the firm. Ultimately,
humans, not structures, make decisions; therefore, we must resolve the
question of what is the firm. Other questions also crowd in quickly.
What is the difference between a firm and a bureaucracy? Does the
firm size affect the origination and implementation of decisions? In
short, how does the view that the firm is the entrepreneur improve the
theory of entrepreneurship?
Successful firms tend to grow, and larger firms tend to be dominated
by rigid rules of conduct. The idea of the firm as the entrepreneur is
likely to be opposed, therefore, on grounds of methodological individ-
ualism. Stauss (1944, p. 126) rejected the notion that the firm is a
mere aggregation of decision makers having a collective will expressed
through a system of working rules. He proposed instead that the firm be
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treated as an accounting entity for purposes of general economic anal-
ysis, and as a particular, concrete institution when specific problems
need to be solved. But he did not explain how to make this dual idea
of the firm operational in economic theory, and after more than four
decades, it is virtually impossible to find any trace of Stauss’s influence
on subsequent writers.
10.4 Postscript
The distinction between the entrepreneur and the firm, and the matter
of their interchangeability, was seriously raised in the first half of the
20th century. These matters remain unsettled among contemporary
economists. Rather than melding the two into one entity, the sentiment
seems to be preserving a distinction, even if an ambiguous one, because
the notion of personality apart from human beings is opposed in most
quarters. Controversy on this subject has served to focus attention on
the relation – symbiotic or otherwise – between the entrepreneur and
the form of business organization within which he functions.
11
Conclusion
This essay began with a taxonomy of who the entrepreneur is and what
he does, according to how he has been exposited in economic literature.
Now that we have concluded our historical survey, we can complete the
taxonomy by associating certain writers with specific themes, mindful
that significant overlap exists between writers and themes. To reca-
pitulate, the various roles taken on by the entrepreneur in economics
literature are
1. The entrepreneur is the person who assumes the risk associ-
ated with uncertainty (e.g., Cantillon, Thünen, Mangoldt,
Mill, Hawley, Knight, Mises, Cole, and Shackle).
2. The entrepreneur is the person who supplies financial capi-
tal (e.g., Smith, Turgot, Böhm-Bawerk, Edgeworth, Pigou,
and Mises).
3. The entrepreneur is an innovator (e.g., Baudeau, Bentham,
Thünen, Schmoller, Sombart, Weber, and Schumpeter).
4. The entrepreneur is a decision maker (e.g., Cantillon,
Menger, Marshall, Wieser, Amasa Walker, Francis Walker,
Keynes, Mises, Shackle, Cole, and Schultz).
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5. The entrepreneur is an industrial leader (e.g., Say, Saint-
Simon, Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, Marshall, Wieser,
Sombart, Weber, and Schumpeter).
6. The entrepreneur is a manager or superintendent (e.g., Say,
Mill, Marshall, and Menger).
7. The entrepreneur is an organizer and coordinator of eco-
nomic resources (e.g., Say, Walras, Wieser, Schmoller,
Sombart, Weber, Clark, Davenport, Schumpeter, and
Coase).
8. The entrepreneur is the owner of an enterprise (e.g.,
Quesnay, Wieser, Pigou, and Hawley).
9. The entrepreneur is an employer of factors of production
(e.g., Amasa Walker, Francis Walker, Wieser, and Keynes).
10. The entrepreneur is a contractor (e.g., Bentham).
11. The entrepreneur is an arbitrageur (e.g., Cantillon, Walras,
and Kirzner).
12. The entrepreneur is an allocator of resources among alter-
native uses (e.g., Cantillon, Kirzner, and Schultz).
Our survey shows that throughout the ages theories of
entrepreneurship have been both static and dynamic. However,
upon reflection, it becomes obvious that only dynamic theories of
entrepreneurship have any significant operational meaning. In a static
world, there is neither change nor uncertainty. The entrepreneur’s
role in a static state could not be anything more than what is
implied above in item 2 (supplier of financial capital), item 6 (a
manager or superintendent), item 8 (the owner of an enterprise), or
item 9 (an employer of factors of production). In a static world, the
entrepreneur is a passive element because his actions merely consti-
tute repetitions of past procedures and techniques already learned
and implemented. Only in a dynamic world does the entrepreneur
become a robust figure. A dynamic environment is implied in each
of the remaining definitions.
Once we have eliminated purely static representations of the sub-
ject, the taxonomy of entrepreneurial theories can be simplified by
focusing on three major, intellectual traditions, each spawned by
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Cantillon. For purposes merely of identification, let us call these three
traditions the Chicago Tradition (Knight–Schultz), the German Tra-
dition (von Thünen–Schumpeter), and the Austrian Tradition (Mises–
Kirzner–Shackle).
This rather loose classification requires certain obiter dicta. To begin
with, the lines of connection are not as straightforward as might be
implied. Knight does not acknowledge Cantillon as the progenitor of
his own theory of entrepreneurship, but the filiation of the two the-
ories is too strong to ignore. Schultz (1980) openly aligns his theory
with Knight’s. The connection between von Thünen and Schumpeter,
however, is tenuous, as is the connection between von Thünen and
Cantillon. We base the linkage here more on convenience than historical
fact. There is a certain logic to this connection insofar as von Thünen
was the first to exposit the entrepreneur as an innovator in a language
shared by Schumpeter. Of the connection between von Thünen and
Cantillon, likewise, we have no direct evidence of linkage. There is no
doubt, however, of the connection between Mises and Kirzner.1 Shackle
appears as a parenthetical entry with the Austrians because his basic
concept of the entrepreneur is Austrian, but he separates himself from
them (and from other writers in this survey) by rejecting the equilib-
rium paradigm.
Despite its obvious oversimplifications, this classificatory scheme is
useful for several purposes. For example, it provides a quick overview of
the intellectual landscape. It emphasizes that those writers who most
advanced the subject of the entrepreneur did so in the context of eco-
nomic dynamics, and the equilibrium paradigm.2 Persistent themes in
this literature emphasize perception, uncertainty, and innovation (or
other special abilities). Some writers, such as Schumpeter, assert that
1 Cantillon appears to have influenced the Austrians through Menger, whose personal library
(now permanently residing at the Hitotsubashi University Library in Tokyo) contains
a copy of Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature du commerce en general. We are grateful to
Professor Chuhei Sugiyama for providing us a catalog to the contents of the Menger
Library.
2 Blaug (1986, p. 230n) reminds us that two decades after the publication of his Theory of
Economic Development, Schumpeter wrote a preface to the English translation in which
he stated that the arguments of the book “might usefully be contrasted with the theory
of [static] equilibrium, which explicitly or implicitly always has been and still is the center
of traditional theory.”
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the entrepreneur creates disequilibrium, while others, such as Kirzner,
argue that he restores equilibrium after some exogenous shock. But this
is a subtle difference which is of minor import to the overall understand-
ing of the entrepreneurial function in a dynamic economy. Schumpeter
certainly recognized the prevalence of other forces in the economy that
work to restore equilibrium.
Another dominant trait of economics literature on the subject is
that the entrepreneur should be defined according to function, not per-
sonality. However, Schumpeter (1954, pp. 896–897) cited two reasons
why a functional theory might not capture all of the entrepreneurial
gains or losses known to business practice. In the first place, the
entrepreneur who stands between the commodity and factor markets is
better placed to exploit favorable situations – to capture certain “left-
overs” or residuals. In the second place, whatever their nature in other
respects, practically speaking, entrepreneurs’ gains will almost always
bear some relation to monopolistic pricing.
We find the first of these arguments more compelling than the sec-
ond, especially in view of Kirzner’s (1973) attempt to clarify the dis-
tinction between competition and monopoly. By Kirzner’s reasoning,
true entrepreneurial gains have nothing to do with monopoly in its
“proper” sense, which implies only that entry barriers exist. The prob-
lem of who has a legitimate claim to economic leftovers is, however, a
thorny one that will, in our opinion, continue to plague the theory of
entrepreneurship for some time to come.
An issue that has marred the historical treatment of entrepreneur-
ship is whether the entrepreneur bears risk, uncertainty, or both. Early
discussions made little or no distinction between risk and uncertainty,
but all of that changed with the contribution of Frank Knight. Today
there is growing consensus that non-entrepreneurial decision making
takes place under conditions of risk, whereas entrepreneurial decision
making takes place under conditions of uncertainty (cf., Alvarez and
Busenitz, 2001, Loasby, 2002). The implications of this development
will be discussed further below.
Finally, contemporary economics continues to grapple with the
proper relationship of the entrepreneur to the firm. In some instances,
the entrepreneur is seen as a substitute for the firm; in others he is
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seen as the progenitor and guiding hand of the firm; it has even been
suggested that the entrepreneur is the firm.
11.1 Risk, Uncertainty, and Organization
There is a considerable appeal in the notion that everyone is a poten-
tial entrepreneur in one set of circumstances or another: the student,
housewife, laborer, retiree, etc. who must deal with disequilibrating
change (à la Shultz) or the person from any and all walks of life who
are simply alert to opportunity (à la Kirzner). But economic discourse
is dominated by the fact that entrepreneurs frequently organize firms
in order to assemble and coordinate the economic resources required to
exploit market opportunities.
Recently Alvarez and Barney (2005) have argued that firms are
established for different purposes. “Entrepreneurial firms are organized
under conditions of uncertainty,” they maintain, “and their primary
purpose is to solve transaction difficulties associated with the inability
to know the value of an exchange at the time that exchange is com-
menced.” By contrast, non-entrepreneurial firms “are organized under
conditions of risk, and their primary purpose is to solve transaction
difficulties associated with allocating the value that a transaction is
known to create among those that have made specific investments in
an exchange” (2005, p. 788). Recognition of these different purposes,
Alvarez and Barney contend, can not only help distinguish between
types of firms but also help define the boundary of entrepreneurship as
a research discipline.
The very fact that research boundaries are called for is a direct
consequence of the fractured nature of the subject of entrepreneurship,
which in turn is a consequence of its diverse historical evolution. Pur-
suit of the subject along the lines suggested by Alvarez and Barney
requires that researchers concentrate not on the personality attributes
of entrepreneurs that have been traditionally studied but rather on the
distinction between risk and uncertainty introduced by Frank Knight.
In the future, therefore, Knight may be more relevant to the subject of
entrepreneurship than Schumpeter, at least among management spe-
cialists who study entrepreneurship.
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Finding existing theories of how firms are organized inadequate,3
Alvarez and Barney develop a typology of entrepreneurial firms that
ranges from “clan-based” to “expert-based” to “charisma-based” orga-
nizations.4 Decision making in clan-based entrepreneurial firms is not
hierarchical – with a boss telling others what to do – but demo-
cratic; its leaders tend to search for a consensus among all those who
have made specific investments in the firm. As a result, clan-based
entrepreneurial firms are characterized by a high degree of trust on
the part of those involved in making transaction-specific investments.
Expert-based entrepreneurial firms employ a somewhat traditional
hierarchy, but the boss is chosen on the basis of his/her opportunity
cost of joining the firm rather than on the basis of his/her ability to
monitor and control. This “boss” is most likely to be someone having
expert knowledge essential to the firm’s success. Decision rights would
be centered on this expert, who may make or delegate critical deci-
sions. Charisma-based entrepreneurial firms are also hierarchical, but
the “boss” exercising control operates on the basis of his/her charisma
and vision rather than his/her specific expertise or ability to monitor
and adjust incentives. If other firm members share the entrepreneur’s
vision they give decision-making power to him/her. This “boss” would
establish residual claims in the organization.
The broader issue confronted by Alvarez and Barney is that
the distinction between risk and uncertainty helps to categorize
entrepreneurial behavior. Under risk-based theories it may be reason-
able to think of opportunities as objective phenomena waiting to be
discovered by entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973, Shane, 2003). But under
uncertainty-based theories entrepreneurs do not so much discover profit
3 The two theories of how firms are organized that currently dominate the literature are the
transactions cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and the incomplete contract theory
(Grossman and Hart, 1986).
4 A basic premise of this approach is that whether a decision to invest in a market oppor-
tunity is risky or uncertain depends on the objective properties of that investment, not
on the perceptions of decision makers. “[N]o matter how a decision maker feels or what
a decision maker believes or perceives about the outcomes of a decision, if the outcomes
of a decision are not certain, then they are either risky or uncertain. If prior experience
with that decision makes it possible to estimate a probability distribution associated with
a decision, then that decision is risky. If it is not possible to estimate such a probability
distribution, that decision is uncertain” (Alvarez and Barney, 2005, p. 779).
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opportunities as create them, often through their organizing efforts
(cf., Alvarez and Barney, 2005, p. 788. Among the ironies revealed by
their research, Alvarez and Barney recognize that because the condi-
tion of uncertainty is often not stable over time, the bases of organizing
entrepreneurial firms are not likely to be stable over time. In particular,
uncertainty-based firms may turn into risk-based firms once the prob-
ability distribution of outcomes associated with uncertain exchanges
are learned through experience. Entrepreneurial firms, in other words,
may be temporary, but their persistence is nevertheless a prerequisite
for the continual development of economic firms.
11.2 Past as Prologue
It is difficult if not impossible to predict the future course of research
on entrepreneurship. But several lessons can be learned from a study
of the intellectual past. One lesson is that the place of entrepreneur-
ship in economic theory is more a problem of method than a prob-
lem of theory. The history of economic theory clearly demonstrates
that the entrepreneur was squeezed from economics when the dis-
cipline attempted to emulate the physical sciences by incorporating
the mathematical method. Clearly, mathematics brought greater pre-
cision to economics, and thereby promised to increase its powers of
prediction. Yet the introduction of mathematics to economics (about
the time of Alfred Marshall) was a two-edged sword. Its sharp edge
cut through a tangled confusion of real world complexity, making
economics more tractable, and accelerating its theoretic advance. Its
blunt edge, however, bludgeoned one of the fundamental forces of
economic life – the entrepreneur. Since there was not then, and is not
now, a satisfactory mathematics to deal with the dynamics of eco-
nomic life, economic analysis gradually receded into the shadows of
comparative statics, and the entrepreneur took on a purely passive,
even useless, role.
Another historical lesson is that in its most fruitful phase, theorizing
about entrepreneurship has been part of a broader search for the basic
tenets of the dynamics of economic life. The dynamics of economic
life involve relations between people and relations of people to material
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things. As economics became more like a branch of mechanics, it struck
a kind of Faustian bargain in which its “soul” was sacrificed for a better
glimpse of the future (i.e., prediction). Yet this future should have been
suspect all along, because the static method totally represses change.
By contrast, dynamics is change, and more than anything else, change
is the province of the entrepreneur.
Does it matter that the entrepreneur is the person who provokes
change or merely adjusts to it? If we rely on the most elemental features
of entrepreneurship – perception, courage, and action – the answer is,
probably not. Entrepreneurial action means creation of opportunity as
well as response to existing circumstances. Entrepreneurial action also
implies that entrepreneurs have the courage to embrace risks in the face
of uncertainty. The failure of perception, nerve, or action renders the
entrepreneur ineffective. For this reason, we must look to these elements
for the distinctive nature of the concept, not to the circumstances of
action or reaction.
Just as theorizing about entrepreneurship has been most fruitful
when economists have concerned themselves with the dynamics of eco-
nomic life, so has it been least productive when economics has confined
itself to the world of statics. At the close of our inquiry, therefore, we
face the most basic of questions: What is the function of economics?
Is it to enable us to understand the foundations of economic life, or to
predict the course of events that are yet to happen? If it is the former,
we must take economic life as it is, with its imperfections, its risks, and
its uncertainties. If it is the latter, we are justified in extruding from
our theoretic models certain real life conditions, but we must become
aware of the costs of doing so.
We are finally confronted with the ultimate scientific dilemma. On
the one hand we may sacrifice realism to gain precision; on the other
hand, we may give up precision to gain realism. The choice we make
determines the place of the entrepreneur in economic theory. Ulti-
mately, the reason the entrepreneur is such an important subject of
economists’ interest is that his or her function and character penetrate
to the very core of economics and raise fundamental questions of eco-
nomic method that have never been resolved – indeed, have not even
been fully discussed in the economic light of day.
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Halévy, E. (1955), The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, translated
by Mary Morris. Boston: Beacon Press.
Harbison, F. (1956), ‘Entrepreneurial organization as a factor in eco-
nomic development’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, 364–379.
Hawley, F. B. (1892), ‘The fundamental error of Kapital and Kapi-
talzins’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 6, 280–307.
Hawley, F. B. (1893), ‘The risk theory of profit’. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 7, 459–479.
Hawley, F. B. (1900), ‘Enterprise and profit’. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 15, 75–105.
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Hébert, R. F. and A. N. Link (1988), The Entrepreneur: Mainstream
Views and Radical Critiques. New York: Praeger.
Hennings, K. H. (1980), ‘The transition from classical to neoclassical
economic theory: Hans von Mangoldt’. Kyklos 33, 658–682.
Hermann, F. B. W. (1832), Staatswirtschaftliche Untersuchungen Über
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